The 1996 UK ARbitration Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law: a contemporary analysis by Lembo, Sara
  
UNIVERSITA’ LUISS GUIDO CARLI 
FACULTY OF LAW  
  
 
PHD THESIS ON 
“INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW” 
XXI CYCLE  
 
 
 
 
THE 1996 UK ARBITRATION ACT  
AND THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
- A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS - 
 
 
By 
Sara LEMBO 
under the supervision of 
Prof. Bruno SASSANI 
 
 
 
 
Academic Year: 2006-2009 
Rome, January 2010 
  
 
 
“…[I]t was said that the existence of these powers reflected an 
attitude of suspicion and hostility on the part of the English legal 
establishment in general and on the part of the judiciary in 
particular towards a rival system of adjudication”.1 
                                                 
 
1  Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, A Report on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (HMSO, 1989), 
Chaired by The Rt Hon Lord Justice Mustill, at 5. 
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Abstract 
In the first chapter this thesis traces the development of 
arbitration from its early foundations to the well-established 
dispute resolution mechanism that it has become today. In 
particular, emphasis is placed on the tumultuous relationship 
that has existed between the judiciary and the autonomy of 
arbitration and, moreover, attention is drawn to the 
consequences of this ‘suspicious attitude’ on the part of the 
courts. Furthermore, the extent to which arbitration has become 
an alternative to litigation, and the reasons for such, is assessed 
in light of an examination of the inherent attributes of 
arbitration in solving commercial disputes in an international 
context.  
The locus of the Thesis turns to arbitration in the United 
Kingdom in Chapter 2. First, the statutory history of arbitration 
is charted and the need for change that prompted the 
Arbitration Act 1996 identified. Following this, the 1989 Report 
of the Departmental Advisory Committee that laid the 
groundwork for the radical change which the new Act would 
effect is considered. The object of the Thesis in this part is to 
make a novel contribution to academic discourse by examining 
the Committee’s reasoning for choosing not to adopt the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and, particularly, whether these reasons 
are still applicable two decades on. Finally, this chapter provides 
an overview of the Arbitration Act 1996. The guiding 
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philosophy, structure and primary tenets of the Statute are 
introduced and discussed.  
In the third chapter, an objective and comparative analysis is 
conducted in respect of certain provisions of the Arbitration Act 
1996 and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Four key areas have been 
identified as offering the most substantial differences between 
the two legislative frameworks and are the subject of acute 
examination, namely: arbitrability, seperability, competence of 
the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and judicial 
intervention at all stages in arbitral proceedings. Through the 
course of this comparison, a well-defined methodology is 
followed. First, the respective provision is introduced under the 
Arbitration Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Secondly, an 
objective analysis is discreetly conducted of each provision. 
Next, the critical comparative analysis between the 1996 Act 
provision and the UNCITRAL Model Law provision is 
undertaken. This is subsequently followed by a conclusion of the 
findings.   
Chapter 4 contains an empirical inquiry as to recent trends in 
international arbitration. Reference is made to a number of 
leading studies to highlight, in particular, those features of 
dispute settlement which concerned parties find attractive. Of 
the empirical data cited, an analysis in terms of the Thesis’ 
parameters is given. Furthermore, a specific case study of a 
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jurisdiction currently in the process of adopting the Model Law 
– Ireland – forms the final part of this chapter. 
The Conclusion of the Thesis draws these various strands 
together in attempt to decipher whether, in order to preserve 
London as a leading arbitral hub, England and Wales should 
adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law as the legislative regime in 
place of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
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1 ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF 
SETTLING DISPUTE 
It is incontrovertible that arbitration has become a significant 
alternative to litigation in the resolution of commercial disputes. 
A former President of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in 
England has perceived that “[t]he growth of arbitration, as an 
alternative to litigation, reflects its ability to escape from the limitations of 
the courts”.2 Indeed, the traditional arguments made in favour of 
arbitration are well known. Its attractiveness lies in the cost and 
time that can be saved as well as the ability to have disputes 
decided on familiar rules and to appoint an arbitrator with 
expertise of the industry sector. In the arena of international 
commerce, however, the advantages of arbitration are brought 
into sharper focus where businesses, faced with litigation outside 
of their home jurisdiction, may have to engage in foreign court 
proceedings which can be time-consuming, complicated and 
expensive. Further, a decision rendered in a foreign court has the 
potential to be unenforceable. Contrast this with the 
international recognition generally accorded to arbitral awards, in 
addition to well-defined procedure, and it is clear to see why 
businesses choose arbitration to settle disputes.  
A 2008 International Arbitration Study conducted by the Queen 
Mary University of London School of International Arbitration 
                                                 
 
2 The Right Hon. Sir Michael Kerr in Ronald Bernstein ed., Handbook of Arbitration 
Practice (Sweet and Maxwell, 1987), at 3. 
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indicated that 88% of the participating corporations preferred to 
use international arbitration as the method of settling their cross 
border disputes. This Study and the preceding 2006 
International Arbitration Study found that the major advantages 
of arbitration included the flexibility of procedure, enforceability 
of awards, privacy in the arbitral process, depth of expertise of 
arbitrators and the opportunity accorded to the parties to select 
their own arbitrators.3  
The following Chart illustrates the dispute resolution 
mechanisms that respondents in the Survey indicated they had 
experienced. 
 
                                                 
 
3  Queen Mary University of London School of International Arbitration, 
International Arbitration Study: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2008, sponsored by 
Price Waterhouse Coopers, available at: 
 <www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/International_arbitration.html>. 
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Indeed, much empirical data points to the conclusion that 
arbitration has achieved a more exclusive status than simply an 
alternative to litigation in international commerce. Rather, as 
Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter note, “[i]nternational arbitration 
has become the established method of determining international commercial 
disputes”. 4  In addition, leading arbitration law scholars Julian 
Lew, Loukas Mistelis and Stefan Kröll have asserted that “[f]or 
centuries arbitration has been accepted by the commercial world as a 
preferred or at least an appropriate system for dispute resolution”. 5  
Adopting a more sceptical account, Jan Paulsson argues that 
arbitration is often the only option for parties wishing to settle 
disputes in an international context as there is no other realistic 
choice. “[International arbitration] prevails by default; there exists no 
neutral international court for private-law disputes”.6 The object of this 
introductory chapter is to assess the theoretical foundations and 
to chart the growth of international commercial arbitration in an 
attempt, particularly, to identify the reasons for its present-day 
popularity. 
                                                 
 
4  Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter with Nigel Blackaby and Constantine 
Partasides, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (4th Edition, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2004), at 1. 
5 Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis and Stefan Kröll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International, 2003), at 18. 
6  Jan Paulsson, “International Commercial Arbitration”, Bernstein’s Handbook of 
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Practice in John Tackaberry, Arthur Marriot QC 
and Ronald Bernstein eds., (4th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 2003), at 335. 
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1.1 Arbitration – Theoretical Foundations  
Arbitration is a mechanism for settling disputes which provides 
a final, binding and enforceable result.7 A unique feature of this 
mechanism is that parties generally agree to participate in arbitral 
proceedings prior to the dispute arising. Furthermore, resolution 
of the dispute is always by way of an impartial third-party finding 
which may be appealed to a court of law. There is no single 
definition of arbitration but the Arbitration Act 1996 in the 
United Kingdom endeavours to describe the object of the 
process, namely “to obtain the fair resolution of disputes, by an impartial 
tribunal, without unnecessary delay or expense”.8  
From here we can build up a picture of the defining 
characteristics which are important to bear in mind as we move 
through this inquiry: a mechanism for resolving disputes, 
impartial tribunal, avoidance of unnecessary delay or expense.  
Many authors, however, point out that although the latter is 
commonly perceived to be the most significant distinguishing 
trait of arbitration as compared to litigation, it is not necessarily 
the case that arbitration is a quicker or cheaper alternative to 
litigation in present day commercial disputes. 9  Christopher 
                                                 
 
7 See Ercus Stewart, Arbitration: Commentary and Sources (First law, 2003), at 1.  
8 General Principles of the Arbitration Act 1996, section 1(a). 
9  See Christian Buhring-Uhle, “A Survey on Arbitration and Settlement in 
International Business Disputes: Advantages of Arbitration”, in Towards a Science of 
Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research, Christopher Drahozal and Richard Naimark 
eds. (Kluwer Law International, 2005), at 38.  
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Drahozal and Richard Naimark posit that “whether arbitration is 
faster or cheaper than litigation is a perennial question, and one of obvious 
importance to the parties’ choice of dispute resolution forum”. 10  In an 
empirical study appended to the insightful text Towards a Science of 
Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research, Christine Buhring-Uhle 
concludes “as a general result it could be said that, on balance, 
arbitration was seen as faster but not less expensive than litigation”.11  
One generally accepted characteristic associated with arbitration, 
however, which is not mentioned in the 1996 Act description is 
the role of ‘party autonomy’. In other words, the parties should 
be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject to 
safeguards necessary in the public interest.  
It is important to note at this stage that arbitration is consensual, 
parties to an arbitration agreement intend for their disputes to be 
resolved in this manner rather than litigation. This independent 
expression of intention is referred to as ‘party autonomy’. 
Usually, arbitration law attempts to accord immense significance 
                                                 
 
10 Christopher Drahozal and Richard Naimark, “Commentary”, in Towards a Science 
of Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research, Christopher Drahozal and Richard 
Naimark eds. (Kluwer Law International, 2005), at 20. 
11 The same finding was found by a study conducted by Kritzer & Anderson on 
American domestic arbitration which concluded that AAA arbitration was faster 
but not necessarily less expensive than litigation, see Kritzer  & Anderson, “The 
Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time, 
Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the 
Courts”, 8 Justice Systems Journal 6 (1983) cited in Christian Buhring-Uhle, “A 
Survey on Arbitration and Settlement in International Business Disputes: 
Advantages of Arbitration”, in Towards a Science of Arbitration: Collected Empirical 
Research, Christopher Drahozal and Richard Naimark eds. (Kluwer Law 
International, 2005), at 38. 
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to party autonomy. As Ercus Stewart points out “[a]rbitration is a 
method of dispute resolution. It is not ‘litigation without wigs’, nor is it 
supposed to be litigation by another name”. 12  Party autonomy, it is 
submitted, is the defining attribute of arbitration, especially 
when one considers that its origins lay in the concept of 
resolving disputes by and between merchants. It is perhaps 
surprising, therefore, that it does not feature in the 1996 Act’s 
initial purview of the arbitration mechanism. 
Some other characteristics of arbitration, which may vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, should also be identified. Arbitrators 
are often chosen by the parties upon mutual agreement and need 
not possess any particular qualifications. However, it is in the 
interests of an efficient and final solution that the arbitrator has 
a knowledge of the industry and the applicable law. There is 
generally a right afforded to the parties to appeal where either is 
not satisfied with the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. In 
addition to this interference by the courts, they are also 
permitted to intervene in arbitral proceedings at earlier stages, 
even before and during the arbitration itself.  
These comprise the key tenets that form the skeleton of arbitral 
procedure and it is now pertinent to see how these attributes 
have enabled arbitration to gain its pre-eminent reputation in the 
field of international dispute settlement. 
                                                 
 
12 Ercus Stewart, Arbitration: Commentary and Sources (First law, 2003), at 2.  
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1.2 The Growth of International Arbitration 
Arbitration is not, contrary to popular belief, a recent 
phenomenon. It has in fact “existed for as long as the common law” in 
England.13 As courts struggled to develop their jurisdiction at a 
rate consistent with the number and complexity of trade 
disputes in the rapidly growing sphere of international 
commerce, arbitration quickly became the dispute resolution 
mechanism of choice. Merchants insisted that it was far more 
effective if they themselves dealt with mercantile problems and 
they developed their own rules and procedures for resolving 
disputes. By the mid-seventeenth century in England, Karen and 
Andrew Tweeddale highlight that the power of the arbitral 
tribunal was, in some ways, greater than the courts. 14  This 
prompted the judicature, wishing to keep all matters legal within 
their jurisdiction, to assume a supervisory role over arbitration 
and began to intervene in the exercise of the arbitral tribunal.15 
In the late 19th century, international arbitration began to gather 
significant momentum but its governance remained the preserve 
of national law. With no international regulation of arbitration, 
the enforcement of awards was handled differently in different 
countries. This added yet a further complexity to international 
                                                 
 
13 Karen Tweeddale and Andrew Tweeddale, A Practical Approach to Arbitration Law 
(Blackstone Press, 1999), at 1. 
14 Ibid. 
15  See Lord Parker of Waddington, The History and Development of Commercial 
Arbitration (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1959), at 13.  
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arbitral procedure, especially when compounded with the 
multifarious legal regimes with which parties to an international 
arbitration had to grapple. 
Early efforts to regulate international arbitration are evident in 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 promoting the 
“Pacific Settlement of Disputes” which established the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. Over the decades that 
followed, the business community set up the International 
Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter “ICC”) and the Court of 
Arbitration, with the inception of the former occurring in 1919 
and the latter in 1923. These institutions helped to drive the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions on Arbitration and the 
Execution of Foreign Awards in 192316 and 192717 respectively, 
which have since been superseded by the New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 1958.18 These all represent early attempts at harmonising 
arbitration law on an international scale.  
                                                 
 
16 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, (Geneva, 24 September 1023). 
17 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign arbitral awards (Geneva, 26 
September 1927). 
18 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958). This Convention was the result of 
unsatisfactory results of the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and 
the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927. In 
this framework, the  International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) played a very key 
role in that it took the  initiative to replace the Geneva treaties and issued a 
preliminary draft convention in 1953. Working on the ICC’s initiative, in 1955, the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council drafted an amended version of the 
convention which was discussed in May-June 1958 and led to the establishment of 
the New York Convention. 
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In an effort to break down the remaining barriers to 
international trade as a result of the disparities in national trade 
laws, the United Nations General Assembly established the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(hereinafter “UNCITRAL") in 1966. The mandate given to the 
UNCITRAL in this task was to “further the progressive harmonisation 
and unification of the law of international trade”.19 The Commission is 
now the principal legal body of the United Nations system as 
regards international trade law and is composed of sixty member 
States elected by the General Assembly. Its principal 
contributions to international arbitration law include the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
The former set of rules was adopted by the General Assembly in 
1976 and according to Jan Paulsson “were prepared with the input of 
lawyers from round the world, and therefore thought to be more acceptable to 
parties from developing countries than the rules of institutions perceived as 
inspired by the Western capitalist ethos”. 20  Latterly, in 1985, the 
UNCITRAL adopted a Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law quickly attained popularity on the 
international plane given that, as Lew, Mistelis and Kröll 
describe, they “…are autonomous and suitable for use in almost every 
                                                 
 
19 United Nations Resolution 2205 (XXI) on the Establishment of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
20  Paulsson, “International Commercial Arbitration”, Bernstein’s Handbook of 
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Practice in John Tackaberry, Arthur Marriot QC 
and Ronald Bernstein eds., note 6, at 345. 
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kind of arbitration in every part of the world…[and they]…deal with 
every aspect of arbitration from the formation of the tribunal to rendering an 
award”.21 In fact, more than 53 countries have adopted the 1985 
Model Law in the last twenty years.  
Today, the Model Law provides an essential legal framework for 
arbitration procedure in many jurisdictions around the world. It 
sets out the fundamentals of a national arbitration law including, 
the form of the arbitration agreement, the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal, the jurisdiction of the tribunal, elementary 
procedural rules, the award, and recognition and enforcement. 
Robert Merkin notes that “[t]he Model Law in most respects follows 
the terms of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules so far a those rules deal 
with these matters”. 22  Its widespread adoption by States, 
institutions and ad hoc tribunals such as the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal highlights its utility in solving a variety of disputes, as 
well as its inherent flexibility to adapt to different forums of 
application. 
The Model Law is characterised by a number of notable aspects. 
The first is the importance of party autonomy accorded to all 
phases of the arbitration. This is, however, subject to default 
procedures where no agreement has been reached by the parties. 
The second noteworthy feature is the right of parties and the 
                                                 
 
21 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, note 5, at 
26. 
22 Robert Merkin, Arbitration Law, (3rd Ed., Informa Business Publishing, 2004), at 
7. 
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arbitrators, in contrast to the position in most domestic arbitral 
frameworks, not to apply the domestic law of the forum to the 
procedural aspects of the arbitration. Third, the role of the 
courts in the arbitral process is severely restricted. Their 
involvement is limited to the appointment of arbitrators where 
no agreement exists, the hearing of challenges to arbitrators, the 
replacement of arbitrators unwilling to act, the determination of 
preliminary issues as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators on 
appeal from their decision on the point, providing assistance 
with obtaining evidence and the setting aside of awards on 
certain grounds. A final and highly significant tenet of the Model 
Law is that it does not provide for a right to appeal against an 
error of law.  
An apparent blow was dealt to this sweeping global legislative 
regime in 1989 when the Departmental Advisory Committee 
(hereinafter “DAC”) in the United Kingdom decided not to 
adopt the Model Law framework in England and Wales. Instead, 
it proposed an alternative reform of its antiquated arbitration law 
by enacting the Arbitration Act 1996.23 Although expressly not a 
wholesale incorporation of the Model Law, it is, in many 
respects, tantamount to such. Notably, however, critical 
differences between the two legislative frameworks exist. 24  
                                                 
 
23 A comprehensive discussion of the Departmental Advisory Committee’s Report 
in 1989 will follow in Chapter 2. 
24 A comparative analysis of the two legislative frameworks will form the subject-
matter of Chapter 3. 
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Arbitration remains broadly successful since, according to the 
2008 International Arbitration Study, 92% of arbitration 
disputes are resolved at some stage through the arbitration 
proceedings. Furthermore, in the same study, the overwhelming 
majority of participating corporations indicated that they were 
satisfied with international arbitration. Among the 5% of 
respondents who were disappointed with arbitration, concerns 
stemmed from the spiralling costs and increased delays in 
arbitral proceedings.25 Through the course of this inquiry, the 
systemic causes of these disabling traits will be identified and 
both quantitatively as well as qualitatively analysed in the various 
jurisdictions under examination.  
*  *  * 
The object of this thesis will be to determine which legislative 
regime better promotes arbitration as a mechanism for the 
resolution of commercial disputes. In particular, the fact that 
one of the world’s leading arbitration centres has declined to be 
party to a growing international legislative regime is curious and 
its decision to adopt its own scheme to regulate arbitration 
prompts many questions. It is highly fruitful both in an academic 
and practical sense, therefore, to evaluate whether the DAC 
                                                 
 
25  Queen Mary University of London School of International Arbitration, 
International Arbitration Study: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2008, note 8. 
 24
made the right choice in its rejection of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and, specifically, if the 1996 Act adequately safeguards 
London in the intended way. Moreover, consideration will be 
given to whether, in light of contemporary developments in the 
field of arbitration, it is appropriate to re-evaluate the legislative 
framework in the United Kingdom as regards arbitral procedure.  
In pursuance of the former line of inquiry, this thesis will begin 
with a deliberation of the DAC’s findings in 1989. Careful 
judgment will be passed on whether the analysis offered and 
conclusions drawn then have the same relevance today. 
Admittedly, this is engaged in with benefit of hindsight but it is 
nevertheless important to conduct given that such a 
consideration has much normative value for the present thesis. 
As this report underpins the decision to adopt the Arbitration 
Act as opposed to the UNCITRAL Model Law and, in addition, 
helped to shape the contours of the aforementioned Act, it is 
crucial that its content is tested for its continuing validity. 
The third chapter of this thesis will adopt a methodical 
examination of the Arbitration Act 1996 and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. First, those provisions existent within the Act which 
present a substantive difference with the Model Law will be 
identified. These will then be subject to an individual inquiry, 
charting their development through jurisprudence and academic 
commentary. With a detailed picture of these provisions and 
their consequential product as borne out through the case law at 
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hand, it is intended to draw objective lines of analysis as to the 
present state of arbitration law under the Act. In particular, a 
critical reflection on the modalities of, and the attitude of the 
English judiciary to, arbitration will be made but, fundamentally, 
this will be conducted through the lens of a need to preserve the 
pre-eminent status of arbitration as a dispute settlement 
mechanism.  
For each of the provisions analysed, the counterpart provision 
under the Model Law will be objectively examined in a similar 
way. Consideration will be given to the effects of the provisions 
of this legislative framework in the various jurisdictions in which 
it has been enacted.  
Next, a comparative analysis – the intended axis around which 
this thesis is built – between the Arbitration Act 1996 and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law will ensue. From this, it will be possible 
to construct arguments as to which offers a better legislative 
framework for arbitration in the United Kingdom.  
The final substantive element of this thesis will look to the 
recent trends in arbitration around the world, both in terms of 
the needs of parties to arbitration and also jurisdictional and 
institutional developments in arbitral procedure. In particular, 
empirical data will be interpreted with a view to determine the 
direction of international commercial arbitration. Furthermore, 
resort will be had to changes that are occurring in certain 
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jurisdictions – specifically Ireland – and the likely impact that 
this will have on the popularity of London as a seat of 
arbitration.   
By this wealth of analysis – objective, functional, comparative 
and empirical – it is hoped that a strong foundation is laid on 
which to compose pragmatic conclusions for the future 
advancement of UK arbitration law. Herein will feature the case 
for the adoption of the Model Law on the basis of a rigorous 
intellectual examination of each legislative framework – 1996 
Act and Model Law, theoretically sound reasoning and having 
reference to the emerging themes in leading arbitral jurisdictions 
around the world. 
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2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARBITRATION LAW IN ENGLAND 
London has long been a leading hub for international 
commercial arbitration due to its pre-eminence as the centre for 
shipping, insurance, commodity, and financing businesses. 
Arbitration became ubiquitous in London, not least because of 
the volume of commercial transactions and, inevitably, disputes 
which occurred there. In addition, however, Alexander 
Goldštajn highlights the traditional link between a centre of 
arbitration and the application of national law. Typically, it was 
more convenient for the arbitrator to apply the law of the 
country of which he was a national when required in arbitral 
proceedings. 26  England, as the home of the common law, 
offered a familiar legal regime and a host of specialists suitable to 
act as arbitrators. These factors placed London firmly on the 
map as an arbitration centre of choice for businesses the world 
over.  
Given the prominence of London as an international arbitration 
centre it was essential that the law developed to cater for the 
needs of those choosing it as a seat. Tweeddale and Tweeddale 
express the development of arbitration law in England as falling 
into six distinct periods. Common law governed arbitral 
proceedings until legislative provision was first made in the 
                                                 
 
26 Alexander Goldštajn, “Choice of International Arbitrators, Arbitral Tribunals 
and Centres: Legal and Sociological Aspects”, in Essays on International Commercial 
Arbitration, Petar Šarčević ed., (Brill, 1989), at 46. 
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Statute 9 & 10 Will 3, c.15 of 1698. Then, further statutory 
provision was made in the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 
before the first specific Arbitration Act was enacted in 1889. 
The Arbitration Act was revised at various chronological 
intervals until the most recent Act - the subject of this thesis - in 
1996.27 
The 1996 Act was preceded by the Arbitration Act 1950. The 
latter came under increasingly acute criticism in a number of 
respects in the 1980s and early 1990s, prompting calls for a total 
overhaul of arbitration law in the United Kingdom. From a 
structural point of view, the arrival of the Model Law brought 
the deficiencies of the 1950 Act into sharp focus. In fact, “[i]ts 
logic was indefensibly illogical and caused confusion and difficulty to those 
trying to comprehend it.28 Furthermore, there existed no rules for 
arbitral procedure and it lacked any reference to party autonomy. 
Rutherford and Sims note that “[i]t was largely preoccupied with the 
relationship between arbitration and the courts”. 29  In addition, the 
technique which had been utilised in its drafting was often that 
of ‘deeming provisions’, whereby, unless a contrary intention 
was expressed to a particular provision, some condition would 
be deemed by that provision.  
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The provision which had attracted most criticism under the 1950 
Act was the case stated mechanism.30 This entitled the arbitrator 
to state any question of law which had arisen during the hearing 
or the award, in the form of a special case to the High Court. 
Although the merit of such of a procedure was evident given 
that it ensured arbitrator’s decisions were in accordance with law 
and, further, it enabled the law to develop in a meaningful way, 
its demise was facilitated by recourse to this procedure as a 
delaying tactic. Such an abuse undermined the advantages which 
arbitration offered as an efficient dispute resolution procedure.  
One of the most controversial cases in this regard was that of 
Coppee-Lavalin NV v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd.31 There, 
an application was made to an English court for an order that 
the respondent provide security for its costs on the basis that 
Ken-Ren was an insolvent company. The International Chamber 
of Commerce Rules governed the conduct of the arbitration and 
it was argued by Ken-Ren that, therefore, the English courts had 
no power to intervene. Coppee-Lavalin argued that there was a 
residual power of the court to order security, although it 
conceded that such a power should only be used in exceptional 
circumstances. The House of Lords held that it did have the 
power to order the respondent to provide security and that there 
were exceptional circumstances justifying the order.  
                                                 
 
30 Section 21, Arbitration Act 1950. 
31 [1995] 1 AC 38. 
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Meanwhile, international arbitration centres began to be 
established outside London with many aggressively pursuing 
arbitration business. “The Netherlands, France, Sweden and the Far 
East tried to seize a share of the multi-million pound industry”.32  
The 1979 Arbitration Act was an attempt to redress the 
disincentives which were turning parties away from London. 
Crucially, it removed the case stated procedure and replaced it 
with an alternative appeal process. Under the Act, appeals were 
to be heard exclusively on points of law with leave for appeal 
having to be sought beforehand. Through a string of cases,33 
however, the House of Lords had to temper the scope of the 
appeals procedure to ensure that it too was not abused. 
Nevertheless, the 1979 Act received its share of disapproval: 
“Some have criticised the 1979 Act for having been rushed through the 
legislative process with indecent haste, some say that it was ill-prepared, 
made in response to pressure from the international community”.34 
Mindful of this and especially the momentum the UNCITRAL 
Model Law was gaining, the British government initiated the 
Departmental Advisory Committee to consider whether the UK 
should adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the DAC concluded that the UNCITRAL Model Law should 
                                                 
 
32 Rutherford and Sims, Arbitration Act 1996: A Practical Guide, note 28, at 6. 
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AC 724, the House of Lords laid down the Nema guidelines to which the right of 
appeal would be subjected.  
34 Rutherford and Sims, Arbitration Act 1996: A Practical Guide, note 28, at 6. 
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not be adopted in England. In June 1989, Lord Justice Mustill, 
the chair of the Committee, published a report which, although 
rejecting the Model Law, approved of its presentation and logic 
(hereinafter “DAC Report”).35 
The DAC outlined its reasons for the rejection of the Model 
Law in England and Wales as follows. First, given that the 
Model Law provides only for international commercial 
arbitrations, the DAC noted in its report that the introduction of 
it in England would lead to a divorcing of arbitral regimes: 
domestic and international. The former being governed by the 
Arbitration Act and the latter by the Model Law. Secondly, 
wholesale adoption of the Model Law would remove the existing 
power of the English courts to correct errors of law. The 
consequence of such was thought unsatisfactory, leaving those 
aggrieved by an error in law without a sufficient remedy. The 
third concern of the DAC related to the existing law, legal 
framework and experience of lawyers and arbitrators in England. 
The DAC felt that the Model Law did not resemble a typical 
English statute and, as a result, those involved in arbitral 
procedure would be required to substantially revise their existing 
wealth of knowledge and established approach. Further, 
although it was accepted that many of the principles enumerated 
                                                 
 
35  Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, A Report on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, note 1.  
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in the Model Law may benefit the legal framework for 
arbitration in England, others may be damaging. 
In the alternative, the DAC highlighted that the Model Law was 
most suited to those jurisdictions with no developed arbitration 
law or with a practically redundant corpus of arbitration law. 
England, however, was not such a jurisdiction given its 
developed law as well as its standing as a prominent hub of 
commerce. In sum, the Committee did not consider the 
adoption of the Model Law an adequate solution to the 
problems that London faced as an arbitral centre. Substantial 
statutory reform was, instead, thought the most appropriate way 
forward. 
The DAC’s terms of reference in initiating the reform of 
arbitration law in England was to safeguard London as a leading 
arbitration centre. Many other jurisdictions were meeting the 
needs of parties to arbitral agreements by developing their 
arbitration law in such a way as to make it both accessible and 
intelligible to the layman. 36  This was an advantage that the 
UNCITRAL Model Law had over the Arbitration Acts existing 
in England. Undoubtedly, this influenced the decision to ensure 
                                                 
 
36 For example Australia’s International Arbitration 1974 concerning procedures for 
international arbitration, covering all international commercial arbitrations 
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the Arbitration Act 1996 was drafted in a straightforward, yet 
comprehensive manner. It is indeed widely praised for having 
achieved this object.37 As Lord and Salzedo comment, “[t]here is 
no doubt that replacing four Acts with one will make the statutory law 
easier to find. It is also true that the Act is written in plainer English than 
was the previous legislation”. 38  Consequentially, however, it is 
inevitable that detail is sacrificed at the hands of simplicity and 
these authors go on to caution that “ …some of the precision and 
certainty of the previous law has been lost, especially when it is unclear 
whether a change in language involves a change in substance or makes the 
old case law redundant.”39 
2.1 The DAC Report: A Contemporary Rebuttal 
The British government, in response to the growing concern as 
to the state of English arbitration law at the time, set up the 
Departmental Advisory Committee to review whether 
UNCITRAL should be adopted in the UK. A profound 
consideration of the DAC Report is crucial to this thesis given 
its significant role in the shaping of UK arbitration law as it 
stands today. It has already been noted that the DAC strongly 
objected to the adopting of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a 
wholesale legislative framework in the UK but the 
                                                 
 
37 Richard Lord and Simon Salzedo, A Guide to the Arbitration Act 1996 (2nd Ed., 
Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2001). 
38 Ibid., in ‘Introductory Chapter’ 
39 Ibid. 
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recommendations exposited in the report, which have not yet 
been systematically examined, will form the remaining subject-
matter of this Chapter. It is hoped that this analysis – a critical 
reflection of the propositions made by the DAC in light of the 
current state of arbitration law in the UK - will strengthen the 
arguments in favour of adopting the Model Law and contribute 
to the intellectual rigour of this thesis.  
An appropriate point of departure for the analysis is to outline 
the seven primary recommendations put forward by the 
Committee in respect of a sought-after Arbitration Act. The 
DAC advocated the following characteristics for the proposed 
legislative scheme: 
(a) It should comprise a statement in statutory form of the 
more important principles of the English law of 
arbitration, statutory and (to the extent practicable) 
common law. 
(b) It should be limited to those principles whose existence 
and effect are uncontroversial. 
(c) It should be set out in a logical order, and expressed in 
language which is sufficiently clear and free from 
technicalities to be readily comprehensible to the layman. 
(d) It should in general apply to domestic and international 
arbitrations alike, although there may have to be 
exceptions to take account of treaty obligations. 
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(e) It should not be limited to the subject matter of the 
Model Law.  
(f) It should embody such of our proposals for legislation as 
have by then been enacted. 
(g) Consideration should be given to ensuring that any such 
new statute should, so far as possible, have the same 
structure and language as the Model Law, so as to 
enhance its accessibility to those who are familiar with the 
Model Law. 
These principles illustrate that the consideration given by the 
Departmental Advisory Committee was, perhaps, not quite as 
adept as is typically thought. The tenor of the DAC Report 
suggests that the lessons it took from the Model Law - as 
expressed through these guiding principles - were rather 
concerned with presentation, logic and accessibility. It occurs to 
the Author that these recommendations speak to the form that a 
new legislative framework was to take in contradistinction to any 
purported substance. Despite the fact that, strictly speaking, 
these recommendations were beyond the mandate given to the 
Departmental Advisory Committee (since it was asked to advise 
on whether or not the Model Law should be adopted), once a 
decision to include suggestions for the development of 
arbitration law which were likely to have a profound influence, 
these should at least have included some of the more substantive 
elements of the Model Law. For example, it is notable that the 
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issue of court intervention, one of the catalysts for the reform 
movement in the UK, is not addressed in any of these seven 
recommendations.  
The following comments of Lord Justice Saville seem to 
characterise the problem as viewed by the DAC at the time: 
“Our law has built up over a very long time indeed. In the main the 
developments have come from cases, but in addition, from as early as 1698, 
Parliament has passed legislation dealing with the law of arbitration. To a 
large degree this legislation has been reactive in nature, putting right 
perceived defects and deficiencies in the case law. Thus it is not easy for 
someone new to English arbitration to discover the law, which is spread 
around a hotchpotch of statutes and countless cases”.40 
This focus on codification and accessibility – desirable though 
these norms admittedly are – may have meant that the need for 
substantive alteration of arbitral law to some extent became less 
of a concern, or was overlooked. These remarks are made purely 
in light of a holistic consideration of the DAC Report given in 
1989. Next, a closer analysis of individual propositions contained 
in the text of that Report is required.  
2.1.1 The UNCITRAL Model Law: Suitable Candidates  
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The Report promptly concluded that the Model Law would not 
provide a suitable legislative framework for the United 
Kingdom. In the alternative, the DAC suggested that there were 
four broad categories of states to whom the UNCITRAL Model 
Law was primarily directed: 
(1) States with no developed law and practice in the field of 
arbitration. 
(2) States with a reasonably up-to-date body of arbitration 
law which has not been greatly used in practice. 
(3) States with an outdated or inaccessible body of arbitration 
law. 
(4) States with an up-to-date body of arbitration law, and 
with a sufficient volume of arbitrations over a sufficient 
period to have permitted the growth of an expertise in 
putting their law into practice.41 
The author considers that the DAC’s perception in this regard is 
somewhat troubling. A number of states, which seemingly do 
not fit into these categories had, or have since, enacted the 
Model Law. The USA (California, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Oregon and Texas), Singapore, Australia, Canada, 
Germany and Norway come to mind in this respect. It follows 
that the categories are, to some extent, redundant today given 
that they do not comprise all states which have now adopted the 
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UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, note 1, at 10. 
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Model Law. Furthermore, one of the criticisms of UK 
arbitration law at the time that the DAC had to address was the 
inaccessibility of the law. Bearing in mind the descriptions that 
Committee provide for each group, it seems that the UK system 
would have fitted squarely into the third category: “[f]or states 
within the third category, enactment of the Model Law will bring their 
arbitration law up-to-date and at the same time render it more easily 
accessible to the legal and business communities”.42 
The DAC noted in the Report a factor which, in their view, was 
essential to take into consideration: “The number of states which have 
so far enacted, or are planning to enact the Model Law, is modest and some 
major trading nations have recently enacted legislation which is inconsistent 
with the Model Law.”43 
The number of States which have now adopted the Model Law 
stands at sixty-eight. This is far from being an insubstantial 
number. It should be conceded that the majority of these 
nations adopted the Model Law following the DAC Report but 
this in itself serves to illustrate that, 20 years on from the DAC 
Report, the UNCITRAL Model Law is worth reconsidering in 
the light of contemporary developments. Furthermore, the 
Committee stated that: “…the fact remains, however, that of those 
nations where practically all of the world’s truly international arbitrations 
are currently held none have so far shown any signs of an intention to enact 
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the Model Law unaltered, although some have decided to use it as a 
pattern.”44 
In this respect the abovementioned states, particularly the 
emerging arbitral centres such as in Norway and Germany, 
provide sound examples for rebutting such an assertion. The 
adoption by these states in particular, and, more generally, the 
increasingly widespread acceptance of the Model Law illustrate 
not only its substantive appeal and workability in a variety of 
jurisdictions but, in addition, it serves to obviate the increasingly 
isolated position of London, an arbitral hub which does not exist 
in a jurisdiction in which the Model Law has been adopted. 
A final point that should be made having regard to 
implementation is the value that the DAC accorded to 
harmonisation. The DAC noted that considerations of 
harmonisation as an end in itself carry very much less weight 
than considerations relating to the intrinsic merits of the Model 
Law. Lord Steyn has stated in a relatively recent article that, 
“[n]ot all the reasons put forward in 1989 for not adopting the Model Law 
seem as compelling today as they did then”.45 It is urged that this is 
directly on point with respect to the issue of harmonisation. 
Indeed he highlights that the Departmental Advisory 
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Committee, in their Report, noted at the time: “The arguments in 
favour of enacting the Model Law in the interests of harmonisation, or 
thereby keeping in step with other nations, are of little weight. The majority 
of trading nations, and more notably those to which international 
arbitrations have tended to gravitate, have not chosen thus to keep in 
step.”46 
This, he contends, is no longer an acceptable assertion and 
further illustrates the outmoded nature of the Report today. 
“That was a judgment made four years after the publication of the Model 
Law. Today one would have to revise that judgment”.47 Although it is 
important to point out that Lord Steyn remains supportive of 
the rejection of the Model Law in England, it is interesting for 
the purposes of the present analysis that he accepts the original 
reasons for such may not have relevance today. 
The Author would submit that the importance of harmonisation 
carries much more weight today than in did in the late 1980’s for 
three primary reasons. First, the nature of business has changed 
significantly and in modern commerce, as a result of increasing 
globalisation, it is fundamental that businesses be able to trade 
multilaterally in an efficient fashion. Second, the arbitral 
landscape has changed around the world. Not only has it 
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become more ubiquitous as a method of dispute resolution but, 
further, a number of arbitral centres have emerged since the 
publication of the DAC Report in 1989. Finally, the recent 
economic crisis brings into sharp focus the fragility of 
international trade and illustrates that there is a persisting need 
for governments not to take inward investment for granted. The 
challenge now is to make trade as attractive as possible; 
harmonisation of arbitration laws, amongst other factors, is part 
of this overarching project.  
2.1.2 Substantive Analysis 
From paragraph 86 of the Report, the DAC engage in a 
consideration of individual articles of the Model Law to which 
this examination will now turn. It is difficult to refrain from 
commenting on the cursory manner in which the DAC 
undertakes this analysis. Each article is considered somewhat 
superficially and little explanation is offered as to the actual 
effect the respective articles would have on the law of arbitration 
in the UK. The Committee defend this, “[w]e see little purpose in 
burdening this report with a lengthy discussion of these various changes”.48 
The  Author(s) would like to have seen a more detailed analysis 
in respect of each article of the Model Law and especially a 
greater emphasis on the effect that each would bring in practice. 
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It should be noted that the Report posits that “[t]he impact of each 
Article is set out in Part II of the Consultative Document [in Appendix 
2]”, although little attempt is made to anticipate the likely effect 
of each article even in this more detailed consideration. In the 
body of the Report, however, the Committee simply decided to 
characterise the provisions within the ambit of its consideration 
according to three groupings:  
1. Provisions which would be beneficial or neutral; 
2. Provisions where the benefits were debateable; and  
3. Provisions which would be detrimental.  
A critical analysis of the categorisation of certain articles of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as well as the commentary provided by 
the DAC on each of these will presently ensue. As is notable 
from the title of the categories, a purely objective consideration 
of the articles which formed the subject of examination was not 
conducted. By categorising in this manner, the direction of the 
ensuing analysis is, to some extent, predetermined. In particular, 
it is argued that such a framework is likely to have constricted a 
holistic analysis of the effect of each provision.  
The Author perceives that such an approach is most evident in 
respect of the consideration of Article 16 of the Model Law. 
This concerns the competence of the tribunal to rule on its own 
jurisdiction – a principle which, as will be adverted to later in 
this thesis, had not been on the English Statute Book until the 
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enactment of the Arbitration Act in 1996, despite it being widely 
accepted in jurisdictions around the world. Nevertheless, the 
Committee concluded that this was a provision of the Model 
Law whose substantive benefits were debateable. Although 
noting that it would “put beyond doubt that separability of the 
arbitration agreement is recognised by English law”,49 they went on to 
undermine the benefit of such by introducing an antithetical 
factor to the notion of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The Report 
asserts that the codification of such a principle “would in practice 
impose undesirable time and cost constraints on the procedure for challenging 
the jurisdiction of arbitrators”.50 The Author would argue that the 
placing on a statutory footing of this principle would be likely to 
have the diametrically opposite effect to that described by the 
DAC. Where competence is shifted from the courts to 
arbitrators as regards ruling on jurisdiction, the very benefit of 
such a move is to speed up the arbitral procedure, and, in 
addition, to make it more economical by reducing the costs 
associated with proceedings in court. It may be speculated that 
the DAC considered such a conferral of jurisdiction to operate 
in addition to, rather than by way of substituting a hearing in the 
courts on this ground. On the contrary, it is submitted that the 
very essence of the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is to 
transfer jurisdiction from the courts to the arbitrator and thus 
strengthen the procedural foundation of the latter. The 
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exposition provided for in the appendix appears to confirm that 
this is what the DAC envisaged: “The Model Law provides that the 
arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction; it enjoins a prompt 
raising of the issue; and provides for a right to seek a decision on the 
tribunal’s ruling within 30 days. In English law the position is that the 
court has the last word, without the procedural and time constraints of the 
Model Law.”51 
We turn now to the more detailed consideration of each article 
provided for in the Appendix of the DAC Report. The Author 
would first like to discuss Article 5 of the Model Law and the 
manner in which it is dealt with by the DAC. Article 5 of the 
Model Law concerns the curtailment of judicial intervention in 
the arbitral process. The DAC Report highlights the uncertainty 
as to the scope of Article 5 and the difference in opinion over its 
purpose, which the Committee noted “have presented a number of 
conceptual difficulties”, although it refrained from recalling these in 
the Report.52 However, it is submitted on the contrary that the 
effect of Article 5 is quite clear. It restricts the intervention of 
the court to a defined arena. Within this boundary it is evident 
that intervention may only occur in the circumstances envisaged 
by Article 34(2) and also to Articles 11(3), (4), 13(3), 14(1), 16(3) 
and 27. Further, within the allotted field, judicial intervention 
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may only take place in the case of “recourse to a court against an 
arbitral award”, by means of setting aside or remission.  
*   *   * 
 
The following extract from the Report appears to appropriately 
capture the key tenets which later emerged in the Arbitration 
Act: “The ideal system of arbitration law in the view of the Committee is 
one which gives the parties and their arbitrators a legal underpinning for the 
conduct of disputes which combines the maximum flexibility and freedom of 
choice in matters of procedure with a sufficiently clear and comprehensive set 
of remedies which will permit the coercive, supportive and corrective powers of 
the courts to be invoked when, but only when, the purely consensual 
relationships have broken down.”53 
The key phrase here is ‘set of remedies which will permit the 
coercive, supportive and corrective powers of the courts to be 
invoked’. This confirms that the DAC had in mind that the 
courts must retain an element of control over the arbitral 
process and goes a long way to explaining the subsequent 
differences which emerged in the Arbitration Act. The balance 
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between the autonomy of the arbitral process and judicial 
intervention as set out in this closing paragraph is akin to that 
which appears in the 1996 Act. This only reinforces the assertion 
that the DAC Report had an influential role in the shaping of 
UK arbitration law as it presently stands and thus the need to 
critically reflect on the findings of the Report in an effort to 
determine what is best for the procedure of arbitration today is 
apt. In particular, it is submitted that the most important 
consideration today - contrary to the findings of the DAC in 
1989 - is harmonisation, given the increasingly globalised nature 
of business and also bearing in mind that many new countries 
have adopted the UNICTRAL Model Law since the DAC made 
their determination. In the current economic climate, it is 
essential that the UK is not left behind. 
2.2 The Arbitration Act 1996:  an Overview  
The DAC Report prompted the parliamentary drafting of a new 
Arbitration Bill which became law in 1996. The Act has been 
described as “probably the most radical piece of legislation in the history of 
English arbitration law” 54  given its comprehensive nature. The 
drafting history of the Bill reveals that the legislature very much 
intended this. Initially, the long title of the Act read “An Act to 
consolidate with amendments the Arbitration Acts 1950, 1975 
and 1979 and related enactments”, however, it later became “An 
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Act to restate and improve the law relating to arbitration pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement; to make other provision relating to arbitration and 
arbitration awards; and for connected purposes”.55 
Although it is common for national legislation to avoid defining 
arbitration, it is noteworthy that the 1996 Act helpfully 
enumerates some guiding principles. It sets out, first, that the 
object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes 
by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense 
and, secondly, that parties should be free to agree how their 
disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are 
necessary in the public interest.56  
In addition to being comprehensive, certain characteristics 
common to the UNCITRAL Model Laws are evident in the 
1996 Act. In particular, it is logical, clear and has the principles 
of ‘party autonomy’ as well as ‘judicial non-intervention’ as 
central themes in the Act. Tweeddale and Tweeddale comment 
that: “[a]lthough at its conception it was agreed that the Arbitration Act 
1996 would not enact without modification the UNCITRAL Model Law 
it is clear from the use of language and format that the Law has played a 
major role in the shape that the Act has taken”.57 
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The DAC, in their report, determined that a principled approach 
would be necessary in the new arbitration statute. Three guiding 
rationales underlie the 1996 Act. Procedural fairness, party 
autonomy and judicial restraint are the intended doctrinal 
foundations of the Act’s provisions. There would, however, 
appear to exist internal tensions within these noble objectives.58 
Within the first principle – procedural fairness – lies a potential 
conflict between expediency and due process. These ends are 
difficult to equate in arbitral proceedings, more so than in 
litigation, as a premium is placed on speed and economy. As 
Park notes: “[w]hat appears as undue delay to a claimant expecting an 
easy win may be dressed as an essential due process or natural justice to a 
defendant anxious to present its case more fully”.59 Second, although the 
parties’ agreement is paramount, this may be overridden by 
certain mandatory rules as the public interest requires and to 
ensure the integrity of the arbitration. For example the Act 
requires an arbitrator to act impartially and efficiently, a further 
area of probable conflict in principle. Finally, judges are 
expected, according to the statute, to exercise restraint in arbitral 
intervention. This is not, however, absolute and the Act permits 
courts to exercise their inherent jurisdiction to alleviate injustice 
where necessary. 
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The Arbitration Act 1996 contains four parts. The first of these 
is the most substantive and deals with arbitrations conducted 
pursuant to an arbitration agreement. Many general principles 
and definitions appear under this part, particularly having regard 
to the constitution of the arbitration agreement itself. It is 
arranged in a logical manner, dealing with arbitral procedure in a 
chronological way. First the procedure for the commencement 
of arbitration is outlined and then the intricacies of the tribunal 
are dealt with. The award of the arbitration is considered at the 
latter end of Part I. At each stage of the arbitral proceedings the 
power of the courts in respect of such is clearly detailed. 
Furthermore, in a novel step for English arbitration legislation, 
the power of the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction is given 
at section 30 of the 1996 Act. 
The remaining parts of the Act contain 25 sections, in contrast 
to the 84 enumerated in Part I. Part II concerns other provisions 
relating to arbitration such as purely domestic arbitration 
agreements, consumer arbitration agreements and small claims 
arbitration in the county court. Part III essentially adopts the 
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards as set out under Part II of the Arbitration Act 
1950. Finally, Part 4 sets out 5 general provisions.  
The provisions of the Act may be split into two primary 
categories: mandatory and non-mandatory sections. Bruce 
Harris, Rowan Planterose and Jonathan Tecks submit that the 
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distinction “… is fundamental to the scheme of Part I of the Act”. 60  
This is provided for under section 4 of the Act. Section 4(1) 
outlines that mandatory provisions contained within the Act 
apply “notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”. In other words, 
parties may not agree to contract out of these provisions, even if 
the consent to do so is mutual as between the parties. An 
example of such a provision is the Court’s power to stay legal 
proceedings, as set out in sections 8 to 11 of the Act.  
On the other hand, the non-mandatory provisions enable parties 
to agree terms as they wish, but, in the absence of an agreement, 
will apply as the default position. Harris, Planterose and Tecks 
note that within the terminological construction of the non-
mandatory provisions, different formulae is utilised.  For 
example, section 16 of the Arbitration Act provides, “[t]he parties 
are free to agree on the procedure for appointing the arbitrator…If or to the 
extent that there is no such agreement, the following provisions apply…”. 
The authors highlight that given this construction, the default 
rules apply, unless expressly contracted out of or contradicted 
(emphasis added). Conversely, section 14 provides an example 
of the other form of wording used – “[t]he parties are free to agree 
when arbitral proceedings are to be regarded as commenced…If there is no 
such agreement, the following provisions apply…” – whereby any 
agreement “…will oust all the default rules”.61 As is evident from 
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A Commentary (3rd Ed., Wiley Blackwell, 2003), at 68. 
61 Extracted from Ibid., at 70. 
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this comparison, the subtle difference in the operative wording 
of non-mandatory provisions has a decisive influence on the 
specificity of the agreement required, of which the parties will 
need to be acutely cognisant.  
The abovementioned distinction between mandatory and non-
mandatory provisions in the 1996 Act represents a novel 
development in UK arbitration law. Previous Arbitration Acts 
did not provide for such a distinction. Although it should be 
noted that the 1950 Act did make provision for an overriding 
agreement between the parties in respect of certain matters 
which were enumerated in the Act. The new addition shows 
strong support for the principle of party autonomy and, as 
Harris, Planterose and Tecks point out, the majority of sections 
in Part I are non-mandatory. However, they go on to note that 
the balance of sections as listed in schedule 1 are mandatory in 
nature and “[t]he scope of party autonomy is thereby restricted”.62 
The major themes which will be dealt with in this thesis are of 
critical importance in any assessment of the Arbitration Act, not 
least because they illustrate the primary differences between the 
Act and the Model Law. These concepts will be explained in 
great detail under Chapter 3, but it nevertheless is beneficial to 
highlight these at this stage in order to build up a picture of the 
Arbitration Act as a complete legislative framework. A brief 
                                                 
 
62 Ibid,. at 69. 
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survey of the sections to feature in this thesis will henceforth 
follow.      
 53
a) Separability 
It is Section 7 of the 1996 Act which provides for the principle 
of separability in English Law and is reproduced below: “Unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or was 
intended to form part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) shall 
not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because that other 
agreement is invalid, or did not come into existence or has become ineffective, 
and it shall for that purpose be treated as a distinct agreement”. 
Although this provision represents the first appearance for 
separability on the statute book of England and Wales, it 
nevertheless codifies existing practice evident through case law. 
In effect, it puts the principle that an underlying arbitration 
agreement within a contract or agreement between two parties 
survives despite the overarching contract or agreement not 
surviving. The phrasing of the section necessarily implies that it 
is non-mandatory since it provides that parties may agree to opt 
out. This latter requirement, however, must be done in writing 
as is stipulated by section 5 of the 1996 Act. 
As Harris Planterose and Tecks point out, the phrase ‘for that 
purpose’ in the section narrows the scope of application of the 
separability principle. The wording implies that the it may only 
be extended to situations of invalidity, non-existence or 
ineffectiveness of the substantive agreement over the arbitration 
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agreement, “[t]hey do not therefore affect the question of whether an 
assignment of rights under the substantive agreement carries with it the right 
or obligation to submit to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration 
agreement”.63 
   b) Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
Unlike the Model Law, the Arbitration Act deals with 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz in a separate provision to the principle 
of separability. As with the previous section considered, this 
provision is non-mandatory since the phrase, ‘unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties’ appears. It is section 30 of the arbitral 
tribunal which concerns the tribunal’s power to rule on its own 
jurisdiction and it provides thus: “Unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction, 
that is, as to 
(a) Whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, 
(b) Whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and 
(c) What matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance 
with the arbitration agreement.” 
The link made by the Model Law between the principle of 
separability and that of competence is also borne out in part (a) 
of the above section. Given that, under section 7 of the Act an 
                                                 
 
63 Ibid., at 82. 
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arbitral tribunal may separate an arbitration agreement from an 
overarching agreement between the parties it may also determine 
the validity of the arbitration agreement.  
Reference may be made to the DAC Report in an effort to 
delineate the scope of the section. It was the intention of the 
DAC to ensure that time was not wasted with “spurious challenges 
to [the tribunal’s] jurisdiction”, 64  and therefore the doctrine of 
kompetenz-kompetenz would be placed on a statutory footing.  
c) Stay of legal proceedings 
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides for a stay of legal 
proceedings to be imposed where an arbitration agreement 
requires that the matter be referred to arbitration. Some 
commentators have highlighted that this section has been the 
subject of more court decisions than any other under the 
Arbitration Act 1996.65 
The section makes clear that it is only a party against whom legal 
proceedings are brought that may apply to the court for a grant 
of stay of legal proceedings. Furthermore, at subsection 4 of the 
provision it is stated that “the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied 
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A Commentary, note 60, at 82. 
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that the arbitration agreement is null void, inoperative, or incapable of being 
performed”. The threshold is therefore relatively low for the court 
to grant such a stay as it may only be shown that the arbitration 
agreement is valid and that the matter before the court falls 
within that agreement.  
d) Court Intervention  
Any discussion of judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings 
under English arbitration law should be viewed through the 
prism of Section 1(c) of the Arbitration Act 1996. This makes 
clear that courts “should not” intervene in arbitral proceedings 
“except as provided for” by the Act. The premise is therefore that 
the court may intervene where it is licensed to do so under the 
Act and should refrain from doing so outside these parameters. 
In this Thesis, the modalities of intervention as set out in the 
Act will be divided into three broad categories: those powers 
before, during and after arbitral proceedings which permit 
judicial intervention will be considered. First, prior to the start of 
arbitral proceedings a court may intervene by extending time 
limits for the commencement of arbitration proceedings under 
sections 12(1) and (3) of the Arbitration Act 1996. This may 
occur where the contractual time limit, originally agreed by the 
parties for the bringing of arbitral proceedings, runs out. It is, 
however, required by the proceeding subsection that any arbitral 
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mechanisms for the granting of such an application are first 
exhausted. In this sense, the court is a last resort.  
The second instance of intervention that this thesis intends to 
make reference to is that of judicial discretion to appoint 
arbitrators under section 18 of the Act. This is a case in point of 
the courts asserting their power over the arbitral process in order 
to support it. The section provides: If or to the extent that there is no 
such agreement any party to the arbitration agreement may (upon notice to 
the other parties) apply to the court to exercise its powers under this section. 
The court’s role in this respect is therefore to positively help the 
arbitral procedure in an effort to avoid its failure at the ‘first 
hurdle’ where parties do not agree upon the appointment of an 
arbitrator. 
During the arbitral process, there are a number of ways in which 
the court is permitted to intervene. Primarily, the court may 
grant certain interim measures, grant a stay of legal proceedings 
and, further, is entitled to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in 
some circumstances. 
Some of the measures that a court may advocate in supporting 
the arbitral process include, in accordance with section 44 of the 
Arbitration Act, the taking of the evidence of witnesses, the 
preservation of evidence, making orders relating to property 
which is the subject of the proceedings, the sale of any goods the 
subject of the proceedings, the granting of an interim injunction 
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or the appointment of a receiver. Furthermore, where court 
proceedings are commenced in breach of the valid agreement 
between the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration, the 
court may, under section 9 of the Arbitration Act, stay those 
litigation proceedings. Finally, the court retains its inherent 
jurisdiction to intervene in arbitral proceedings at any stage. 
Judicial intervention after the award may be characterised in 
terms of enforcement, challenge or appeal of the arbitral award. 
To this end, the Arbitration Act 1996 makes provision for all 
three through the courts. Under section 66, an award may be 
enforced where this is necessary. Alternatively, the award may be 
challenged or appealed on the grounds of a lack of jurisdiction 
under section 67 of the Act, where there is a serious irregularity 
or where a party has suffered a substantial injustice in 
accordance with section 68, and, under section 69 where the 
appeal relates to a substantive point of law.  
*   *   * 
As is evident from this brief survey of the Arbitration Act, its 
provisions are relatively wide-ranging and tend to be prescriptive 
in nature. This indeed was the objective of the DAC when they 
set out to construct a legislative regime which would overhaul 
UK arbitration law and, although drawing upon the provisions 
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of the Model Law, the committee ultimately chose to reject its 
wholesale incorporation in an effort to build upon and better it. 
The task now is to assess whether the DAC achieved the balance 
that had to be struck, on the one hand, in preserving London as 
a leading arbitral centre, and, on the other, in retaining the 
wealth of jurisprudence which had built up in English 
commercial law more generally. 
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3 THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996 VERSUS THE UNCITRAL 
MODEL LAW: AN OBJECTIVE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The object of this chapter is to consider specific provisions of 
the Arbitration Act and to analyse these on a functional and 
comparative basis. The methodology of examination will follow 
a clear and consistent structure throughout the Chapter. Under 
each section an overview of the issue to be discussed will be 
provided initially. Following this, an objective analysis will ensue 
of the Arbitration Act provision in point and, in addition, any 
counterpart under the Model Law will likewise be considered. 
The critical part of the methodology will be to conduct a 
comparative analysis between the respective provisions of the 
Act and the Model Law with a view to determining which is 
better for arbitration as an autonomous and effective method of 
settling disputes. The latter determination will form the basis of 
the conclusions drawn under each section. 
The issues that will be addressed in the Chapter will comprise 
the primary differences that exist between the two legislative 
frameworks. These include the separability of the arbitration 
agreement, Kompetenz-Kompetenz and judicial intervention: 
before, during and after arbitral proceedings. In respect of the 
latter, the major themes to be addressed encompass the 
discretion to appoint arbitrators by the court, interim measures 
as a means of assistance in arbitral proceedings, as well as the 
challenge and appeal of the arbitral award. First, however, an 
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issue that is scarcely adverted to by either the Arbitration Act or 
the Model Law is the subject of a critical examination.   
3.1 Arbitrability 
Arbitration is a method of settling disputes that serves as an 
alternative to litigation and which is premised on the 
fundamental principle of party autonomy. However, it is difficult 
to distinguish this private procedure from the state’s sovereignty 
over the jurisdictional function and therefore, by implication, the 
arbitral process is subject to the limits on arbitrability established 
by the domestic legal system. In other words, “[Arbitrability] 
determines the point at which the exercise of contractual freedom ends and 
the public mission of adjudication begins.”66  It therefore represents the 
litmus test of arbitral procedure by which those matters most 
suited to resolution by arbitration are determined. Thus, the 
principle of party autonomy – the right of parties to submit any 
dispute to arbitration – and the suitability of an issue to 
arbitration must be balanced.  
The question of whether particular disputes can be referred to 
arbitration is for each State to determine on the basis of 
different criteria, i.e. the economic nature of the dispute, the 
possibility for the dispute to be settled, the impact of the dispute 
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on public policy rules. 67   In other words, “The concept of 
arbitrability, properly so called, relates to public policy limitation upon 
arbitration as a method of settling disputes. Each State may decide, in 
accordance with its own economic and social policy which matters can be 
settled by arbitration and which may not. In international cases arbitrability 
involves the balancing of competing policy considerations.” 68  
Even thought there is no internationally accepted definition as 
to what disputes can be referred to arbitrators, many domestic 
legal systems generally reserve criminal law as well as family law 
matters to the domain of the public judicature. In the same vain, 
also some commercial matters, such as intellectual property or 
antitrust disputes, have often been considered non-arbitrable. 
Broadly speaking, public policy shapes the contours of 
arbitrability.   
 However, as Mistelis points out, “…not every rule of public policy 
justifies reserving the disputes involved for determination by state courts”. 69 
                                                 
 
67 Even though the concept of arbitrability is by each State to be determined and 
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68 Redfern and Hunter, International Commercial Arbitration, note 4, at 137 
69 Loukas A Mistelis, “Arbitrability – International and Comparative Perspectives” 
in Loukas Mistelis and Stravros Brekoulakis eds. (Kluwer Law International, 2009) 
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Accordingly, Brekoulakis goes as far as to say “…the relevance of 
public policy to the discussion of arbitrability is essentially very limited, and 
therefore, the scope of inarbitrability should not be determined by reference to 
public policy”.70 He brings to bare other variables which influence 
the exercise of this instrument of dispute resolution: 
“Arbitration…has inherent limitations. Based on consent, arbitration has 
intrinsic difficulties to affect a circle of persons other than the contractual 
parties to an arbitration agreement….Eventually, arbitrability should be 
determined on the basis of efficiency: whether an arbitral tribunal can get 
disposed of the pending dispute in an effective manner”.71 
This is arguably a sensible approach in developing a 
methodology for arbitrability. Given that arbitration is a 
consensual process and relies for its justification on the twin 
advantages of economy and efficiency, the arbitral tribunal itself 
should exercise its jurisdiction discriminately to ensure that it 
only presides over appropriate disputes. This argument is 
concisely articulated by Mistelis: “[t]ribunals should only be dealing 
with disputes specifically referred to them by the disputing parties and should 
exercise self-restraint if certain matters before them are manifestly 
inarbitrable”.72 
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The following section will consider the provision for arbitrability 
under English law, primarily noting the absence of definition 
that exists. This lack of definition is problematic and a survey of 
the case law will demonstrate the challenges that the courts have 
faced in this regard. Next, it is intended that the position under 
the Model Law be examined with a view to highlighting the 
difficulties of developing an international conception of 
arbitrability. To conclude this section, the author will outline 
their own roadmap methodology for arbitrability as a 
preliminary matter to arbitral proceedings.  
a) Arbitration Act 1996 Provision: Objective Analysis 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Arbitration Act 1996 does not 
expressly cover arbitrability, as is the case in many other 
jurisdictions with the exception of Switzerland and Germany, 
whose laws address the issue in general terms.73 Also, English 
courts have not payid too much attention to the arbitrability 
topic, since they have instead, more frequently, dealt with the 
interpretation of the arbitration agreement in order to define its 
scope of application rationae materiae.  
                                                 
 
73 Lord Mustill and Stewart Boyd, Commercial Arbitration – 2001 Companion (2nd Ed., 
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As will now be evidenced, the lack of definition in English 
statutory law has caused some difficulties for the courts in 
carving out the precise scope of arbitration. It is particularly 
difficult to delineate the role of arbitral tribunals given their 
present status as an alternative to litigation. This conception of 
arbitration is in contradistinction to the classical notion of 
arbitration in which it existed as a subset of litigation.  
Lord Justice Hurst has offered a relatively definitive notion of 
arbitration in the English jurisdiction: “To my mind the hallmark of 
the arbitration process is that it is a procedure to determine the legal rights 
and obligations of the parties judicially, with binding effect, which is 
enforceable in law, thus reflecting in private proceedings the role of a civil 
court of law.74 
Although this refines the concept of an arbitral procedure, it 
does not give much guidance as to the nature of those issues 
that are arbitrable.  
There are, however, some judgments that have played a role in 
determining which disputes can be referred to arbitration within 
the UK legal System.  
First, in O’Callaghan v Coral Racing Ltd75  a dispute occurred in 
relation to a gaming transaction which was rendered null and 
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void under the Gaming Act 1845. It was held that since the 
latter dispute no longer involved a determination of legal rights, 
the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction to determine the 
dispute.  
In a similar vein, the case of Soleimany v Soleimany,76 is authority 
for the proposition that the dispute must be capable of legal 
resolution. In that case, for reasons of public policy, the Court 
of Appeal refused to enforce an English arbitration award issued 
on the basis of the Jewish law (which according to the contract 
was the applicable law), as the dispute arose in relation to a 
company practice deemed to be illegal under UK law.  
On the other hand, Tweeddale and Tweeddale highlight that the 
“arbitral tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the consent of the parties, from 
an order of the court or from statute”.77 They make reference to two 
cases in which it was stressed that the consent of the parties is at 
the heart of arbitral jurisdiction. This was explicitly stated in 
Walkinshaw v Diniz, 78  in which the Court held that a 
characteristic of arbitration was that the arbitral tribunal was 
chosen, either by the parties, or by a method to which they have 
consented. A similar finding was implicit in the case of Al Midani 
v Al Midani,79 where the parties agreed to refer disputes to an 
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‘Islamic Judicial Body’ without having any participation in its 
appointment. An arbitration agreement could not be implied in 
this instance given that there was no mention of arbitration and 
the utilisation of the words ‘Judicial Body’ suggested that 
determination be by the judiciary as opposed to an arbitral 
tribunal.  
As is demonstrated from this brief excursion, some limited 
principles may be extracted from the case law regarding 
arbitrability in the UK. These include that a civil dispute exists 
between parties, which is capable of legal determination. 
Furthermore, prior consent that the dispute be referred to 
arbitration is relevant to establishing the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral procedure. It may be asserted, nevertheless, that the 
precise scope of arbitrability is still far from clear following a 
survey of UK jurisprudence. The position under the Model Law 
will now be considered in an effort to determine whether a more 
satisfactory delineation may be obtained in an alternative 
framework. 
b) UNCITRAL Model Law Provision: Objective Analysis 
As with the Arbitration Act 1996, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
neither provides any definition of which disputes are arbitrable. 
During the deliberations on the Model Law, it became clear that 
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agreement would not be reached on such a definition.80 This is 
largely due to the chasm of difference that exists between each 
state’s perceptions of what issues are of such public importance 
so as to be left to the public judicature. In fact, Article 1(5) 
provides that it is not intended to affect other laws of the state 
that preclude certain disputes being referred to arbitration. Thus, 
where the Model Law is implemented in a domestic legal system, 
it is left to the legislature to decide those issues which are 
arbitrable and those which are not.  
As is becoming clear, “[t]here is no internationally accepted opinion as 
to what matters are arbitrable”.81 Mustill and Boyd go as far as to say 
that “the attempt to draw up a list containing the common factors which 
determine inarbitrability was bound to fail, and has failed”.82 They go on 
to note that “…in the majority of instruments where one might expect to 
find a definition there is none”. 83  Despite this somewhat cynical 
outlook however, endeavours are still being made to reach some 
consensus on an international delimitation of arbitrability. 
UNCITRAL has published a paper entitled ‘Possible Future Work 
in the Area of International Commercial Arbitration’84 which flags the 
need to reach global agreement on arbitrability. The Committee 
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has made some tentative inroads in developing an international 
concept of arbitrability by suggesting that UNCITRAL should 
request each country to list the issues which that country 
considers are not arbitrable. This would facilitate parties to an 
international contract gaining an understanding as to whether 
their disputes are capable of settlement by arbitration at the seat 
of the arbitration and if their awards are likely to be enforced. 
This would appear to be a step in the right direction as far as 
UNCITRAL is concerned and may lead to an international 
definition in the Model Law at some point in the future. At 
present, however, this issue remains conspicuous by its absence 
from the legislative framework. 
By way of an attempt to carve out some broad principles, 
Tweeddale and Tweeddale note that a general presumption in 
favour of the validity of arbitration agreements was established 
in Oldroyd v Elmira Savings Bank FSB,85 and further explain that 
this “…also translates into a presumption that disputes are arbitrable”.86 
Indeed, they go on to note that this proposition seems to have 
been confirmed in the US case Moses H Cone Memorial Hospital v 
Mercury Construction Corp, in which it was held that “any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favour of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract 
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defence to 
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arbitrability”.87 Further, in Deloitte Noraudit A/S v Deloitte Haskins 
& Sells US,88 it was asserted that where there is an international 
relationship between the parties, this presumption may be 
greater. 
Some limited guidance on international trends in respect of 
arbitrability may be garnered from the New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
Article II(1) of the Convention emphasises that each of the 
contracting States: “…recognise an agreement in writing under which the 
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have 
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable 
of settlement by arbitration.” 
Tweeddale and Tweeddale point out that this is the provision in 
the Convention which creates a presumption in favour of 
arbitration but are keen to highlight that this does not necessarily 
amount to a presumption in favour of arbitrability. In ACD 
Tridon Inc v Tridon Australia Pty Ltd,89 it was firmly held by the 
New South Wales Supreme Court the assertion of such a 
presumption would not be entertained. This is significant since it 
further highlights the vacuum which exists at the international 
level regarding the issue of arbitrability.  
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c) Comparative Analysis: Arbitration Act 1996 v 
UNCITRAL Model Law 
From this foray through the issue of arbitrability as it exists in 
the sphere of international commercial arbitration, it is clear that 
there is far from accord as to the scope of arbitration on the 
international plane. It may be concluded that it was perhaps a 
sensible approach on the part of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
drafters to leave arbitrability to national legislators in the 
formulation of a definition. This brings the absence of such a 
delimitation under the Arbitration Act 1996 into sharp focus. 
Arbitrability is a threshold issue in arbitration law which may be 
invoked at various stages in the arbitral process. On a functional 
basis alone, it surely merits codification.  
The difficulties of negotiating a harmonised definition at the 
international level cannot explain the lack of mention in the 
1996 Act. The issue of arbitrability has been developed through 
the case law in the English jurisdiction and from the above 
survey, it is evident that this provides a somewhat threadbare 
indication of its scope. Given the restricted nature of the 
drafting process involved in the 1996 Act as compared with the 
Model Law, it is submitted that formulating a precise definition 
as well as clearly defining its scope would have been 
straightforward and, indeed, beneficial. In this sense, and bearing 
in mind the objective of the drafters to build upon the Model 
Law, this would have been an area where the Act could have 
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provided a better offering than the Model Law. In the Author’s 
opinion, failure to do so represents a missed opportunity.  
*    *    * 
The absence of definition under the UK Arbitration Act and the 
Model Law is problematic and is likely to become more so with 
the increasingly autonomous status that arbitration is gaining 
relative to litigation. It will be important to determine those 
issues which are arbitrable to ensure that arbitrators are clear on 
the remit of their jurisdiction. Two fundamental principles will 
have to be balanced in this regard. These are that issues of public 
interest remain subject to the public administration of justice 
through the courts and, also that the notion of private dispute 
settlement in accordance with party autonomy is upheld.  
The author would propose a tripartite methodology to the issue 
of arbitrability at the domestic level. The first is to consider 
whether the parties have an arbitration agreement between them. 
This, as Brekoulakis has highlighted is “a condition precedent for the 
tribunal to assume jurisdiction over a particular dispute”. 90  It is a 
jurisdictional requirement. Second, the arbitral tribunal should 
ensure that the arbitration agreement between the parties is 
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valid. Given the consensual nature of arbitration, a valid 
agreement is critical and will equate to a contractual requirement 
to arbitrate. The final aspect to a determination of arbitrability is 
to assess whether the matter is suitable for arbitration. This will 
involve a calculation of both party autonomy and the public 
interest in the matter to be arbitrated. In this respect, the 
tribunal should exercise its jurisdictional discretion to refuse to 
decide upon those matters which, as Mistelis notes above, are 
manifestly inarbitrable.  
The above formula, it is argued, provides a clear roadmap for 
arbitral tribunals to make self-determined and rational decisions 
as to arbitrability where this is necessary. This methodology 
builds upon those norms suggested by the aforementioned 
leading authors but, also, is inspired by an approach taken in the 
US frequently termed ‘Jurisdictional and Subject Matter 
Arbitrability’. This terminology was applied in the First Circuit 
Court of the US in PainWebber Inc v Mohamad S Elahi,91 but was 
initially formulated in Imports Ltd v Saporiti Italia SpA.92 In that 
case, the Court noted that the methodology it would use to 
decide matters of this nature would be bipartite. First, a 
consideration as to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate would 
be conducted. This, likewise, underlines the importance of 
consent in this analysis. Next, if it were indeed found to be the 
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case that the parties had agreed to arbitrate, the court would 
assess the scope of that agreement, specifically whether it 
encompassed the asserted claims. This part of the test takes into 
consideration the subject matter of the dispute and attempts to 
marry the intentions of the parties.  
Indeed, arbitrability has the potential to become an issue at 
various points in any arbitration.93 The first possible scenario is 
when an application is made to stay the arbitration. Here, the 
opposing party may claim that the tribunal lacks the authority to 
determine a dispute given that it is not arbitrable. Secondly, 
during the arbitral proceeding itself, either party may challenge 
the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal. Finally, arbitrability 
may be raised where an application to challenge the award or to 
oppose its enforcement is made. 9
                                                
4  In other words, the 
arbitrability of the dispute is a condition of validity of the 
arbitration convention and therefore of the arbitrator’s 
competence to decide the dispute and to issue a valid award 
enforceable at law. This underlines further the importance of 
determining a precise notion of arbitrability. 
 
 
93 See Francis Russell, Russell on Arbitration, David Sutton and Judith Gill eds., (22nd 
Ed., Sweet and Maxwell Publishing, 2002) Arbitrability Chapter, at 15. 
94  For example, under the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, non-arbitrability is a ground for a 
court refusing to recognise and enforce an award. 
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3.2 Separability 
For some time, the doctrine of separability was unfamiliar to 
English law. It is now, however, well established and this is 
reflected not least by its presence in the 1996 Act. As will be 
seen from the discussion below, the notion of separability was 
one of the core precepts in the Model Law and codification of 
the principle in the Act brings the latter into line with well-
established international arbitration practice.  
According to this doctrine, an arbitration clause may be 
separated from a contract and is taken as a distinct agreement to 
arbitrate. The theoretical premise on which separability is 
founded is based upon the primacy of party autonomy. Thus, 
the parties agreed that disputes would be submitted to 
arbitration and regardless of the status of the underlying contract 
- void or otherwise - this is the method of dispute resolution 
which should be pursued. 
The object of this section is to examine the evolution of the 
principle of separability in English law from its common law 
origins to its codification in the 1996 Act. Furthermore, it is 
intended to consider how separabilty compares in its present 
characterisation through statute and jurisprudence to the 
conception of separability under the Model Law regime.  
a) Arbitration Act 1996 Provision: Objective Analysis 
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Section 6(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 defines the arbitration 
agreement as an “agreement to submit to arbitration present or future 
disputes (whether they are contractual or not)”. The agreement to 
arbitrate must comprise a written arbitration clause; this can, 
however, exist within or outside the contract. In fact, under the 
Act, an arbitration agreement need only be evidenced in writing 
- written in clear and certain terms - for example by an exchange 
in communication which may include letters, faxes or 
memorandums. This stipulation was illustrated in Birse 
Construction Ltd v St David Ltd95and it is also made clear in section 
5(2) of the Act. An agreement is evidenced in writing if it is 
recorded by one of the parties, or a third party, with the 
authority of the parties to the agreement.  
The Arbitration Act 1996 provides a statutory basis for the 
previous common law position as regards separability. The 
doctrine had been established in Heyman v Darwins Ltd, 96  a 
decision handed down by the House of Lords in 1942, in which 
it was held that an arbitration agreement is not determined 
where the underlying contract is void. It was the words of Lord 
Macmillan in that decision which illustrate the scope of the 
doctrine. “[The arbitration clause] survives for the purpose of measuring 
the claims arising out of the breach, and the arbitration clause survives for 
determining the mode of their settlement”. 97  Later, this premise was 
                                                 
 
95 [1999] 1 BLR 194.  
96 [1942] AC 356. 
97 Ibid, at 372. 
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clearly restated and developed upon in Harbour Assurance Co. 
(UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd. 98  In that 
case, the Court of Appeal confirmed that despite an underlying 
contract being void for illegality, an arbitration clause within that 
contract was separate and survived the voided contract. The 
arbitration clause within the contract, therefore, was capable of 
standing as an independent agreement. In other words, “[A]n 
arbitration agreement and the underlying contract need not rise and fall 
together.” 99  An arbitration agreement retains the essential 
characteristics of any contract, meaning that the requirements of 
offer, acceptance, consideration, capacity, and intention to create 
legal relations should all exist in any arbitration agreement. It is, 
however, important to point out that no separate consideration 
nor offer and acceptance is required for the arbitration 
agreement specifically. The separable clause derives its 
contractual nature from the (voided) underlying contract. The 
author submits that, in this respect, theoretical consistency is 
compromised in order to accommodate party autonomy. 
Furthermore, in the latter case mentioned above, the Court of 
Appeal, removed the distinction that the House of Lords had 
previously asserted in the former case. In Heyman, the Court had 
distinguished between a contract which had been terminated 
wrongfully by one of the parties – as a result of which the 
                                                 
 
98 [1993] QB 701. 
99 Tweeddale and Tweeddale, A Practical Approach to Arbitration Law, note 13, at 74. 
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doctrine of separability did not apply – and a situation in which 
the contract was voided, whereby the arbitration clause was 
separable. In Harbour Assurance however, the claimant - the 
reinsurer of the six defendants under a quota share reinsurance 
treaty - brought an action against the defendants seeking 
declarations that the contract of reinsurance was illegal and void 
by reason of it being affected by the defendant carrying on 
insurance business contrary to the Insurance Companies Acts 
1974 and 1981 in relation to the underlying business. The 
defendants denied illegality and sought a stay of the action on 
the ground that the parties had agreed to submit the dispute as 
to initial invalidity to arbitration. Holding that the dispute came 
within the terms of the arbitration agreement, the Court of 
Appeal clearly brought situations where a contract was rendered 
void on the basis of illegality into the scope of the doctrine. 
Lord Hoffmann said that the relevant questions were 
(a) whether the arbitration clause on its true construction is wide enough 
to embrace the dispute in question, and 
(b) whether the issues raised impeach the separate or collateral 
arbitration agreement.100 
However, despite removing the aforementioned distinction, the 
Court in Harbour Assurance noted that it could differentiate 
                                                 
 
100 Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd [1993] 
1 Lloyds Rep 455, at 469 per  Hoffmann LJ. 
 79
between a contract voided for initial illegality and one declared 
void ab initio. In the latter case, the arbitration clause could not 
survive. Thus, its reasoning was that it was a question of fact 
whether the type of illegality affected both the underlying 
contract and the arbitration clause.  
The distinction rests upon a sound theoretical premise since a 
contract which is void ab initio can be said to have never 
represented the parties’ intentions. On the other hand, a contract 
which is voided at a later date, for whatever reason, did at some 
point contain the agreement of the parties to submit their 
disputes to arbitration. Given that it is likely to be a dispute 
between the parties which led to a voiding of the contract, it 
follows that the dispute should be subject to arbitration.  
It is now recognised in English law that, where parties have 
entered into a contract which incorporates by any reference a 
written form of arbitration clause, this will constitute a distinct 
contract from the underlying contract. The former is a contract 
to refer all disputes arising from the underlying contract to 
arbitration.  
It was realised that codification of the principle was necessary in 
English Law and the Departmental Advisory Committee sought 
to achieve this in the 1996 Act. In its consideration of the Model 
Law’s counterpart, the DAC thought the doctrine of separability 
ought to be distinct from the doctrine of Kompetenz-
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Kompetenz. The Model Law may be distinguished in this regard 
from the 1996 Act, as will be demonstrated below.  
Section 7 of the Act put the principle of separability on a 
statutory footing in the United Kingdom.101 The doctrine had 
been in its infancy immediately prior to the drafting of the 1996 
Act having only been recognised by the common law in the 1993 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Harbour Assurance v Kansa.102 
Judicial opinion on the issue of separability has been somewhat 
varied since its enactment, however. Shackleton, conducting a 
review of English judicial opinions on arbitration in 2002, 
argued that this was one of the legal principles and paradigms 
whereby the position prior to the 1996 Act continued to be 
applied by the courts: “A weak principle of separability remains in force 
despite the introduction of a strong principle at section 7”, 103  and in a 
different commentary, noted in particular that “[c]ase law under the 
new regime reflects these tensions: a liberalisation of jurisdiction ratione 
materiae contrasts with the maintenance of a conservative approach to 
jurisdiction rationae personae”.104 
                                                 
 
101 Section 7 of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides: “Unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or was intended to form part of another agreement 
(whether or not in writing) shall not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because 
that other agreement is invalid, or did not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it 
shall for that purpose be treated as a distinct agreement”. 
102 [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 455; [2002] EWCA Civ 721 3 [1999]. 
103  Stewart Shackleton, “Annual Review of English Judicial Decisions on 
Arbitration 2002 6(6) International Arbitration Law Review (2003), 220. 
104  Stewart Shackleton, “Challenging Arbitration Awards: Part 1 – Procedural 
Irregularity” 152(7058 New Law Journal (2002), 1816. 
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In Downing v Al Tameer Establishment and another,105 the Court gave 
no weight whatsoever to section 7 in upholding the claimant’s 
argument that an accepted repudiation brought to an end not 
only the obligation of the parties to perform the primary 
obligations of the contract but also the arbitration agreement 
contained within it. This is to be contrasted with the judgment 
of Mr Justice Clarke in ABB Lummus Global Ltd v Keppel Fels 
Ltd, 106  who opined that whether an agreement had been 
repudiated was a matter which could be determined by 
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the agreement 
and the arbitration agreement was not affected by the invalidity 
of the main agreement.  
It is submitted that the earlier judgment of Mr Justice Clarke is 
in accordance with the terms of section 7 which provides that an 
arbitration agreement “shall not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or 
ineffective because the other agreement is invalid, or did not come into 
existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that purpose be treated as 
a distinct agreement”. Reiterating the importance of separability in 
strengthening arbitral procedure, it is submitted that, the courts 
will need to develop a consistent jurisprudence in order to effect 
meaningful change in this regard. At present, the case law is 
confused, offering varying degrees of support for the principle 
of separability. As Shackleton contests: “Pro-arbitration attitudes co-
                                                 
 
105 [2002] EWCA Civ 721. 
106 [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 24. 
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exist with traditional conceptual frameworks that emphasise strict 
contractual analysis of arbitration agreements.107 
b) UNCITRAL Model Law Provision: Objective Analysis 
The UNCITRAL Model Law at Article 16(1) sets out: “The 
arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections 
with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that 
purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated 
as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by 
the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso 
jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.” 
Aron Broches has commented in respect of this provision under 
the Model Law: “…separability of the arbitration clause is intended to 
have the effect that if an arbitrator who has been validly appointed and who 
stays within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the 
arbitration clause concluded that the contract in which the arbitration clause 
is contained is invalid, he does not thereby lose his jurisdiction.”108 
This indicates a rather more complex notion of separability than 
that which we considered under the Arbitration Act 1996. 
Indeed, under the Model Law - as briefly alluded to above - 
                                                 
 
107  Stewart Shackleton, “Challenging Arbitration Awards: Part 2 - Procedural 
Irregularity”, 152(7058) New Law Journal (2002), 1816. 
108 Aron Broches, Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, International Council 
for Commercial Arbitration Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Supplement 
11 of January 1990), at 74 to 75. 
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separability and competence are dealt with under the same 
provision: Article 16. It is section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1996 
in which the competence of the tribunal to rule on its own 
jurisdiction is dealt.109 This is as distinct from section 7 which 
concerns the issue of separability under the Act.110 Park explains: 
“Unlike the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, however, the Act 
wisely avoids affirming separability in the same section with reference to the 
arbitrator’s power to decide jurisdictional questions, thus resisting the 
tendency to confuse these two concepts.”111 
Tweeddale and Tweeddale assert that “the autonomy of the 
arbitration agreement is considered as being one of the cornerstones of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law”. It is submitted, however, that if this is 
the case, it might have been defined in a more precise manner 
and under a provision dealing solely with this issue. 
It is now the case that the doctrine of separabilty is recognised in 
many jurisdictions but it is important to highlight that, as well as 
differing in name in a number of jurisdictions (‘severability’ in 
the US and ‘autonomy’ in France and Germany, as well as in 
Italy, for example)112 it also differs in form between jurisdictions. 
As Tweeddale and Tweeddale note “[t]he concept of separability of 
                                                 
 
109  The doctrine of competence under the Arbitration Act 1996 and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law will be dealt with in a later section in this thesis. 
110 Margaret Rutherford, The Arbitration Act 1996 – A Practical Guide, note 28, at 
55-57. 
111  William P Park, Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and 
Practice, (Oxford University Press, 2006), at 210. 
112 Under the ‘autonomy doctrine’ applied in place of separability in France and 
Germany, courts are obliged to respect the choice made by the parties. 
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the arbitration agreement exists as a matter of law and not fact”. This 
divergence of notions as regards separability is likely to account 
for the relatively convoluted proposition that can be seen under 
Article 16.  
c) Comparative Analysis: Arbitration Act 1996 v 
UNCITRAL Model Law 
Notwithstanding the strong emphasis in the latter provision on 
the discretion of the arbitral tribunal as regards determining 
separability, there is one other substantive difference between 
the two provisions.  As a brief aside, a formal point to note is 
that, under the UK Arbitration Act, the guarantee of separability 
is a non-mandatory provision and may be contracted out of by 
the parties.113 
As regards the scope of separability under the Model Law, a 
consideration of the Hong Kong case Fung Sang Trading Ltd v Kai 
Sun Sea Products & Food Co Ltd114 is instructive. The High Court 
of Hong Kong held that the doctrine is broad enough to include 
those contracts which are subject to a challenge of initial 
invalidity. This is to be contrasted with the position under 
English law whereby, as we have seen in Harbour Assurance, a 
                                                 
 
113 Under the Arbitration Act 1996, a distinction is made between mandatory and 
non-mandatory provisions. Those provisions which fall under the latter category 
may be contracted out of by the parties where they agree to do at the conclusion 
of the arbitration agreement.  
114 (1992) XVII Ybk Comm Arbn 289-304. 
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distinction was drawn between two species of initial invalidity. 
This means that an arbitration clause in a contract declared void 
ab intio may not survive. Thus, in this instance, the narrower 
scope of English law becomes evident as far as the doctrine of 
separability is concerned.  
In order to garner a deeper understanding of the doctrine of 
separability, reference should be made to Judge Schwebel’s 
International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems 115 in which he 
provides four justifications for the doctrine. These include, first, 
the autonomy of the parties and the pre-existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate. The second justification is to avoid delay 
in the arbitral process by ensuring that the parties do not use the 
void contract as an excuse to postpone proceedings. Third, there 
is no reason to treat an agreement in an underlying contract 
differently from an ‘ad hoc’ agreement. Finally, in the absence of 
separability, courts may have to consider the entire dispute in 
order to determine whether there was a valid arbitration 
agreement, frustrating the fundamental purpose of arbitration.  
*    *   * 
                                                 
 
115  Judge Stephen Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems 
(Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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As is evident from the above examination, what appears at face 
value to be a similar notion of separabilty under the two 
legislative frameworks, actually entails subtle differences. This 
derives largely from the Model Law treating the concept of 
competence alongside the notion of separabilty in the same 
Article. Davidson offers a possible explanation for the 
difference: “The Model Law presents the two as logically interdependent, 
whereas in logic and reality the existence of the one does not necessarily 
presuppose the other. Separability is not nearly as well established in 
international arbitration as the other concept, and the Model Law by 
connecting it to a particularly extensive version of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
has produced a version of separability the scope of which is wider than that 
hitherto recognised in any legal system.”116  
Although the separabilty envisaged under the Model Law is 
likely to be broader in scope and therefore promote party 
autonomy to a greater extent, there is merit in Davidson and 
Park’s assertion that the two notions of separability and 
competence are conceptually distinct. For the purposes of 
defining the scope of separabilty in a clear and precise way, it is 
submitted that they should be treated under separate provisions. 
                                                 
 
116 Fraser Davidson, “The New Arbitration Act – A Model Law?” (1997) Journal of 
Business Law 101, at 117. 
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3.3 Competence 
It has been made clear in the previous section that seperability 
and competence are embodied in discrete provisions under the 
Arbitration Act 1996 and the following quotation would appear 
to characterise the position under UK law as regards 
competence: “Arbitrators are entitled, and indeed required, to consider 
whether they will assume jurisdiction. But that decision does not alter the 
legal rights of the parties, and the court has the last word.”117  
The discourse that follows will include an examination of 
competence under English law and particularly, recent 
developments at the European Union level will be highlighted. 
The implications of such developments for arbitration in 
London will also be speculated upon. Furthermore, the nature of 
competence under UNCITRAL regimes will be considered and 
conclusions drawn as to the merits and demerits of differences 
with UK law in this respect.  
3.3.1 Conflict of competence within the UK legal system. 
The Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle 
As emphasised before, the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
refers to the jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional matters. This 
                                                 
 
117 Lord Steyn, England's Response to the UNCITRAL Model Law of Arbitration, 
(1994) 10 Arbitration International 1, at 1. 
 88
issue is dealt with by section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1996118 
according to which the arbitral tribunal is permitted to rule upon 
its own substantive jurisdiction, subject to challenge in court. 
This new positive principle replaced the previous position at 
common law whereby the tribunal was entitled to make 
enquiries as to its jurisdiction but did not have the power to rule 
on it. This was made explicit by Lord Roskill in the case of 
Willcock v Pickfords Removals Ltd,119 when he asserted: “One thing is 
clear in this branch of the law. An arbitrator cannot decide his own 
jurisdiction”. 120  The new position taken by the 1996 Act has, 
therefore, the merit of extending the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to 
matters of separability, the constitution of the tribunal and the 
determination of what matters have been submitted to 
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement.  
The advantage of permitting the arbitral tribunal to rule on 
matters of its own jurisdiction was emphasised in the DAC 
Report where it was noted that the application of the 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle would prevent parties from 
delaying “valid arbitration proceedings indefinitely by making spurious 
                                                 
 
118 Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides: “(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, the arbiral tribuanl may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction, that is as to – (a) 
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119 [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 224. 
120 Extracted from Ian Menzies, “1996 and all that”, Arbitration Act Special Edition 
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challenges to its jurisdiction”.121 On the other hand, however, some 
writers have warned of the danger of completely abolishing the 
jurisdiction of the courts in relation to the arbitral proceedings. 
They argued that since arbitration is a method of settling 
disputes serving as an alternative to litigation and, as it is based 
on the principle of party autonomy, then questions of 
jurisdiction should be decided by arbitrators only if the parties 
give them the power to do so. In other words, according to the 
more sceptical branch of thought, “[q]uestions of the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal cannot be left (unless the parties concerned agree) to the tribunal 
itself, for that would be a classic case of pulling oneself up by one’s own 
bootstraps”.122 It is, indeed, this latter conception of competence, 
whereby the parties can agree to limit the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal in this respect, which has come to fruition in 
section 30 by virtue of it having a non-mandatory character 
under the Act.  
The Arbitration Act 1996 affords the arbitral tribunal 
jurisdiction to rule on its own substantive jurisdiction as to three 
circumstances: whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, 
whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and what matters 
have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the 
                                                 
 
121 Report of The Departmental Advisory Committee on the Arbitration Bill 1996, 
Department of Trade and Industry, Chaired by Lord Justice Saville (London, 
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122 Saville LJ Speech at Middle Temple Hall, 8 July 1996. 
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arbitration agreement. These are the categories under which the 
case law can be broadly considered. 
The determination of the validity of the agreement has been 
shaped by several factors. It is important to distinguish for the 
purposes of this analysis the notion of separability of the 
arbitration agreement since this concerns the validity of the 
underlying contract. As it has previously been emphasised, an 
arbitration agreement will not be considered to be valid if the 
underlying contract never came into existence, 123  i.e. if the 
contract is invalid ab initio. 124 A determination of whether the 
original contract came into existence is conducted using an 
ordinary contractual analysis. Similarly, where the arbitration 
agreement was induced by fraud, misrepresentation, duress or 
undue influence, the clause will be voidable. This is the claim 
that the applicant in Irvani v Irvani made. 125  However, the 
claimant in that case was unsuccessful in his assertion that he 
had been unfairly induced to enter into an arbitration agreement 
by his siblings. In the Court of Appeal, Buxton LJ held that 
there was no evidence of active undue influence. Family loyalty 
was thus an insufficient ground for claiming undue influence in 
this case. 
                                                 
 
123 May and Butcher v R (1934) KB 17. 
124 See discussion concerning the distinction made in terms of voided contracts in 
Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 1 
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Other grounds on which an arbitration agreement may be found 
to be void include uncertainty; that is uncertainty as to the 
meaning of the arbitration agreement being so ambiguous as to 
be incapable of being construed to give the agreement certainty. 
Although courts may attempt to ascribe meaning and cure the 
ambiguity was evident in Tritonia Shipping Inc v South Nelson Forest 
Products Corp 126  and Swiss Bank Corp v Navorossiysk Shipping 127  
where the courts clearly tried to give effect to the intentions of 
the parties. Alternatively, the case of Altco Ltd v Sutherland is 
authority for the proposition that an agreement to arbitrate is 
voidable where the parties have made a mutual fundamental 
mistake as to fact. A further area in which the validity of an 
arbitration agreement has come into question has been where a 
party denies the existence of the arbitration agreement and this 
denial is accepted. This question was answered in the case of 
Downing v Al Tameer Establishment 128  in which it was held that 
such a situation would entail the arbitration agreement coming 
to an end. 
The second aspect of arbitral competence as adverted to by 
section 30 of the Act relates to the constitution of the tribunal. 
This is determined by the arbitration agreement, or where there 
is a lack of agreement, by the terms of the Arbitration Act. Very 
broad scope is given to the parties in that they may decide to 
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constitute the tribunal in whatever manner they wish having 
regard to the number of arbitrators, the procedure by which they 
are appointed and whether there is to be an umpire or chairman 
of the arbitral proceedings.  
The final branch of section 30 deals with the matters submitted 
to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement. This 
implies that the arbitration agreement is to delimit the type of 
disputes that may be referred for resolution by the arbitral 
tribunal. Disputes falling outside of this scope, unless 
subsequently agreed by the parties, may not be submitted to 
arbitration. In M/S Alghanim Industries Inc v Skandia International 
Insurance Corp 129  the parties referred a dispute to arbitration 
which concerned whether substantial losses incurred by the 
claimant during the first Iraq war were covered by the insurance 
policies provided by the respondent. There had been an 
agreement between the parties to refer only this matter to 
arbitration as a preliminary issue. In the arbitral proceedings, the 
tribunal held, against Alghanim, that the claims were not covered 
by the insurance. Following this finding, the parties could not 
agree on the costs. The arbitral tribunal maintained that they had 
the power to tax costs. Alghanim claimed that as the award was 
a final award the arbitral tribunal was functus officio. The Court 
held that the arbitral tribunal at the time the award was made, 
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had retained the right to deal with the taxation of costs and were 
therefore not functus officio.   
It is important to bear in mind that although the arbitration 
agreement defines the ambit of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, this 
may be extended by the parties at a subsequent stage, even once 
the arbitration proceedings have commenced. This is done via a 
submission agreement between the parties. A submission 
agreement may be concluded from an exchange of 
correspondence, faxes, or email. It may also be implied from the 
conduct of the parties. What is essential, therefore, is the 
objective intentions of the parties. Interestingly, a submission 
agreement may comprise the initial arbitration agreement. As 
can be seen from the case of Westminster Chemicals and Produce Ltd 
v Eichholz and Loeser130 in which there was not prior arbitration 
agreement. Nevertheless, the parties appointed an arbitrator and 
participated in the arbitration. Devlin J held that an ad hoc 
arbitration agreement had arisen by the conduct of the parties. 
It would appear that, on an analysis of the jurisprudence that has 
built up around section 30, much weight is given to the notion 
of party autonomy and, in particular, importance is accorded to 
the consent of the parties. This is admirable given that the 
mandate of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is the arbitration 
agreement itself – the objective codification of the parties’ 
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intentions. Thus the ambit of the tribunal’s jurisdiction should 
reflect the intentions of the parties, even where these intentions 
evolve or alter over time.   
3.3.2 Conflicts of Competence within the European Union 
It has been asserted that “[i]t is almost impossible to avoid issues 
relating to conflict of laws in international commercial arbitrations”.131 The 
issue of conflicts of competence has been the subject of deep 
controversy and much academic debate of late in the European 
Union (hereinafter “EU”). A number of recent cases have 
defined the contours of this area in which a distinction has been 
drawn in the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “ECJ”) 
rulings between those conflicts of jurisdiction which exist 
between EU Member States and those which exist between an 
EU Member State and a non-EU Member State. The decision of 
the ECJ in Allianz SpA (formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà SpA) 
v West Tankers Inc, 132  has undoubtedly provoked the most 
emphatic reaction, especially in England. It is fair to say, 
however, that although this decision shocked many lawyers, it 
failed to surprise them. Indeed, the European Court of Justice 
decision could well deprive companies of the effective “anti-suit 
injunction” which prevents counterparties taking legal action 
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beyond the process they had contractually agreed. 133  Many 
authors went on to caution that the effect of such a move could 
well result in companies choosing to arbitrate in other 
arbitration locations outside of the EU, for example in Hong 
Kong or Singapore rather than in London or Paris. 
In West Tankers, following a shipping vessel collision with a 
jetty in Syracuse, Italy, the insurance company for the jetty sued 
West Tankers - a British shipping company - in the Italian courts 
to reclaim damages it had paid to the jetty owners. Subsequently, 
West Tankers sought an injunction restraining the Italian 
proceedings on the grounds the lease under which it had 
chartered the vessel provided for the arbitration of the disputes 
in the UK. The relevant issue for decision in this case was 
whether it is consonant with EU law, specifically EC Regulation 
44/2001,134 for a court of a Member State to make an order to 
restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings 
in another Member State on the ground that such proceedings 
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are in breach of an arbitration agreement. Lord Hoffman MR, 
giving the decision of the House of Lords in that case, held that 
arbitral proceedings were excluded from the scope of Regulation 
44/2001 and that crucially, jurisdiction on arbitral proceedings 
was for the parties to decide. The judge noted that there had 
developed a court practice in the UK of restraining foreign court 
proceedings where the arbitration agreement serves to promote 
legal certainty and reduces the possibility of conflict between the 
foreign judgment and the arbitral award. Further, he asserted 
that there was no doctrinal necessity or practical advantage 
which requires the European Community to handicap itself by 
denying its courts the right to exercise the jurisdiction to restrain 
foreign court proceedings.  
The European Court of Justice did not agree. The Court argued 
that English courts should not stop proceedings in another 
European Union Member State even if proceedings are in 
breach of an arbitration agreement. In this vein, it rejected the 
use of anti-suit injunctions as contrary to the proper 
implementation of the Brussels regime and underlined that they 
interfered with the right of the foreign court to adjudicate upon 
the existence of its jurisdiction. In conclusion, the ECJ held that 
it was up to the Italian Court to decide whether it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case.  
Samad has commented that a lack of meaningful analysis was 
given by the ECJ in West Tankers and this leaves the waters 
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muddied as to when an arbitration exclusion will operate in the 
future. 135  He points out that the effect of the decision is to 
introduce an unwelcome level of parity between jurisdiction and 
arbitration agreements which will weaken arbitration as an 
effective means of dispute resolution in Europe.  
Alternatively, Peel highlights the difference in approach of Lord 
Hoffmann and the decision of the ECJ, proposing that it is 
purely one of emphasis. The Law Lord seeing the issue as one of 
private law, a contractual right, and the European Court of 
Justice as one of public law, the right of a member State court to 
determine its own jurisdiction. Although this does not account 
for the damage that will be done to arbitration business both in 
England and to other jurisdictions in Europe, it does frame an 
argument for judicial non-intervention. The difference in 
emphasis existent in West Tankers illustrates in part -specifically 
in the decision of the ECJ - the varying priorities that judges 
must accord when administering justice to those of arbiters 
when making a decision. Judges must make their decisions with 
the wider public interest at heart, with the interests of the private 
disputants only a factor to be taken into account. On the other 
hand, the arbiter has only the interests of the private disputants 
to consider, therefore making a confined decision purely on the 
issues before him. The latter reasoning is why many parties 
                                                 
 
135 Mahmud Samad, “West Tankers: A Critique” (2009) Commercial Law Practitioner 
103. 
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choose arbitration and, where the circumstances are otherwise, 
the essence of arbitration will be damaged.  
Two suggestions have been mooted as a means of reducing the 
“damage” that West Tankers has potentially inflicted upon 
arbitration in Europe. The first is by Samad, who poses that a 
possible solution is to insert liquidated damages clauses into 
commercial contracts.136 Accordingly, a party which brings court 
proceedings contrary to an arbitration agreement is liable to pay 
damages, thus introducing a disincentive to avoid obligations to 
arbitrate. This, it is argued by the author, does not deal with the 
problem, however. It merely shifts the locus of it, placing an 
obligation on commercial contract drafters to insert such clauses 
into arbitration agreements. It is the European legislators who 
should remedy the situation if they are to safeguard arbitration in 
European Member States. In this way, Hess suggests a more 
robust approach. He argues for legislative reform of the Brussels 
Regulation following West Tankers to oblige foreign courts to 
stay proceedings in favour of the court in the Member State 
which is the seat of the arbitration where jurisdiction is 
challenged. Such a move was given life with the publication of a 
recent Green Paper and report entitled ‘Report from the 
Commission of the European Parliament, the Council and 
European Economic and Social Committee on the application 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
                                                 
 
136Ibid. 
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recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters’. It proposed “[p]artial deletion of the exclusion 
of arbitration from the scope of the Regulation [which] might improve the 
interface of the latter with court proceedings”. 137  This would allow 
English courts to continue to grant anti-suit injunctions for 
proceedings commenced in other EU Member States in breach 
of an arbitration clause.  
Subsequent to the decision in West Tankers, some clarification as 
to its reach can be garnered from other decisions. In addition, 
the Ministry of Justice is currently engaged in a consultation 
process that has the potential to reverse the effect of West 
Tankers. On the latter, Lord Hoffmann - speaking extra judicially 
- has expressed the view that the Ministry of Justice is unlikely to 
make such a reversal, however. Instead, he urged that “[w]e’ve got 
to treat West Tankers as water under the bridge and not be obsessed by 
it”.138 
The English courts had been restrained in their exercise of anti-
suit injunctions by virtue of the ECJ decision in Turner v 
Grovit.139In that case, an exclusive jurisdiction clause prevented 
one of the parties to the case from instituting proceedings in 
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another jurisdiction while the case was pending before an 
English court. The ECJ ruled that the Brussels Regulation 
prevented the issuing of anti-suit injunctions against the court of 
another Member State. English courts continued to issue anti-
suit injunctions on the grounds that the Brussels Regulation did 
not apply to arbitration.  
Turner meant that a party wishing to enforce a jurisdiction 
agreement breached by the commencement of proceedings in 
the courts of another Member State must first take its claim to 
the court first seised by way of an application to have it decline 
jurisdiction. West Tankers extends the practice to arbitration 
agreements. In the most recent case of Youell v La Reunion,140 the 
key tenets of West Tankers have been confirmed by the United 
Kingdom’s Court of Appeal. 
Anti-suit injunctions create a harmonisation difficulty for the 
EU since their use in some Member States’ jurisdictions are not 
possible. In the 2004 Greek case of Piraiki Nomologia, 141  such 
injunctions were found to be in contravention of the Greek 
constitutional guarantee of access to the courts. Other 
jurisdictions, for example Ireland, have similarly worded 
provisions which, if invoked, could prevent the use of anti-suit 
injunctions in those countries. This would result in a situation 
which is likely to be at odds with the Brussels Regulation and its 
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underlying philosophy of harmonisation. The only way, it would 
seem, to create a level playing field within the EU is by 
preventing the use of the injunctions throughout the EU. In a 
similar vein, an interesting aspect in the case of Fili Shipping Co 
Ltd and others v Premium Nafta Products Ltd and Others 142  adds a 
further perspective to this line of argument. It was submitted by 
one of the parties before the House of Lords that the approach 
to separability adopted by the Court of Appeal in the same case 
infringed the owners’ right of access to a court for the resolution 
of their civil disputes. This, it was contended, was contrary to 
Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Lord Hoffmann 
dismissed the contention without any real analysis, merely noting 
that the European Convention on Human Rights 143  was not 
intended to destroy arbitration and that the parties to an 
arbitration can, by agreement, waive their right to a court. 144  
This reasoning could be criticised on the basis that it is a 
fundamental precept of any human right that it should not be 
possible to contract out of it. It is a shame that the argument 
was dispensed with so rapidly and that reasoning was not 
developed further. The Author feels that such discourse could 
have provided an interesting further dimension to the debate 
over anti-suit injunctions.  
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In the recent decision of CMA CGM SA v Hyundai Mipo 
Dockyard Co Ltd,145 Burton J held that the parties had agreed to 
arbitrate their dispute in London and the judgment which one of 
them had obtained from the Marseilles Commercial Court 
formed the basis of a claim for damages. The judge concluded 
“…[t]his is no more of a circumvention of the Judgments Regulation than 
would be an injunction to restrain the continuation of proceedings in a 
foreign court prior to its reaching a judgment. This is not a question of not 
recognising a judgment, but concluding that, as the parties were obliged to go 
to arbitration, it is only the outcome of arbitration which is of any 
relevance.” 
Peel suggests that this could be the future response of the 
common law to the judgment in West Tankers.146 One thing is for 
certain, if England is to remain at the centre of arbitration 
procedure on the world stage, it will have to innovate and adopt 
measures which keep it attractive and competitive as regards 
arbitral procedure. It would appear that the danger in respect of 
arbitral proceedings has been realised by the English judiciary, 
whom have been quick to pass judgment on the matter. 
Accordingly, the case of Sheffield United Football Club Ltd v West 
Ham United Football Club plc, 147  should be highlighted. In its 
decision, the Commercial Court found that the ECJ’s decision in 
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West Tankers should not impinge upon the granting of anti-suit 
injunctions in respect of arbitral proceedings, as opposed to 
court proceedings. It was noted that the rationale of the ECJ 
decision, that of trust in other Member States’ jurisdictions, is 
not relevant to the issue of restraining arbitral proceedings given 
that the practice does not interfere with a judicial determination 
on jurisdiction by a Member State’s courts, thereby retaining the 
mutual trust. As a general comment, the English courts appear 
to be immediately concerned with the business of doctoring the 
scope of West Tankers, both within and outside the framework of 
the European Union. 
3.3.3 Conflicts of Competence Outside the European 
Union 
It is important also to consider those developments which are 
occurring in relation to arbitrations between parties originating 
outside of the European Union. The consequences of recent 
jurisprudence of the ECJ148do not extend to the latter category 
of parties who choose to arbitrate in the UK. 
In Shashoua & Others v Sharma,149the Commercial Court provided 
assurance that West Tankers had not restricted the power of 
English courts to grant anti-suit injunctions where this is 
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between England and a non-EU Member State jurisdiction 
governed by the New York Convention 1958 (which requires 
the courts of signatory states to stay proceedings before them, 
brought in breach of an arbitration agreement).150 In this case, 
the Court was forthright in granting an anti-suit injunction 
preventing litigation in India in favour of England. The 
Commercial Court followed suit in the subsequent case of 
Midgulf International Ltd v Groupe Chimique Tunisien.151 
More specifically, in Shashoua, one of the parties contended that 
the ECJ’s reasoning as regards the granting of anti-suit 
injunctions extended to other conventions and signatory 
jurisdictions outside of the EU. This was on the basis that the 
ECJ had made reference to Article II(3) of the New York 
Convention in West Tankers which makes clear that it is the court 
of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in 
respect of which the parties have made an arbitration agreement, 
that will refer the parties to arbitration. However, where the 
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable 
of being performed, such a referral will not be made.  
The Commercial Court dismissed the reference that the ECJ 
made to the New York Convention as merely a way of 
demonstrating compatibility with it rather than any extension of 
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its decision. The ECJ was more concerned with the concept of 
mutual trust between autonomous Member States and applying 
the Brussels Regulation uniformly across the European Union. 
These rationales, the Court argued, had no application where an 
EU Member State granted an anti-suit injunction against a non-
EU Member State. Additionally, the object of the New York 
Convention is to regulate enforcement and recognition and, 
therefore, does not detail a procedure for determining the 
jurisdiction of signatories at the outset of proceedings, in 
contrast to the Brussels Regulation which does. 
In Midgulf, the defendant, whilst opposing an anti-suit injunction 
to restrain proceedings in Tunisia, adopted a similar line of 
argument as in Shashoua, that the ECJ’s decision had wider scope 
than simply within the European Union. Here, it was 
emphasised that the decision in West Tankers meant a restrictive 
approach should be taken towards the granting of anti-suit 
injunctions outside the EU. The Court in this case quickly 
rebutted the argument, determining that the exercise of caution 
was a pre-existing requirement when granting anti-suit 
injunctions. 
In the light of the foregoing, it has to be argued that West 
Tankers undoubtedly marks a line in the sand for anti-suit 
injunctions against Member States within the EU but the above 
cases represent an emphatic struggle by the English courts to 
avoid any extension of the precedent created.   
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3.3.4 A comparative Analysis: Arbitration Act 1996 v 
UNCITRAL Model Law 
Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1996, has been formulated 
with the aim of balancing two different interests: (i) to give 
arbitrators the power to rule upon their  own substantive 
jurisdiction in order to avoid time-consuming litigation due to 
spurious jurisdictional challenges before courts; and (ii) to 
protect the principle of party autonomy. The Kompetenz-
Kompetenz principle has been introduced in the UK legal 
system as a non-mandatory provision which allows parties to 
exclude it from their arbitration agreement. This caveat represents 
the main difference existing between the Arbitration Act 1996 
and the equivalent provision of the UNCITRAL Model law. It 
has to be emphasised that, on the one hand, Section 30 has the 
merit of having brought English law into line with many 
countries which have adopted the Model Law, but on the other 
hand, it is worth noting that according to Article 16 of the 
Model Law, 152  the power to rule on jurisdiction is vested 
                                                 
 
152 Article 16 of the Model Law provides as follows: 
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arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter 
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squarely in the arbitral tribunal and parties may not agree to 
doctor this jurisdiction.  
As a result, the legislature, through the Arbitration Act, has 
instilled a level of confidence in the ability of the arbitral tribunal 
to determine its own jurisdiction. Arguably, this is an 
improvement on the previous common law position as regards 
the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. It does, however, fall 
short of the display of confidence that the Model Law 
demonstrates in the arbitral procedure.  
Furthermore, the Arbitration Act 1996 does not have provisions 
which are equivalent to Articles 16(2) and 16(3) of the Model 
Law. In the case of the former provision, a denial of jurisdiction 
must be raised before, or concurrent to, a defence being served. 
This restricts the use of the mechanism to challenge jurisdiction 
to the period in which such an objection should arise and 
prevents its use to stall proceedings at a later stage. Under 
Article 16(3), on the other hand, an application to a court 
challenging the arbitrators’ decision must be made within 30 
days of the decision. This latter provision ensures that litigation 
                                                                                                                       
 
alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. The 
arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified. 
 
(3) The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either as 
a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a 
preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after 
having received notice of that ruling, the court specified in Article 6 to decide the matter, which 
decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may 
continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award.” 
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is not initiated as an instrument to cause delay in proceedings, 
thus preserving that crucial efficiency in the arbitral process. 
These further underline the importance accorded to expedited 
procedure under this method of dispute resolution, as well as the 
autonomy of the arbitration process itself, existent within the 
Model Law regime.  
Moreover, section 30 provides for the meaning of jurisdiction, 
whether the tribunal is properly constituted and what matters are 
within the scope of the arbitration. The meaning of jurisdiction 
in this instance is directly related to whether there is a valid 
arbitration agreement. Davidson suggests “[i]t must be assumed that 
the reference to whether there is a valid arbitration agreement indicates that 
the tribunal is entitled to rule not merely where one party suggests that the 
agreement is invalid, but when one party denies entering the agreement at 
all”.153 Article 16, on the other hand, outlines that the tribunal’s 
power to rule on its own jurisdiction permits it to consider any 
objection to “the existence” of the arbitration agreement.  
A further difference between these legislative provisions exists 
which is directly on point in the present inquiry. The scope of 
Article 16(3) under the Model Law in respect of a court 
reviewing a tribunal decision as to jurisdiction is restricted 
whereas the counterpart section 67 is not so. Soderlund 
articulates concisely that “[t]he Model Law does not leave room for a 
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positive finding of jurisdiction by the court (in the event that the arbitrators 
found themselves lacking jurisdiction)”.154 On this locus of difference, 
Davidson points out that “the framers of the Model Law defended their 
position” thus: “It was recognised that a ruling by an arbitral tribunal that 
it lacked jurisdiction was final as regards its proceedings since it was 
inappropriate to compel arbitrators who had made such a ruling to continue 
proceedings”.155 
Davidson further notes that the matter is not dealt with by the 
DAC Report and it is therefore difficult to determine the 
rationale for the difference in the 1996 Act. He does suggest 
however, that recourse can be made to the decision to adopt the 
Model Law in Scotland where an amendment was made to 
Article 16(3) which allowed for an appeal against a tribunal 
determination that it did not have jurisdiction. It was thought, in 
this respect, that if the parties were informed by the tribunal that 
it lacked jurisdiction and thereafter resorted to litigation, one of 
them could petition the court (under Article 8) or refer the 
matter to Arbitration, which it would be bound to do if satisfied 
that the matter fell within a valid arbitration agreement. The 
Scottish Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law commented at 
the time “[t]his seems to be a very roundabout way to achieve a ruling by 
                                                 
 
154 Christer Soderlund, A Comparative Overview of Arbitration Laws: Swedish 
Arbitration Act 1999, English Arbitration Act 1996 and Russian Federal Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration Act 1993, 20(1) Arbitration International 
(2004) 73. 
155 Fraser Davidson, “The New Arbitration Act – A Model Law?” (1997) Journal 
of Business Law 101, at 115. 
 110
the court on whether or not the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction”. 156  
Davidson asserts “[t]he situation under the Act would appear to be more 
akin to the Scottish position”. 157  In a similar vein, under section 
67(3)(c) the court may, as an alternative to confirming the award 
or setting it aside, vary it or set it aside in part on jurisdictional 
grounds.  
On a section 67 application, the court is not limited to reviewing 
the award, but may rehear the jurisdictional objection, with oral 
evidence if necessary, nor is the evidence that can be adduced 
before the court limited to that submitted to the arbitral tribunal. 
However, Aeberli contends that if evidence is late, “it may 
attract a degree of scepticism and affect how the court deals with 
the costs”.158 These are archetypal examples of the Act licensing 
the court to meddle in arbitral proceedings. As Davidson clearly 
states “[t]his emphasises the fact that it is open to the court to determine the 
exact extent of the tribunal’s jurisdiction”.159 Combine this fact with 
empirical finding that the three most litigated provisions of the 
Arbitration Act 1996 are sections 67, 68 and 69160 and a clear 
picture emerges as to the extent to which, and for what purpose 
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the appeal procedure is utilised following an international 
arbitral award. Shackleton adds to this: “Disappointed parties turn to 
these articles to challenge arbitral awards for lack of jurisdiction under 
section 67 or serious defect of procedure under section 68. The courts may be 
persuaded to review the legal merits of an arbitration award under section 
69.161 
*   *   * 
The above inquiry reveals a number of differences between the 
provisions which relate to arbitral tribunal competence under the 
respective legislative frameworks. Significantly, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, as adverted to previously, considers the notion of 
competence under the same Article as that of separabilty, which, 
although not necessarily desirable for the purposes of clarity in 
legislative drafting, would appear to appeal to logic when 
competence is considered conceptually. The other notable 
difference is the scope of competence accorded to the arbitral 
tribunal under each. The Model Law, through its detailed 
provision in Article 16, offers a broader notion of competence 
and would appear to restrict the involvement of the court in this 
respect as compared to the equivalent 1996 Act provision. 
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Anti-suit injunctions have been adverted to in the inquiry into 
the various aspects of competence and jurisdiction in the above 
section. This is because they had previously represented a very 
attractive selling point in promoting England as an arbitration-
friendly centre. As has been illustrated by reference to assorted 
academic commentary and case law, their restriction in the EU 
by the recent ECJ decision in West Tankers could mean that dark 
clouds loom over the long-established reputation for favourable 
arbitration conditions.  
The relevance of this issue to the locus of the examination in 
this thesis derives from that changing of arbitration conditions 
in the UK. The removing of anti-suit injunctions compounds 
the likelihood for judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings 
and will inevitably dissuade parties to arbitration agreements 
from choosing London as an arbitration centre (as well as others 
in Europe). Further side effects may include the undermining of 
arbitral procedure and arbitration as a method of dispute 
resolution more generally. In the case of the former, where an 
anti-suit injunction does not exist there is the risk of delay in the 
arbitration process. This is an antithesis to its fundamental 
advantage. The latter point is more abstract but nevertheless 
prevalent given the direction that the EU appears to be 
following. The recent cases do not vest confidence in this rapidly 
developing instrument of dispute resolution. Instead, they 
potentially encourage judicial interference and serve to shackle 
arbitral procedure to litigation rather than to promote it as an 
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autonomous and meaningful mechanism for the efficient and 
specialist resolution of disputes. In these recent developments, 
one cannot help but be reminded of the early attitude of the 
courts in the UK towards arbitration. The reputation that the 
UK developed then was sought to be remedied by the passing of 
legislation in an effort to restrict judicial influence and promote 
arbitration in the UK once again. Perhaps a renewed response is 
thus required.  
3.4 Judicial Intervention in Arbitral Proceedings 
The enactment of the Arbitration Act 1996 was intended to 
mark a departure from the traditional close supervision of the 
courts and to reinforce the principle of party autonomy. Lord 
Steyn has commented on the historical relationship between the 
courts and arbitration in England: “The supervisory jurisdiction of 
English courts over arbitration is more extensive than in most countries, 
notably because of the limited appeal on question of law and the power to 
remit.”162 
He goes on to confirm that “it is certainly more extensive than the 
supervisory jurisdiction contemplated by the Model Law”. 163  But, 
following the consultative process engaged in by the DAC, it 
was decided that there would be no significant change to the law 
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in respect of the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts over the 
arbitration proceedings. Lord Steyn notes, however, that “it 
became clear that further thought had to be given to the so-called special 
categories under section 3 of the Arbitration Act 1979 and to the ambit of 
the power to remit under section 22(1) of the Arbitration Act 1950”.164  
Sir John Thomas has attempted to chart the difficult balance 
that is involved in ensuring commercial disputes are settled in a 
specialised and expeditious manner but simultaneously that the 
principles of justice and the rule of law are applied fairly. He 
emphasises the need for malleability in commercial law more 
generally to facilitate its application to the constantly evolving 
requirements of international commerce: “…the challenge of 
maintaining the position of the City as a leading international financial 
centre is a real one, what role the legal system plays is difficult for lawyers to 
assess, but it is not insignificant”. 165  Furthermore, he notes that 
where the domain of commercial law does not meet needs of the 
City, parties choose other methods of dispute resolution such as 
mediation and conciliation. This indeed captures the quagmire 
faced by merchants for centuries. The struggle of arbitration has 
been to increasingly detach itself from the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the courts.  
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The intervention of the courts in arbitral procedure, under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, is limited by Article 5 which 
establishes that: “in matters governed by this Law, no court shall 
intervene except where so provided in this Law”. The DAC Report 
illustrates that the purpose of Article 5 was to “achieve a certainty 
as to the maximum extent of judicial non-intervention, including assistance, 
in international commercial arbitration, by compelling the drafters to list in 
the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration all relevant 
instances of court intervention”.166 One view of the Working Group 
on the Arbitration Act in their consideration of the Model Law 
was that Article 5 could “adversely affect the positive and helpful 
attitude of the courts”. 167  But, as is now evident in those 
jurisdictions which have adopted the Model Law, Article 5 
provides clear guidance and restricts court intervention in the 
arbitral process. Improved efficiency and cost-effectiveness are 
thus the by-products in the Article 5 framework of judicial 
intervention. Peter Binder perceives, “Article 5 can be seen as a 
provision useful in helping to secure the Model Law’s freedom from 
disruptive court interferences”.168 
On the other hand, what emerged under the Arbitration Act 
1996 (see Section 1 (c)), embodied within the interpretive 
principles, was that courts “should not” intervene in arbitral 
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proceedings. This can be contrasted with the wording used in 
the equivalent Model Law provision - Article 5 - and also in the 
original Arbitration Bill, which subsequently became the 
Arbitration Act 1996. In each of these latter constructions, 
“shall” replaces “should” to give “no court shall intervene”. Some 
commentators have concluded that the effect of the discrepancy 
is unclear169 while others note that the “phrasing of this guideline is 
hortatory rather than mandatory”.170 William Park suggests that the 
reason for the use of the word “shall’ in the Model Law is to 
facilitate its use in developing countries which do not have a 
developed legal framework as regards court intervention in 
arbitral proceedings. This does not, however, explain the 
reasoning behind the change from the Bill to the Act. To this 
end, Lord and Salzedo draw our attention to the account given 
by Professor Paul Landau at an International Business Centre 
conference 171  in 1996 to the effect that it was considered 
undesirable to entirely remove the courts’ inherent jurisdiction. 
There are two cases which provide an insightful interpretation of 
section 1(c) of the Act containing the abovementioned wording. 
In Vale do Rio Doce Navegacos SA v Shanghai Bao Steel Ocean 
Shipping Co Ltd and Sea Partners Ltd,172 it was highlighted that the 
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use of the word ‘should’ in contrast to ‘shall’ in section 1(c) 
demonstrated a will on the part of the legislature for there to be 
no absolute prohibition on the court intervening in arbitral 
proceedings other than in those circumstances as detailed under 
Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996. The judge in that case 
considered the 1996 DAC Report in which it was noted that a 
mandatory prohibition on the court’s intervention in terms 
similar to Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law was not 
appropriate. A similar approach is detected in the decision of JT 
Mackley and Co Ltd v Gosport Marina Ltd 173  in which the court 
granted declaratory relief outside of its powers in the Arbitration 
Act 1996. It is important to point out, however, that in each of 
these cases it was stressed that such intervention was contrary to 
the general intention of the 1996 Act and that the courts should 
usually not intervene outside the general circumstances specified 
in Part I of the Arbitration Act. Nonetheless, the foregoing 
illustrates the apparent licence granted by the UK legislature, and 
a willingness on the part of the judiciary, to stray beyond the 
boundaries defined under Part I of the Arbitration Act as well as 
bringing into sharp focus the implications of the subtle 
difference in construction between the provisions of Part I and 
those of Article 5 of the Model Law.  
                                                 
 
173 [2002] EWHC 1315 (TCC), 3 July 2002, Court of Appeal – Technology and 
Construction Court. 
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The Arbitration Act 1996 permits two broad mandates for 
judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings. The first is where 
provision is explicitly enumerated under Part I of the Act 
regarding judicial intervention. This principle of non-
intervention has since been affirmed by the House of Lords, as 
is pointed out in Russell on Arbitration,174 in the decision of Lesotho 
Highlands v Impreglio SpA. 175  In that case, Lord Steyn quoting 
Lord Wilberforce noted: “[i]t has given to the court only those essential 
powers which I believe the court should have; that is, rendering assistance 
when the arbitrators cannot act in the way of enforcement or procedural 
steps, or alternatively, in the direction of correcting very fundamental 
errors”.176 
The alternative flagged in the quote – correcting very 
fundamental errors - provides the second justification for judicial 
intervention in arbitral proceedings. This is only to occur in the 
most exceptional of cases to ensure that an injustice is not 
suffered, however. To this end, the court may intervene where 
the grounds for doing so do not feature in Part I of the Act.  
A variety of specific powers are open to the court, generally 
upon application by one of the parties, but also where the court 
of its own accord thinks appropriate, to intervene at various 
stages in the arbitral procedure: before during and after. An 
                                                 
 
174 See Francis Russell, Russell on Arbitration, note 93, at 345. 
175 Lesotho Highlands v Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43; [2005] 3 WLR 129. 
176 [2005] 3 WLR 129, at 138, per Lord Steyn. 
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inquiry into some of these powers of the court is conducted in 
the following section. Throughout, reference is also made by way of 
comparison with equivalent provisions under the Model Law. 
3.4.1 Judicial Intervention Prior to the Commencement of 
Arbitral Proceedings 
“The commencement of the arbitration is the first formal step that a 
claimant must take and in many regards is the most important”.177 The 
authors of this quote highlight the significance attached to the 
modalities by which a dispute is commenced. Where notice of 
the initiation of proceedings is given this may be defective where 
it falls outside of the terms of the arbitration agreement: for 
example a time limit set for bringing disputes to arbitration. 
Where this is the case, the claimant will find that the notice has 
no effect and, fundamentally, no remedy. Tweeddale and 
Tweeddale point out that the claimant will therefore have to 
“consider the content of the notice of commencement and the time when that 
notice needs to be served.”178  
There are two formal instances whereby a court may intervene in 
arbitral proceedings prior to their commencement. First, judges 
may extend the power of arbitrators to decide the dispute after 
the expiry of the time limit agreed by contract in order to 
                                                 
 
177  Tweeddale and Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and 
English Law and Practice, note 40, at 261. 
178 Ibid. 
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commence an arbitral proceeding (this is the case when a 
contract includes a contractual time bar clause that provides a 
limitation on claims being brought after this time).179 Second, 
courts have the power to make orders regarding the 
appointment of an arbitrator when one of the parties refuses to 
participate in the process. In both cases, the court intervention 
will assist the arbitration process when there is a deadlock 
situation due to (i) the expiry of the time limit to commence 
proceedings contractually agreed by the parties; or (ii) the inertia 
of one of the parties (generally the defendant).  
a) Power to extend time limits 
Under the Arbitration Act 1996, the courts are vested with a 
power to extend time limits for the commencement of 
arbitration proceedings under sections 12(1) and (3) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996. Section 12 provides that where an 
arbitration agreement sets a time limit for the referral of a 
dispute to arbitration, this shall be upheld unless the claimant 
can show that either of two steps were taken: that they sought to 
begin arbitral proceedings, or, that they began other dispute 
resolution procedures which had to be exhausted before arbitral 
                                                 
 
179 Contractual time bars seek to curtail the statutory time limit for bringing a 
claim. There are a number of international commercial contracts which provide 
for the barring of a claim if the claim is not made within a specified time. For 
example, claims under the Centrocon arbitration clause require that any claim 
must be made and the claimant’s arbitrator appointed within three months of final 
discharge. Alternatively, the normal statutory period for commencing claims under 
the English Limitations Act is 6 years from the date of the breach. 
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proceedings could be initiated. An order may be made by the 
court in this respect whether or not the time limit that was 
originally agreed between the parties has expired. The order does 
not affect the operation of the Limitations Acts.180 
Alternatively, a court may extend the time limit where it is 
satisfied that the circumstances are such as to be outside the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties when they agreed the 
original time limit, where to do so would be just, or, where the 
conduct of one party makes it unjust to hold the other party to 
the strict terms of the provision in question. 
It is generally required that such an application be made to court 
only as a last resort and certainly not where arbitral resolution is 
possible. With this in mind, the courts have tended to take a 
pragmatic non-interventionist approach. This is evident in the 
case of Marc Rich Agricultural Trading SA v Agrimex Ltd.181 That 
case concerned an appeal to the Court on a point relating to an 
assertion of a time bar which would preclude the granting of an 
award. The Court held that it was for the arbitral tribunal to 
decide whether to extend the time for commencing the 
arbitration and it was not for the Court to intervene at this stage.  
                                                 
 
180 Limitations Act 1980. The underlying rationale of the statute of limitations is 
that a defendant should be spared the injustice of having to face a stale claim. 
With the passage of time cases become more difficult to try and the evidence 
which might have enabled the defendant to rebut the claim may no longer be 
available. Furthermore, it is in the public interest that a person with a good cause 
of action should pursue it within a reasonable period. 
181 [2000] EWHC 193 (Comm). 
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An application of the provision under the previous Arbitration 
Act is illustrated by the case of Consolidated Investment and 
Contracting Co. v Saponaria Shipping Co. Ltd.182 A contract provided 
that the concerned ship owners would be free of all liability if 
arbitration proceedings were not commenced within one year of 
the delivery of cargo from the cargo holders. A dispute arose 
between the cargo holders and the ship owners. However, the 
cargo holders did not commence arbitration proceedings due to 
the fact that they had been assured by the ship owners’ insurance 
company that the dispute would be resolved. In the 
circumstances, the Court of Appeal held that they would extend 
the time whereby the cargo holders could commence arbitration 
proceedings.  
It occurs to the Author that such a power could be better suited 
to the arbitrator rather than the courts, even though in reality 
recourse to the courts is a last resort. The reasoning for such an 
assertion is threefold. First, it concerns the issue of jurisdiction 
to hear a case, therefore, by the doctrine of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, could be delegated to the arbitral procedure. An 
arbitrator is better suited because they have a more adept 
understanding of the circumstances of the case at hand and the 
commercial context to make such a determination. Secondly, 
courts will not be able to offer the same efficiency that an 
arbitrator is able to offer in terms of giving a decision on the 
                                                 
 
182 [1978] 1 WLR 986. 
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extension of time limits. Further, in a similar vein, should such 
power be devolved to the arbitral process, this would ease the 
burden on the judiciary, freeing up valuable time and increasing 
judicial efficiency in terms of litigation. Third, where the parties 
have agreed to settle disputes via arbitration, this is the 
procedure that should be followed. A dispute over time limits is 
no different from any other dispute which is likely to arise under 
the contract, and to the Author, an argument to settle such a 
dispute in court does not carry much weight.  
In this respect, it has to be emphasised, however, that the 
Arbitration Act 1996 is more detailed than the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. The latter legislative framework is silent on the issue 
of time limits and the power of courts (or for that matter 
arbitrators) to extend them. It is submitted that although the 
provision in the Arbitration Act is not perfect, the UNCITRAL 
regime is unsatisfactory in this regard as it leaves much 
uncertainty as to the circumstances in which time limits set in 
arbitration agreements may be extended.  
b) Discretion to Appoint an Arbitrator 
Under section 18 of the Arbitration Act 1996, a court may 
exercise discretion in appointing an arbitrator. The relevant part 
provides: “If or to the extent that there is no such agreement any party to 
the arbitration agreement may (upon notice to the other parties) apply to the 
court to exercise its powers under this section.”  
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The section then details the various permutations of the court’s 
powers in respect of appointments. Although the section has the 
potential to be broad in scope given that disagreement between 
the parties as far as appointment of an arbitrator is concerned, it 
seems likely that “the recent trend has been for the court to favour party 
autonomy unless to do so might fundamentally undermine the arbitral 
process”.183 This is therefore an example of an admirable judicial 
attitude towards a power which it has over a consensual dispute 
resolution procedure. Perhaps just one air of caution should be 
noted having reference to the appointment of an arbitrator. It is 
likely to be crucial to the success of the arbitral process that an 
arbitrator is chosen whom both parties can agree is a good 
compromise and in which they can trust and respect. 
Nevertheless, this is an example of the court intervening in the 
arbitral process in a positive way, supporting the continuance of 
an arbitral procedure where a dispute over the appointment of 
an arbitrator threatens to be the death knell in a given 
arbitration. The court therefore has the power to give directions 
as to the making of any necessary appointments, direct that the 
tribunal shall be constituted by such appointments as have been 
made, revoke any appointments already made or make any 
necessary appointments itself.184 The appointment by the court 
of an arbitrator is treated as if it was done so by agreement of 
                                                 
 
183  Tweeddale and Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and 
English Law and Practice, note 40, at 499. 
184 See section 18(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
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the parties and the arbitration should continue in the expected 
manner.  
The position as delineated by the Arbitration Act 1996 is to be 
preferred to the position prior to the enactment of that Act. 
Previously the court had on occasion refused to appoint 
arbitrators where there had been inordinate and inexcusable 
delay. The case of R Durtnell and Sons v Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry185 marks a line in the sand. In that case, although the 
court noted that it could – as in the jurisprudence which had 
preceded the 1996 Act – refuse a remedy to a claimant who had 
for a long time neglected to take the required steps, it asserted 
that the means to settle the dispute which resulted in a fair and 
efficient resolution of the dispute should be that which prevails. 
If this entailed appointing an arbitrator to facilitate the arbitral 
process, then this course should be pursued. “The court considered 
that the exercise of the court’s residual discretion would depend on the 
circumstances of the particular case”.186 Further evidence of the courts 
supportive attitude may be seen in the case of Atlanska Plovidba v 
Consignaciones Asturianas SA, in which Moore-Bick disagreed with 
the earlier courts finding in Durtnell noting that, “…whereas the 
ability to reach a fair resolution of the dispute goes to the heart of the 
arbitral process, delay and expense do not, unless they are so serious as to 
undermine that fundamental requirement”. As can be seen from this 
                                                 
 
185 [2000] BLR 321. 
186  Tweeddale and Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and 
English Law and Practice, note 40, at 634. 
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quotation, the judge’s reasoning is squarely focused on party 
autonomy and respect for the arbitral process.  
Such provision is far from novel, however, and it has been stated 
that “default provisions for the appointment of the arbitral tribunal are 
found in almost all municipal legislation”. 187  It is therefore not 
surprising to find that provision is made under the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. This may be found in Article 11. First and foremost, 
party autonomy is at the heart of this provision in that it sets out 
clearly that parties may agree as to the appointment procedure to 
be adopted. Where there is a failure to agree between the parties, 
this may be conducted by the court upon agreement of the 
parties, the existing arbitrators or another competent authority. 
There are significant differences in the wording of the two 
provisions. Under the Arbitration Act, section 18 clearly delimits 
the powers of the court in its appointment of arbitrators. For 
example these are stated as follows: 
(a) to give directions as to the making of any necessary appointments; 
(b) to direct that the tribunal shall be constituted by such 
appointments (or any one or more of them) as have been made; 
(c) to revoke any appointments already made; 
(d) to make any necessary appointments itself. 
                                                 
 
187 Ibid., at 140. 
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 Whereas under the Model Law, Article 11 is more concerned 
with the qualification of the arbitrator that the court ultimately 
selects.188 Even in the first subsection of that Article, it is given 
that: “no person shall be precluded by reason of his nationality from acting 
as an arbitrator”. 
Although the former would appear to define the scope of the 
court more precisely, it may in reality allow the court to go 
further than envisaged under the Model Law. In this respect we 
                                                 
 
188 Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides 
“(1) No person shall be precluded by reason of his nationality from acting as an arbitrator, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties.  
(2) The parties are free to agree on a procedure of appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators, subject 
to the provisions of paragraphs (4) and (5) of this article.  
(3) Failing such agreement, 
(a) in an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two 
arbitrators thus appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator; if a party fails to appoint the 
arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of a request to do so from the other party, or if the two 
arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within thirty days of their appointment, the 
appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the court or other authority specified in 
article 6; 
(b) in an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties are unable to agree on the arbitrator, he 
shall be appointed, upon request of a party, by the court or other authority specified in article 6. 
(4) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties, 
(a) a party fails to act as required under such procedure, or 
(b) the parties, or two arbitrators, are unable to reach an agreement expected of them under such 
procedure, or  
(c) a third party, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to it under such 
procedure, any party may request the court or other authority specified in article 6 to take the 
necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for 
securing the appointment. 
(5) A decision on a matter entrusted by paragraph (3) or (4) of this article to the court or other 
authority specified in article 6 shall be subject to no appeal. The court or other authority, in 
appointing an arbitrator, shall have due regard to any qualifications required of the arbitrator by 
the agreement of the parties and to such considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of 
an independent and impartial arbitrator and, in the case of a sole or third arbitrator, shall take 
into account as well the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than those 
of the parties.”   
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must also bear in mind the underlying philosophy of the two 
legislative frameworks which has been alluded to earlier. In 
particular, that the Model Law provides under Article 5 that no 
court “shall intervene”. Where the Model Law is silent, one may 
therefore speculate that the court will not intervene in such 
circumstances. Furthermore, under the Arbitration Act it is 
specifically provided that the appointments already made may be 
revoked. Coupled with the foregoing philosophy, it is hard to 
imagine that such would be permitted under the Model Law. 
*   *   * 
Although under both of these areas, the Arbitration Act would 
appear to go further and provide much greater detail, it is 
submitted that the former is nevertheless likely to permit greater 
court intervention prior to the commencement of arbitral 
proceedings. In respect of time limits and the discretion to 
appoint arbitrators, an UNCITRAL court is likely to be 
restricted from exercising discretion beyond the terms of the 
Model Law, particularly having regard to the underlying tenets of 
this legislative framework. 
3.4.2 Judicial Intervention During Arbitral Proceedings 
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Under this section the forms of judicial intervention once the 
arbitral proceedings have been commenced will be examined, as 
before, under both the Arbitration Act and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. In particular, the assistance that the court can 
provide to the arbitral tribunal in the form of interim measures 
as well as the staying of legal proceedings and controversial 
inherent jurisdiction of the court to intervene will be considered 
in some depth. 
 a) Providing Assistance to Arbitral Proceedings 
In accordance with section 44 of the Arbitration Act 1996, a 
court is entitled to support an arbitration in certain enumerated 
ways. Those circumstances include the taking of the evidence of 
witnesses, the preservation of evidence, making orders relating 
to property which is the subject of the proceedings, the sale of 
any goods the subject of the proceedings or the granting of an 
interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver. Apart from 
the final two of the aforementioned powers, all the powers given 
to a court in respect of these circumstances may also be 
exercised by the arbitrator. This may be particularly useful, for 
example, where it is necessary to make an order over property 
which belongs to a third party but is nevertheless implicated in 
the proceedings. Ordinarily, an arbitrator’s powers are confined 
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to property which is owned by, or in the possession of, a party 
to the proceedings.189 
Section 44 is a non-mandatory power and the parties to an 
arbitration agreement may elect to exclude it. It is notable that it 
applies even where the seat of the arbitration happens to be 
outside England or if no seat has been selected. However, the 
court may not exercise its powers if it believes that it would be 
inappropriate where the seat is designated as outside of 
England.190 
It is also worth noting that there has been some divergence 
between the original intention of the manner in which these 
provisions should be applied as conceived by the DAC and the 
way in which they have actually been applied by the courts. For 
example, in Hiscox Underwriting Ltd v Dickson Manchester & 
Company Ltd191 the court decided to interpret section 44 in a less 
restrictive way than had been advocated by the Departmental 
Advisory Committee. The latter’s Report had asserted that the 
power of the court to intervene in cases of urgency was limited 
to the preservation of assets of evidence. Cooke J argued that on 
an interpretation of the words in the provision, the court has a 
wider latitude since the language was permissive rather than 
prohibitive.  
                                                 
 
189 Section 38(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
190 See Tweeddale and Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and 
English Law and Practice, note 40, at 715. 
191 [2004] EWHC 479 (Comm). 
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Section 44 offers a voice of support for the arbitral proceedings 
in that under section 44(5) the applicant must satisfy the court 
that the arbitral tribunal has no power to make the order 
required. It is submitted that this is in line with the notion that 
section 44 is intended to be supportive of the arbitral function 
rather than stifling of arbitral procedure. As Rutherford and 
Sims point out, “…the court’s powers are therefore supplementary to the 
arbitrator’s powers and the intention is that they should be exercised only 
where, for any reason, the arbitrator is unable to exercise them 
effectively”. 192  Furthermore, an order under section 44 may be 
sought where the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted. 
However, once the arbitral tribunal has been fully constituted, 
the court may return control of the proceedings to the tribunal. 
The court may then order that any orders it had made whilst 
awaiting the proper constitution of the arbitral proceedings shall 
cease to have effect subject to an order of the arbitral tribunal. 
This latter power is provided for under section 44(6) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996. 
                                                
An example of a court order given prior to the constitution of 
an arbitral tribunal is evident in Belair LLC v Basel LLC, 193  
whereby the Commercial Court granted an order for interim 
relief under the 1996 Act. Its reason for doing so was to 
preserve the assets involved in the case – a palace in Georgia – 
 
 
192 Rutherford and Sims, Arbitration Act 1996: A Practical Guide, note 28, at 150. 
193 [2009] EWHC 725 (Comm). 
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pending the outcome of an arbitral tribunal which had yet to be 
fully constituted. It was therefore, to use the language of section 
44(5) of the 1996 Act, unable to act effectively and thus judicial 
assistance was permissible.  
This provision is a case in point of court powers being curtailed 
in comparison with the previous position under section 12 of 
the Arbitration Act 1950. Judicial power to order security for 
costs and for the amount in dispute have been omitted. It is now 
for the arbitrator to order such security subject to the parties’ 
agreement otherwise. One might argue that this leaves 
vulnerable parties potentially exposed where an inexperienced 
arbitrator overlooks such an order. The corollary of such an 
oversight would obviously be disadvantageous for the non-
defaulting party left to cover the costs incurred by the tribunal. 
Further, there would appear to be no power for either an 
arbitrator or court to order security for the amount in dispute.194 
This leaves a rather significant vacuum in securing that a just 
outcome is achieved by the arbitral tribunal. It may be envisaged 
that where, for example, companies implicated in proceedings 
are close to insolvency or are being wound up, a party seeking 
compensation may find themselves without a remedy.  
Nevertheless, Rutherford and Sims urge that the overriding 
spirit of this section is captured by the presence of many 
                                                 
 
194 Rutherford and Sims, Arbitration Act 1996: A Practical Guide, note 28, at 151. 
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safeguards which are provided “…to ensure that the court does not 
officiously intervene in matters which should be within the arbitrator’s 
province, in accordance with the principle as to court intervention set out in s 
1(c) [of the Arbitration Act 1996]”.195A prime example of this, as 
well as being an assertion of confidence in the arbitral tribunal 
itself, is that of section 44(6) of the Act. This gives the arbitrator 
a power to order that an order of court made under section 44 
ceases to have effect. Indeed, “[t]hat an arbitrator or organisation 
may terminate the effect of an order of court is an entirely new concept and 
illustrates the radical nature of the thinking behind so much of this Act”.196 
The sentiment expressed by the section reflects the intention 
that the court should intervene in arbitral proceedings only 
insofar as it is required to ensure that they function effectively. 
b) Staying Legal Proceedings 
In order to avoid a party frustrating the arbitral proceedings by 
invoking court proceedings, both the Model Law and the 
Arbitration Act provide for a stay on legal proceedings. Article 8 
of the Model Law outlines that if a matter before a court is the 
subject of an arbitration agreement, the court on the application 
of any party must refer them to arbitration, unless it finds that 
the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.  
                                                 
 
195 Ibid., at 152. 
196 Ibid., at 153. 
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Davidson points out that the aforementioned formula “might 
appear quite familiar as it is drawn from Article 2(3) of the 1958 New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, and in turn appeared in section 1(1) of the Arbitration Act 1975 
– which aimed to give effect to the Convention within the United 
Kingdom”.197 
In the original 1975 English Arbitration Act, 198  an additional 
ground for refusing a stay was provided for. This meant if there 
was, in fact, no dispute between the parties with regard to the 
matter to be referred, the court could refuse to grant a stay. 
However, this further element cannot be found in the 1996 Act 
since, as the DAC asserted the provision was “confusing and 
unnecessary”.199 This brings UK arbitration law into line with both 
the New York Convention and the Model Law in this respect.  
In the Act, a differentiation which has long existed in English 
arbitral legislation remains. The Act differentiates between 
domestic and non-domestic agreements. Where agreements are 
non-domestic, the UK’s treaty obligations demanded that a stay 
should be automatically granted where there was a valid 
arbitration agreement in operation. On the other hand, where a 
domestic agreement is at issue, a court must grant a stay unless it 
                                                 
 
197 Fraser Davidson, “The New Arbitration Act – A Model Law?” (1997) Journal of 
Business Law 101, at 103. 
198 Section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1975. 
199 Report of the Departmental Advisory Committee on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 1989, note 1, at [55]. 
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is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for not requiring the 
parties to abide by the arbitration agreement. It is therefore still 
possible to be refused a stay in relation to domestic arbitration 
agreements. Davidson highlights that “the Act gives no indication 
what is meant by “sufficient grounds”, and indeed this deliberately vague 
phrase is employed to cover the many and various instances where the courts 
have felt able to refuse a stay”.200 The provision does not accord with 
the guiding philosophy of party autonomy and judicial non-
interference. In this respect, even the DAC posited : 
“…consideration should be given to abolishing [the distinction between 
domestic and non-domestic arbitration agreements] and applying the New 
York Convention rules to all cases…[which] fit much more happily with the 
concept of party autonomy than our domestic rules, which were framed as a 
time when attitudes to arbitration were very different and the courts were 
anxious to avoid what they described usurpation of their process.”201 
Despite this forthright assertion, the DAC did not, however, 
recommend for the distinction existent within the domestic and 
non-domestic frameworks to be abolished. The above quotation 
captures the problems which such a distinction creates in terms 
of both party autonomy and enabling judicial intervention at a 
lower threshold than is permitted by the respective Model Law 
provision under Article 8. Furthermore, it facilitates the 
                                                 
 
200 Fraser Davidson, “The New Arbitration Act – A Model Law?” (1997) Journal of 
Business Law 101, at 103. 
201 Report of the Departmental Advisory Committee on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 1989, note 1, at [320]. 
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possibility that a party wishing to delay arbitral proceedings, has 
an avenue to do so in the case of a domestic agreement by 
instigating litigation in an attempt to prove that there are 
sufficient grounds for not requiring the parties to abide by the 
arbitration agreement.  
 
c) Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court 
“Parties, however, sometimes conduct themselves in such a manner as to 
induce the Court of Chancery to restrain them from proceeding in a 
reference”.202  The controversial power of the court to intervene in 
the context of UK arbitration remains and Aeberli articulates: 
“…the court retains its inherent jurisdiction to determine, by declaration 
and injunction, an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction at any time and 
irrespective of whether the party seeking such relief satisfies the requirements 
for recourse to the court under sections 32, 67 or 72 of the 1996 Act.”203 
Similarly, Blanch points out that: “it is not possible to entirely exclude 
the court’s role with wording in an arbitration agreement”.204 
First, section 32 of the Act enables the court to determine the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal following an objection by one 
of the parties that the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction 
under section 31. The former provision is mandatory in nature 
                                                 
 
202 Francis Russell, David Sutton and Judith Gill Russell on Arbitration, note 98. 
203 Aeberli, “Jurisdictional Disputes under the Arbitration Act 1996: A Procedural 
Route Map” 21(3) Arbitration International (2005) 253.  
204 Blanch, “Interim Measures in International Arbitration and The UK Courts – 
The Current Position”, 6(5) International Arbitration Law Review (2003) 161. 
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under the Act and represents an alternative route for the party 
seeking to challenge the jurisdiction by determination as a 
preliminary point as opposed to determination by the tribunal 
itself. Tweeddale and Tweeddale point out that where this 
avenue is followed, “[i]t will, in such circumstances, be quicker and 
cheaper to proceed by this route rather than proceed ex parte to an award, 
which would thereafter be challenged”. 205  The requirements for an 
application under this section, in an attempt to preserve the 
principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, are relatively stringent. 
They include that an application is made with the agreement in 
writing of all the parties to the proceedings or, alternatively, with 
the permission of the tribunal and where the court is satisfied 
that determination is likely to produce substantial savings in 
costs, that the application was made without delay, and that 
there is good reason why this matter should be decided by the 
court.206 It should also be noted that a further option remains 
for a party after the award, by way of a challenge to the 
substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal in accordance with 
section 67 of the Act.  
                                                
 The following discourse embodies an attempt to chart the 
development of this doctrine through the case of the UK courts 
and its current state within the framework of the Arbitration Act 
1996.  
 
 
205 Tweeddale and Tweeddale, A Practical Approach to Arbitration Law, note 13, at 
78. 
206 See section 32(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
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The common law cases of Sneddon v Kyle207 and Ontario Danforth 
Travel Centre Ltd. v British Overseas Airways Corporation208 are early 
authorities for the proposition that the court has an inherent 
jurisdiction to restrain arbitration proceedings where it would be 
right and just to do so. This may occur, for example, where the 
claimant has been guilty of inexcusable and inordinate delay that 
a fair hearing is impossible. At common law, therefore, a court 
hearing a case is able to dismiss the claim for want of 
prosecution. 
The issue of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to deal with a 
delay of prosecution was dealt with in England in the leading 
case of Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik Respondents v 
South India Shipping Corporation Ltd.209 The plaintiffs in that case 
claimed that arbitration proceedings in which they were 
respondents had been prejudiced by the delay of the defendants 
in prosecuting the arbitration. Thus, they sought an injunction 
restraining the defendants from continuing with the arbitration 
and a declaration that the arbitrator had the power to strike out 
the claim. The Court had to answer the question as to whether it 
had jurisdiction to restrain a party from continuing with the 
arbitration. At first instance, Donaldson J held that an injunction 
for restraint of arbitral proceedings could be granted. He argued 
that the prejudice that the plaintiffs suffered as a result of the 
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delay was very serious which entitled the Court to order the 
defendants to desist from taking any further action in purported 
pursuance of the arbitration agreement. He also noted that the 
Arbitrator had the same power as a court to dismiss a claim for 
want of prosecution, unless the parties agreed to curtail the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction.  
The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords, in which the decision was not overturned. 
The Court of Appeal underlined that claimants in an arbitration 
are under a duty not to delay and where this happens, the 
respondents were entitled to treat this as a breach of the 
arbitration agreement. In the House of Lords, Lord Denning 
MR giving the decision of the Court, in no unclear terms 
asserted that it be recognised that arbitrators are impotent and 
thus it was only the court that could bring the party to book. 
The Arbitration Act 1979, then in force in England and Wales, 
provided for courts to make orders enforcing arbitration orders.  
This issue has been the subject of some discourse through a 
number of cases subsequent to the enactment of the 1996 Act, 
which will presently be considered. It is interesting in this 
respect to examine whether there has been a change in attitude 
on the part of the courts given the different guiding philosophy 
that the 1996 Act advocates. In ABB Lummus Global Ltd v Keppel 
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Fels Ltd,210 the Court held that section 1(c) of the Act prevented 
it from determining the jurisdiction of the tribunal, unless the 
requirements under section 32 were fulfilled. The case that 
followed was Vale de Rio Doce Navegacao SA v Shanghai Bao Steel 
Ocean Shipping Co Ltd, which although considering the former 
case, refrained from following it. The Court held that the 
restriction on court intervention in section 1(c) was not, like 
Article 5 of the Model Law, expressed as an absolute 
prohibition. It therefore did not remove the court’s inherent 
power to consider jurisdictional issues surrounding arbitral 
proceedings. The Court suggested that, in the alternative, the 
provision expressed the general intention that the courts should 
not usually intervene except under the parameters if Part I of the 
Act. However, it is notable that the Court nevertheless refused 
to intervene under its inherent power as it asserted that it had 
not been the intention of Parliament to permit such an 
intervention.  
In FT Mackley & Co Ltd v Gosport Marina Ltd, 211  the Court 
accepted that section 1(c) did not exclude the court’s inherent 
power to grant declaratory relief in respect of a question 
concerning the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The requirements for the 
section 32 application had not been met and ordinarily it should 
have been the arbitral tribunal which determined the 
                                                 
 
210 [1999] 2 Lloyds Rep 24. 
211 [2002] BLR 367. 
 141
jurisdictional question. In this case, albeit reluctantly, the Court 
determined the application for a declaration as it argued that the 
question was of general importance and, in addition, as the 
answer to that question had implications for validity of the 
reference to arbitration.  
Very recent cases are indicative of positive support for the 
arbitration process, evident particularly in Fili Shipping Co Ltd and 
others v Premium Nafta Products Ltd and Others.212 In that case, the 
Trial Judge refused an application for a stay of arbitral 
proceedings. This decision was upheld on appeal to the Court of 
Appeal which held that the dispute did not fall within the 
arbitration clause and section 7 of the 1996 Act required an 
arbitration clause to be treated as a distinct agreement. Latterly, 
Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords determined that the 
construction of the arbitration clause should be considered in an 
assessment of whether the parties had intended a matter to be 
excluded from arbitration. He highlighted that the principle of 
separability applied and that the agreement to go to arbitration 
could only be challenged on grounds relating directly to that 
agreement. The arbitration agreement contained nothing to 
exclude disputes on the challenged grounds. The legal 
proceedings for rescission and the appeal were therefore 
dismissed. 
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*   *   * 
It is submitted that the latter judgment of Lord Hoffmann 
represents a pragmatic and desirable attitude towards the 
meaning of the arbitration agreement. His words demonstrate a 
respect for the agreement between, and the autonomy of, the 
parties to arbitration. It is a welcome development upon the 
decision of Lord Denning MR in Bremer VulkanSchiffbau und 
Maschinenfabrik Respondents v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd, 
especially in the sense that it appears to instil a confidence in 
arbitral procedure and the decisions of arbitrators. Furthermore, 
it is likely to aid in that necessary preservation of efficiency in 
the arbitration process by constricting the opportunities for 
challenge in the courts. To this end, Fili Shipping represents a 
significant and positive change in the approach of the court to 
the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to intervene in arbitral 
proceedings. Although this jurisdiction to intervene in arbitral 
proceedings has been carved out by the courts themselves, there 
would appear to be emerging a more deferential attitude towards 
arbitration on the part of the courts in its application. It remains, 
in contrast to the Model Law, however, within the remit of the 
judge to restrain arbitral proceedings which, in theory at least, 
represents a significant power over arbitral proceedings with no 
significant restraints.  
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 3.4.3 Judicial Intervention After Arbitral Proceedings 
This aspect of judicial intervention represents the most 
contestable interference in arbitral procedure. From a critical 
perspective court interference at this stage necessarily entails an 
undermining of the meaning of arbitral awards. Where parties 
are able to challenge, appeal or overturn the outcome of an 
arbitration, the finality and currency that such an award is 
compromised. On the other hand, one may take the view, as the 
DAC Report of 1996 that, “[e]nforcement through the court provides the 
classic case of using the court to support the arbitral process”. 213  The 
relative merits and demerits of court interference after the 
conclusion of arbitral proceedings will henceforth be examined. 
The level and form of review for arbitral awards varies between 
jurisdictions. Three broad frameworks of review for arbitral 
awards by courts can be distinguished however:  
(i) a right to appeal matters related to both points of law and 
procedural fairness; 
(ii) a right to challenge an award only for defects of procedural 
integrity in the arbitration; and 
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(iii) no judicial review at all.214 
The majority of leading arbitral centres adhere closely to the 
second model but there are a number of notable exceptions: 
England and Switzerland may be cited as examples in this 
regard. In the former jurisdiction, parties to arbitration are 
permitted to opt out of judicial review on the legal merits of the 
case. In Switzerland, a novel framework is adopted allowing 
parties to choose between the three regimes. 
Given that a court may reject the enforcement of an award 
under the Arbitration Act 1996, it is the judiciary that, in effect, 
have final sanction over the arbitration. For an award to have 
any practical value it must be enforced in accordance with 
summary proceedings under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 
1996. In the alternative, it may be enforced by bringing an action 
on the award in court. 
More specifically, section 66 provides that the leave of the court 
is required to enforce an award just as a judgment or order of 
the court is. The court will not grant leave where it is shown to 
be defective or invalid. Furthermore, summary proceedings may 
be stayed pending the determination of an appeal or challenge to 
the award as is provided for by the 1996 Act. In this way, the 
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court exercises its final supervisory role. This, it is strongly 
argued, precisely leads to that undermining of an award made as 
a result of an arbitration. A great deal of interference from the 
court is required to give the arbitral award any value which 
severely weakens the armoury of this independent method of 
dispute resolution. 
In the subsections that follow under this head, these 
fundamental aspects of arbitration - execution, enforcement and 
challenge of an arbitral award - will be considered under both 
the Arbitration Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
a) The nature of the award 
Before analysing the power of the court’s intervention for the 
enforcement of an arbitral award some remarks should be made 
on the nature of the award. Tweeddale and Tweeddale highlight 
the scarcity of definition as far as awards are concerned: “The 
term ‘award’ is one that permeates municipal arbitration legislation, 
arbitration rules, treaties and conventions. However, it is a term that is often 
not defined”. 215  This is indeed true for the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Rules of 
Arbitration and broadly for the Arbitration Act 1996. The 
aforementioned authors point out that only two rule-systems 
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attempt meaningful definitions. These are the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 1958 and the Singapore International 
Arbitration Act 1994. The former is unhelpful given that it 
simply states “[t]he terms ‘arbitral awards’ shall include not only awards 
made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by 
permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted”.216 Section 
2(1) of the Singapore International Arbitration Act, however, 
provides that an award (including an interim award) is a decision 
on the substance in dispute. The importance of distinguishing an 
award from other orders made by the arbitral tribunal is 
fundamental since in many countries the arbitration laws accord 
different powers to courts as regards awards or orders.  
Despite this lack of definition, it is section 48 of the Arbitration 
Act 1996 which details the remedies that are available to the 
arbitral tribunal. These remedies may constitute the substance of 
the award. A basic distinction made in the section is between 
declarations and orders. A declaration may be given by the 
arbitral tribunal determining any matter in the proceedings. This 
in effect gives the arbitrator the power to decide the meaning of 
a contractual provision. The declaration may also form part of 
the substance of the award where a declaratory award is sought. 
Alternatively, the arbitral tribunal may make an order. This could 
be in the form of an order to pay money, an injunction, specific 
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performance or the ratification, setting aside or cancellation of a 
deed or document. Interestingly, there is no equivalent provision 
in the UNCITRAL Model Law and it is submitted that this is a 
prime example of the prescriptive nature of the Arbitration Act 
as opposed to the more open-textured Model Law. 
b) The Execution of the Award 
Once an award has been made by an arbitral tribunal, there is no 
guarantee that it will be carried out by the party on which it is 
incumbent. It may be necessary for the party whom the award is 
made in favour to have it enforced against the other party. This 
can only be done through national courts. It is interesting to 
note, however, that “[a]lthough there is no statistical proof it appears 
that most arbitration awards are carried out voluntarily”.217 Where this is 
not the case, the enforcing party must seek enforcement in the 
place where the other party has assets to make an order seizing 
those assets to the value of the award. Therefore, enforcement 
may not always take place in the jurisdiction under which the 
arbitration took place.  
An English arbitration award may be enforced by an action in 
the courts, or by a summary procedure under section 66 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996, by an originating summons made ex parte 
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asking for leave of the court. A foreign arbitration award on the 
other hand, may be enforced in England in a number of 
different ways. First, there is a procedure at common law for 
enforcement, that is by securing an English judgment. Secondly, 
if the award falls within the New York Convention, as enacted 
into English domestic law by the Arbitration Act 1996,218 the 
Washington Convention of 1965,219 or the Geneva Convention 
on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1927, 220  the 
position for the claimant is the same as for the domestic 
claimant. Third, if it has been made enforceable by a foreign 
judgment, an action on that judgment may be sought in the 
courts. Fourth, if it was made in a country to which the 
Administration of Justice Act 1920, Part II, or the Foreign 
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 extends, the 
arbitral award is treated as if it were a judgment rendered by a 
court in that country. Finally, if it was made in another part of 
the United Kingdom (other than England or Wales) and is 
enforceable there as a judgment, it is enforceable by registration 
in England.221 
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As previously mentioned, as regards the execution of an English 
arbitration award, section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996 
provides for a summary procedure which can be initiated by any 
Parties to the arbitral proceedings who is willing to seek a court 
enforcement of an award. This provision is analogous in 
substance to that of Article 35 under the Model Law. Within the 
framework of section 66, parties may seek an order to enforce 
the award as if it were a judgment of the court and to this end 
may have the award entered as a judgment. Accordingly, an 
application must be made to the court for leave to enforce the 
award and, in the case of an award not being fulfilled, the 
remedies where a judgment of the court is not complied with 
will be available to the parties enforcing the award. It is worth 
noting that section 66 embodies a mandatory rule and parties, 
therefore, are not permitted to contract out of this enforcement 
provision even where they agree in the matter. 
An enforcement order can be made to apply to the whole award 
or just part of it, including any interest or costs that may be 
owed. One proviso applies, however. In the case of Walker v 
Rowe,222 it was held that the Court was not entitled to include 
within its enforcement order interest on the award where the 
arbitral tribunal had failed to include this within its award.223 It is 
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therefore not permitted to make good a part of a defective 
award made by the arbitral tribunal.  
The cases of Brown Ltd v Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer 
Waldbesitzer,224 and Delta Civil Engineering v London Docklands225 aid 
in the identification of a shift in the burden of proof as regards 
enforcement procedure. They illustrate that the previous 
common law position was that the enforcing party had the onus 
of proving that there was a valid arbitration agreement and that 
the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction. This has changed somewhat 
as the burden of proof now rests upon the party seeking to 
prevent enforcement to show why the award should not be 
enforced, but only following some formalities being completed 
by the enforcing party. Presently, under the Arbitration Act and 
the Civil Procedure Rules, the enforcing party must demonstrate 
before the court that the arbitration agreement and the award 
are valid. Then, that party must state in the application to the 
court that the award has not been complied with or the extent to 
which it has not been complied with at the date of the 
application. 
This subtle shift in the burden of proof through the 
jurisprudence of the courts represents an underpinning of the 
importance accorded to arbitral awards and is further evidence 
of the supportive role that the courts can play in ensuring that 
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the integrity of arbitral tribunals is maintained from beginning to 
end.  
c) Challenging or Appealing the Award 
The Arbitration Act provides that an award may be challenged 
or appealed on the grounds of: (i) lack of jurisdiction under 
section 67; (ii) serious irregularity of the proceedings or 
substantial injustice suffered by a party in accordance with 
section 68; and (iii) substantive breach of law, under section 69.  
On the other hand, the UNCITRAL Model Law, namely Article 
34, provides for an arbitral award to be set aside in certain 
circumstances mainly different from those established by the 
Arbitration Act. More specifically, an arbitration agreement can 
be appealed not only on the ground of the lack of substantive 
jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrators (Article 34(2)(a)(iii)), 
but also in order to challenge (i) the incapacity of one of the 
parties to enter into an arbitration agreement (Article 34(2)(a)(i)); 
and (ii) the infringement of the public policy of the State where 
the award is made (Article 34(2)(b)(ii)).  
All that established, in the following paragraphs the provisions 
under each legislative framework will henceforth be examined 
with a view to determining which least undermines the value of 
an arbitral award. 
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Section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 allows a party who 
contests that an award was made by a tribunal which did not 
have jurisdiction, to appeal the award for lack of substantive 
jurisdiction. According to this rule a party may apply to the 
court:  
“(a) challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive 
jurisdiction; or  
(b) for an order declaring an award made by the tribunal on the merits to be 
of no effect, in whole or in part, because the tribunal did not have substantive 
jurisdiction.” 
Section 67 of the Arbitration Act is a mandatory section, which 
parties cannot set aside on the basis of a mutual agreement. 
According to this rule, parties may challenge either the arbitral 
tribunal’s ruling because it lacked jurisdiction; or its award on the 
merits - on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction - and 
apply for an order declaring the award to be of no effect, in 
whole or in part. 
Referring to the matters laid down in section 30(1) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996, section 82 enumerates the specific 
circumstances in which arbitrators may lack substantive 
jurisdiction. These include, (1) where there is an invalid 
arbitration agreement, (2) where the tribunal was not properly 
constituted, and (3) where matters submitted to arbitration did 
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not fall within the scope of application of the arbitration 
agreement. 
It is worth noting that this provision differs from that laid down 
in section 32 in that the former gives the party the right to 
appeal the award for lack of jurisdiction only after the award has 
been issued, while the latter refers to the power of courts to 
make a determination of a preliminary point of jurisdiction, 
pending an arbitral proceeding.226  In that regard, it has to be 
pointed out that section 67 can be used also to challenge a 
preliminary award issued by the tribunal during the proceedings 
in order to decide on the objection raised by a party as to the 
tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction, under section 31(4) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996.227 This, to some extent, contravenes the 
principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz given that it leaves a 
determination of jurisdiction ex post facto to the courts. However, 
this assertion may only be made in a strict theoretical sense, 
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since, in reality, recourse will always be necessary where the 
arbitrator makes an erroneous decision on jurisdiction at the 
outset of proceedings. 
  
The second primary ground on which an award may be 
challenged is where a serious irregularity exists. This is 
provided for under section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996.228 
This rule generally reflects the position as it was set out under 
sections 22(1) and 23 of the Arbitration Act 1950 and also under 
Article 34 of the Model Law. Despite that there still exist 
important differences in respect of each of the aforementioned 
provisions.  
The scope of the grounds for serious irregularity have, in fact, 
been narrowed under the Arbitration Act 1996. More 
specifically, under the previous Arbitration Acts 1950-1979, an 
award could be, more generally, remitted back to the arbitral 
tribunal where a deficiency in procedure had occurred. This 
happened in the case of Indian Oil Corp v Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd,229 
in which an arbitration was requested to deal with an argument 
which had not been submitted to it in the pleadings or during 
the hearing. Further, a discussion of the change features in the 
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House of Lords judgment of Lesotho Highlands Development 
Authority v Impregilo SpA and Others,230 in which the Law Lords 
describe that “[t]he sweeping generality of the provision [under the 1950 
Act] is clear…[and]…in the eighties and nineties there was persistent 
criticism about the excessive reach of these powers of intervention”.231 
Conversely, the Model Law makes no reference to serious 
irregularity under its equivalent provision: i.e. Article 34. Instead 
it provides an exhaustive list – in contradistinction to the non-
exhaustive list under section 68 - of those limited circumstances 
whereby an award may be set aside. 
Returning to the 1996 Act, an award can be challenged before 
courts, on the ground of section 68, where there is a serious 
irregularity in relation to the arbitrator’s conduct at any stage in 
the procedure or as to the issuing of the award. “Irregularities”, 
according to section 68(2), can include: (a) failure by the tribunal 
to comply with section 33 (general duty of tribunal), (b) the 
tribunal exceeding its powers (otherwise than by exceeding its 
substantive jurisdiction), (c) failure by the tribunal to conduct 
the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the 
parties, (d) failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that 
were put to it, (e) any arbitral or other institution or person 
vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings 
or the award exceeding its powers, (f) uncertainty or ambiguity 
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as to the effect of the award, (g) the award being obtained by 
fraud or the award or the way in which it was procured being 
contrary to public policy, (h) failure to comply with the 
requirements as to the form of the award, or (i) any irregularity 
in the conduct of the proceedings or in the award which is 
admitted by the tribunal or by any arbitral or other institution or 
person vested by the parties in relation to the proceedings or the 
award. 
The nine circumstances outlined above serve to illustrate that 
Section 68 provides a comprehensive list of situations whereby a 
serious irregularity may be said to arise. The prescriptive nature 
of this provision suggests that outside of these circumstances, 
there exists very little scope to challenge an award on the ground 
of this legal basis. This is supported by the 1996 Report of the 
DAC, which highlighted that “Clause 68 is really designed as a long 
stop, only available in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong in 
its conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected.” 
A further ground for challenging an award is that of substantial 
injustice. The DAC set out the test for substantial injustice as 
follows: “The test of ‘substantial injustice’ is intended to be applied by way 
of support for the arbitral process, not by way of interference with that 
process. Thus it is only in those cases where it can be said that what has 
happened is so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of the 
arbitral process that we would expect the Court to take action. The test is 
not what would have happened had the matter been litigated. To apply such 
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a test would be to ignore the fact that the parties have agreed to arbitrate, not 
litigate. Having chosen arbitration, the parties cannot validly complain of 
substantial injustice unless what has happened simply cannot on any view be 
defended as an acceptable consequence of that choice.232 
As is plainly evident from this piece, a strong emphasis on the 
need to maintain party autonomy is fundamental to the arbitral 
process. It recommends that the courts take a qualified approach 
and that the judiciary respect the choice made by the parties to 
the arbitration. Such an endorsement is to be admired and it is 
hoped that the courts, in applying this test, act with the restraint 
that is expected of them. The Author would advocate for this 
test to be applied to other provisions of the Arbitration Act 
1996 which allow for judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings 
given that it is likely to remind judges of the importance in 
maintaining respect for party autonomy when matters 
concerning arbitration reach the forum of litigation.  
The final way in which an award may be challenged is on a point 
of law. This is facilitated under section 69 of the 1996 Act. The 
reasoning for including a restricted right of appeal in this way 
was provided by the 1996 DAC’s Report: “It seems to us, that with 
the safeguards we propose, a limited right of appeal is consistent with the fact 
that the parties have chosen to arbitrate rather than litigate. For example, 
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many arbitration agreements contain an express choice of law clause to 
govern the rights and obligations arising out of the bargain made subject to 
that agreement. It can be said with force that in such circumstances, the 
parties have agreed that the law will be properly applied by the arbitral 
tribunal, with the consequence that if the tribunal fails to do this, it is not 
reaching the result contemplated by the arbitration agreement.233 
Although such a provision may seem appropriate, it has not 
been met with universal acceptance. Holmes and O’Reilly 
question the value of section 69, noting that it “adds little to the 
cause of justice or the development of the law. As well as being contrary to 
the spirit of party autonomy…it is a source of cost and inefficiency”.234 The 
right to appeal on a question of law under section 69 is indeed 
broad in scope and it could be viewed as a key disincentive for 
arbitration in England. Parties may, however, opt out of this 
provision, and indeed if they choose to arbitrate in one of the 
leading institutions (for example the London Court of 
International Arbitration) the parties must, in accordance with 
the rule-systems, of those institutions, waive their right to 
appeal. This nevertheless leaves parties to ad hoc arbitration most 
exposed to an extensive appeals process unless the provision is 
expressly opted out of.  
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Tuckey J in Egmatra AG v Macro Trading Corporation,235 recognised 
that Article 69 was broad and warned that the courts should 
exercise it sparingly so as to “respect the decision of the tribunal of the 
parties’ choice”. The underlying principle which should be applied 
in respect of this provision was articulated by the Court of 
Appeal in BMBF (No 12) Ltd v Harland v Wolff Shipbuilding and 
Heavy Industry: 236 “it is not for the courts to substitute its own view for 
that of experienced arbitrators on questions such as this”. Although these 
comments of the judiciary represent a sensible approach as 
regards the application of section 69, they also serve to indicate 
the potential that the provision has for undermining the 
decisions and awards of arbitrators.  
However, it is submitted that the remit of section 69 would 
appear to represent an area where judicial intervention is 
justified given that it concerns an aspect upon which judges are 
pre-eminently qualified and are likely to offer more expertise 
than an arbitrator. As the DAC emphasise in their reasoning, 
“…the parties have agreed that the law will be properly applied by the 
arbitral tribunal” and where this does not occur, it is for a court to 
resolve the issue and restore justice in the case. It would seem 
that, in practice, the fine balancing act required in the exercise of 
this power is achieved by the judiciary. Remarks made by Steyn 
LJ in Geogas SA v Tammo Gas Ltd 237 are testament to this 
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assertion: “The arbitrators are the masters of the facts. On an appeal the 
court must decide any question of law arising from an award on the basis of 
a full and unqualified acceptance of the findings of fact of the arbitrators. It 
is irrelevant whether the court considers those findings of fact to be right or 
wrong. It also does not matter how obvious a mistake by the arbitrators on 
issues of fact might be, or what the scale of the financial consequences of the 
mistake of fact might be”.238 
The circumstances in which section 69 is invoked extend to 
where the proper law of the contract is a foreign law, where the 
parties have chosen a foreign law as the procedural law and 
where there arises a question of fact. In respect of the first 
circumstance, Tweeddale and Tweeddale note that a question of 
law under a foreign law is a question of fact under the law of 
England and Wales and cannot be the subject of an appeal under 
section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.239 
In the case of the second scenario, where a foreign law is chosen 
as the procedural law then this will mean that the non-
mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996 are removed 
in the same way as if the parties had explicitly agreed not to 
include them. An appeal cannot then be brought on a question 
of law under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 if the 
foreign law excludes the right of appeal. Reference should be 
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made to Section 4(5) of the Arbitration Act 1996 in this respect, 
which provides: “…the choice of law other than the law of England and 
Wales or Northern Ireland as the applicable law in respect of a matter 
provided for by a non-mandatory provision of this Part is equivalent to an 
agreement making provision about that matter”.  
Questions of fact comprise the final dimension of this provision. 
Whether an event has occurred or not, or whether an allegation 
is proven or not, is a question of fact and is considered having 
regard to the evidence presented in a case. Tweeddale and 
Tweeddale use the example of a situation in which it is to be 
determined whether there has been a breach of contract and 
whether a loss has been incurred due to the breach of 
contract.240As is evident from the cases of Fence Gate Ltd v NEL 
Construction Ltd 241 and Hallamshire Construction plc v South Holland 
DC,242 an arbitral tribunal’s award cannot be challenged under 
section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 on the basis that it has 
made an error of fact. 
It is a stipulation in accordance with this section that a question 
of law in an appeal must result from a valid award. In Baytur SA v 
Finagro Holding SA, 243  the arbitration proceedings had been 
terminated as one of the companies involved had ceased to exist. 
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An award was made after the termination of proceedings but 
this was held to be invalid and therefore a question of law could 
not arise from it. 
A further requirement pertains to this section. The question of 
law must arise from the arbitration award. The difficulties of such 
were alluded to by Judge Thornton in Fence Gate Ltd v NEL 
Construction Ltd,244 “it is never easy to define what is meant by a question 
of law in the context of an arbitration appeal”. 245  Tweeddale and 
Tweeddale note that “…it may not be the same as a question of law in 
a case of judicial review”.246 Generally, a question of law concerns 
the interpretation of legal principles such as, they exemplify, 
whether a tenancy is an assured tenancy or a secured tenancy, or 
the construction of a contractual term.  
In the alternative, where an arbitral tribunal does not account for 
certain factors in its reasoning or where it confuses law and fact, 
this may lead to an error of law. In Fence Gate Ltd v NEL 
Construction Ltd, Judge Thornton cautioned that where the latter 
occurs – a confusion of law and fact – this could lead to an error 
of principle and thus a question of law is likely to arise in this 
instance. The learned judge further warned that the discretion 
given to an arbitral tribunal must not be used in a way which is 
contrary to the intentions of the parties who have conferred 
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such power on it, and also in accordance with the law. 
Moreover, it must not be exercised in a manner in which a 
reasonable arbitration tribunal properly directing itself could not 
have reached. In that decision, a workable analogy was drawn 
with the review standards expected of an administrative body, 
that is the Wednesbury Principles of Reasonableness and those 
of an appellate court in its exercise of judicial discretion at a 
lower judicial level, that is the Birkett v James Principles. This is 
what is expected of the arbitral tribunal in its exercise of powers 
and the question of whether the arbitral tribunal adhered to 
these principles is a question of law. This is because it raises a 
question of jurisdiction or a question as to the correct exercise 
of an arbitral tribunal’s powers in accordance with the law.  
“The trend in legal systems around the world has been towards immunising 
the award from challenge on the ground of error of law”.247 The 1996 Act 
does not restrict a right of appeal on a point of law where the 
parties agree to this beforehand or where a court grants leave 
under section 69(2)(b) to make an appeal. As Stewart Shackleton 
comments “[m]aintenance of this recourse sets England apart from 
UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdictions”.248 The court will grant leave 
where it is satisfied that the determination of the question of law 
concerned could substantially affect the rights of the parties. In 
                                                 
 
247 Fraser Davidson, “The New Arbitration Act – A Model Law?” (1997) Journal of 
Business Law 101, at 122. 
248 Stewart Shackleton, “Challenging arbitration awards: Part 3”, 152(7058) New 
Law Journal (2002), 1816. 
 164
this respect, the 1996 Act does not represent much of a 
development upon the 1979 Act in that no significant restriction 
is placed on the right of appeal where all parties agree to such an 
appeal proceeding. Fraser Davidson notes, “[u]nder the 1979 Act 
the courts had played their role in restricting the availability of appeals, and 
certain provisions in the new Act simply cast judicially articulated principles 
in legislative form”.249 It should be emphasised that the 1979 Act 
represented a compromise however, between two competing 
schools of thought as regards the development of English 
arbitration law. First, there were those that asserted that the 
unrestricted right to demand a special case was damaging 
London as a centre of arbitration. Second, there existed a 
converse opinion that the courts continued to develop the 
jurisprudence in this area to ensure a concrete commercial law 
foundation in the United Kingdom. To this extent, the 1979 Act 
charted a course between these competing points of view. By 
extension, therefore, the 1996 Act reflects this compromised 
position and serves only to provide a halfway house on the 
matter of challenging an award on the merits. Furthermore, in 
2002, Shackleton commented that the transition has been far 
from smooth: “[t]he regime of appeals on the legal merits of arbitral 
awards is under pressure because the legal theory that sustained it under 
former arbitration regimes has all but disappeared.”250 
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As has been noted, it is possible for the parties to agree to 
exclude an appeal to the court under certain conditions. 
Davidson sketches an insightful foundation for this major 
reform of English law. 251  The Commercial Court Committee 
Report recommended the retention of a wider right of appeal in 
relation to such disputes on the basis that “there is no evidence of any 
widespread desire to be able to contract out of a right of judicial review and 
that such a right is very important to the maintenance of English law as the 
first choice in international commerce”. 2  
                                                
52 The Report had 
recommended that the right of appeal should be included in 
respect of certain disputes for a limited period of time on the 
view that the then temporary and abnormal increase in the 
number of parties wishing to contract out derived only from the 
abuse of the pre-1979 special case procedure. It was thought that 
once sufficient time had passed for the superiority of the new 
system to be appreciated, parties would come to support an 
entrenched right of appeal. Davidson points out that this has not 
happened. 
As it has been previously noted, under Article 34 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, an arbitral award can only be set 
aside in limited circumstances. These include the incapacity of 
one of the parties to enter into the arbitration agreement (Article 
34(2)(a)(i)), the lack of substantive jurisdiction on the part of the 
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arbitrators (Article 34(2)(a)(iii)), and the infringement of the 
public policy of the state where the award is made (Article 
34(2)(b)(ii)).  
Critically, the UNCITRAL Model Law does not contain any 
general right to appeal an arbitral award for substantive error of 
law. This is to be contrasted with the respective provision of the 
Arbitration Act 1996, which provides strong support for the 
notion of an appeal on a point of law.  
Some reasoning may be offered in this respect. The Model Law 
is designed to accommodate international commercial arbitration 
where it is very likely that neither the parties nor their dispute 
will have any connection with the state which provides the 
forum for the arbitration, and the governing law may equally not 
be that of the forum State. Thus the Model Law provides that 
awards may only be challenged on grounds which are regarded 
as appropriate in the context of international commercial 
arbitration. An appeal under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 
1996, however, may be challenged on a question of law as 
distinguished from a question of fact. Taner Dedezade posits 
that “[t]his distinction is notoriously difficult to draw and arises in almost 
all areas of law when it comes to a question of appeal”. 253  Similarly, 
Shackleton has emphasised the controversy which surrounded 
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the enactment of this particular provision at the time of the 
drafting of the 1996 Act and highlights that the appeal regime is 
fraught with tension: “Confusion surrounds the demarcation of a 
question of law for the purposes of appeal. Implementation continues to be 
problematic. The legislative objective of reducing appeals form arbitrators’ 
awards has not been met; the largest single category of arbitration-related 
litigation continues to involve appeals on the legal merits of arbitral 
awards.”254 
As an interesting rejoinder to the present discussion, it is notable 
that during its involvement in the drafting of the Model Law, the 
United Kingdom expressed reservations concerning the scope of 
the grounds upon which an award could be challenged. It argued 
that the Model Law should set a minimum level of judicial 
control in the arbitral process but, this does not necessarily entail 
“…that the Model Law must set a maximum, eliminating even those 
means of judicial control which the parties themselves desire to retain”.255 
*   *   * 
The focus of the above comparison has been placed on the 
appeal on a point of law. The Arbitration Act facilitates this 
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procedure by virtue of section 69. As highlighted, this remedy is 
not available to parties within the UNCITRAL framework. Since 
the relevant provision under the 1996 Act has a non-mandatory 
character, where the parties agree that they will have no power 
to challenge the award on a point of law, the position under each 
piece of legislation is essentially the same. It is submitted, 
however, that recourse to appeal on a point of law does not 
necessarily undermine the arbitration proceedings, it rather 
encourages arbitrators to apply the law accurately. Indeed, it 
should be remembered that judges are the most qualified arbiters 
when it comes to the application of the law and are better suited 
to this task. However, given the importance that is laid on 
arbitrator’s qualifications in their appointment where this is not 
done so by agreement of the parties under the Model Law, 
perhaps it may be suggested that the lack of appeal on a point of 
law is tempered somewhat by the more thorough vetting of 
arbitrators at the outset. Thus, an error of law is less likely to 
occur in the first place. 
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4 RECENT TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The object of this section is to trace the development of 
arbitration in terms of its popularity and contours of regulation 
through a statistical analysis. Furthermore, an important part of 
this empirical study will comprise a consideration of the success 
of arbitration both from the perspective of the legal regimes in 
which it is facilitated and, in addition, from those who engage 
with the rule-systems in commerce. In addition, the rule-systems 
which serve to regulate arbitration will be the focus of some 
reflection and speculative inquiry.  
A number of studies conducted by various sources will be 
utilised throughout this analysis in order to establish the features 
of an optimal legislative framework for arbitration in the UK. It 
is important to point out in the introduction to this section that 
research conducted by Professor Loukas Mistelis illustrates 
recent trends in international arbitration.256 As a general remark, 
the overriding consensus from a surveyed group of companies 
was of a preference for international arbitration over litigation. 
In fact, 89% of the respondents said they would opt for 
arbitration and/or alternative dispute resolution. Only 11%, on 
the other hand, would consider international litigation for the 
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resolution of international disputes. This trend, it is submitted, is 
explicable by the reasons adverted to at the beginning of this 
work which embody the fundamental advantages of arbitration 
over litigation. The research by Mistelis confirms the postulate 
that arbitration is the dispute resolution mechanism of choice in 
international commerce. To this end, Gerald Aksen comments, 
“…in today’s world the dispute resolution mechanism will invariably be 
arbitration”. 257  The following pie chart ranks these important 
reasons for choosing arbitration, as viewed by the companies 
that participated in the Mistelis’ survey. 
 
Most Important Reasons in Selecting Arbitration 
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As is evident from the pie chart, the most important reason in 
selecting arbitration is an enforceable award. It is difficult to use 
this as a factor in distinguishing arbitration from litigation since 
the latter may be used as a way of enforcing the former. Once an 
arbitral tribunal has made its award, this then binds the parties 
and important legal consequences ensue. If the award is not 
carried out voluntarily, it may be enforced by legal proceedings - 
both locally (in the place in which it was made) and 
internationally. 258  The New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 
is the most significant treaty in the international sphere of 
arbitral awards. This outlines the procedure to be followed for 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, whilst 
specifying limited grounds on which recognition and 
enforcement of such awards may be refused by contracting 
states. Redfern and Hunter posit that “[t]his Convention was one of 
the first of a series of major steps taken by the United Nations since its 
inception to aid in the development of international commercial 
arbitration”.259 Indeed, the Convention has achieved widespread 
acceptance and these authors go on to point out that: “ Most 
major trading nations of the world have become parties to the New York 
Convention. [In 2004, the Convention had] more than 130 signatories, 
including less-developed as well as developed countries. In particular, several 
Latin American states (such as Argentina, Columbia, Mexico and 
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Venezuela) and Arab states (such as Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) 
are parties to the Convention.260 
Suffice it to say, the New York Convention has been successful 
in providing an international framework which harmonises 
national legislative systems and facilitates widespread arbitration. 
The corollary of this regime is that it provides peace of mind for 
those parties who are successful in arbitral proceedings that their 
awards will be enforced in the other party’s jurisdictions. The 
effect of such is undoubtedly healthy for international trade.  
The Author submits that, like the UNCITRAL Model Law, the 
framework of the New York Convention is skeletal. It provides 
a fundamental structure, outlining the key elements to be 
included in a national law for successful regulation of 
international arbitration but, at the same time, enables the 
national legislature and judiciary sufficient scope to tailor an 
arbitral regime which meets a jurisdiction’s specific arbitration 
requirements. The New York Convention is applied by national 
courts in respect of any arbitral award where enforcement is 
sought. As Redfern and Hunter note: “The procedure to be followed 
in enforcement, the time-limits to be observed, the way in which the 
conventions are to be interpreted and other relevant factors are all matters 
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which fall to be determined by the law of the country in which recognition 
and enforcement of a particular award is sought.”261 
Other factors which were cited by those participating in the 
survey included privacy, the possibility for the selection of 
arbitrators and a flexible procedure. These values are the 
preserve of arbitral proceedings and cannot be offered by the 
counterpart dispute resolution mechanism that is litigation. It is 
pertinent to suggest that any court intervention in the arbitral 
process would, relatively speaking, serve to undermine these 
values. 
 
Top Disadvantages About Arbitration  
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Also charted from Professor Mistelis’ research are the top 
disadvantages of arbitration, as cited by the same companies. It 
will be important to consider the reasons which may turn certain 
parties away from arbitration to ensure that in a consideration of 
any legislative framework, the extent to which the disadvantages 
are minimised is analysed.  
For the purposes of the present inquiry it is notable that 
although court intervention is cited as a disadvantageous factor 
of arbitral proceedings, it is in fact the least troubling of the four 
specified disadvantages. On this point, Professor Mistelis simply 
comments that: “…court intervention is possible before, during and after 
the arbitration proceedings but there is not much an arbitration tribunal can 
do to control or limit such interventions. In many cases, however, modern 
arbitration statutes, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law, specifically 
limit court intervention.”262 
The most significant disadvantage of arbitration, according to 
the research, is expense. Indeed, arbitrations have become more 
expensive but this is in part, it is suggested, due to increased 
judicial influence in the arbitral proceedings. Inevitably, where 
court intervention is decreased the cost of the overall 
proceedings both in terms of minimising delay and legal fees will 
be reduced.  
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As the National Arbitration Forum Report highlight, the 
traditional view is that; “Studies comparing arbitration and litigation 
reveal that arbitration is fair to individuals and businesses. Arbitration is 
cost-effective and reduces the time needed to resolve disputes”.263 
Some authors provide a more detailed and practical explanation 
as to why arbitration has become more expensive over time. 
Kenneth Rokinson QC speculates that it is mostly because those 
conducting international commercial arbitrations in the UK are 
members of the litigation department in London law firms. 
Lawyers in these firms and the counsel they brief are not 
specialists in arbitration and they ordinarily handle a mixed case 
load. Rokinson posits “[c]onsequently, arbitration, like litigation, has 
become too cumbersome and too expensive and has thereby failed to offer the 
commercial community an attractive alternative to litigation in the 
courts”. 264  With this in mind, he argues that “arbitration has to 
change and has to rediscover its roots….Those involved in arbitration in 
London have to change their practices if they are to maintain the important 
position that London still enjoys”.265 Rokinson goes on to note that 
only in a few areas are arbitrations conducted comparatively 
quickly and cheaply. These include maritime arbitrations under 
the guise of the London Maritime Arbitrators Association, 
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“whose members still determine a large proportion of their cases on 
documents alone after informal submissions”.266 
Having regard to the relatively recent phenomenon that is 
institutional arbitration, Professor Mistelis indicates that 76% of 
the respondents in the survey preferred this form of arbitration 
over ad hoc arbitration. The reasons for the preference included 
(in rank order): reputation of arbitral institutions, familiarity, 
cost, convenience, advice from external counsel and review of 
awards, amongst others. Having established this preference, the 
investigation was extended to examine which were the preferred 
arbitral institutions. In so doing, a scoring system was devised 
which enabled respondents to give three points for a first choice, 
two points for a second choice and one point for a third choice. 
Sixty-six respondents in total were asked and the results are 
illustrated by the following chart: 
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Preferred Arbitral Institution  
 
 
It is very clear that the overwhelmingly preferred institution was 
that of the ICC with 41 of the 66 respondents ranking this as the 
most important institution. Professor Mistelis explains: “A 
strongly perceived advantage of institutional arbitration is the cache behind 
the name of the institution. Whilst there are doubts as to the overall value of 
such cache, there is a widespread perception that ultimately being able to 
have an arbitration award issued under the name of a well-known 
institution is considered to be helpful.”267 
Statistical information gathered from the Queen Mary School of 
International Arbitration and the Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre illustrate the popularity of individual arbitral 
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institutions over the last eight years in terms of the number of 
cases administered. The following table displays these results. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
ICC (France) 
(International and 
Domestic) 541 566 593 580 561 521 593 599 663 
SIAC 
(Singapore) 
(International) 41 44 38 35 48 45 65 70 71 
LCIA (UK) 
(International) 87 71 88 104 87 118 133 137 213 
SCC (Sweden) 
(International and 
Domestic) 66 68 50 77 45 53 64 81 74 
JCAA (Japan) 
(International) 8 16 8 14 15 9 11 15 12 
AAA-ICDR 
(USA) 
(International) 510 649 672 646 614 580 586 621 703 
 
These results help in drawing some conclusions relevant to this 
inquiry. Taking two premises which are evident from the work 
considered - a preference for institutional arbitration and the 
relevance of reputation to the choice of arbitral institution – it is 
possible to reason that a system of arbitral regulation which is 
recognised the world-over and has achieved widespread success 
is sought-after. These indeed are the attributes of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and as its reputation grows it will only 
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attract more parties to arbitrate in jurisdictions where it is 
implemented.  
A number of arbitral institutions were willing to impart statistical 
information relating to the rules chosen by parties to 
proceedings. This enables some speculation to be drawn in 
relation to the nature of rule-system that parties to arbitral 
proceedings opt for. As will become evident from the empirical 
findings below, certain systems emerge as clear favourites given 
their specific attributes. 
 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce  
 
 
 180
Preferred Rules SIAC  
 
 
The above charts illustrate that in the chosen arbitral institution, 
the rules of that institution are favoured to govern the 
procedure. This was to be expected as parties are likely to 
choose an institution on the basis of the reputation of their rule-
system and other rules systems may be utilised in ad hoc 
arbitrations. The latter chart demonstrates a temporal increase in 
the choice of SIAC Rules and a decline in cases being 
administered under other rules. A number of institutions are 
strengthening their rule-systems as well as introducing tailored 
rule-systems to facilitate, for example, expedited procedures. 
This is evident in the rules offered by the SIAC, not least in that 
the institution has adopted three editions of rules over the last 8 
years. Furthermore, the SIAC SGX-DT Arbitration Rules (2005) 
and the SIAC SGX-DC Arbitration Rules (2006) are designed 
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for the conduct of expedited arbitration for disputes arising 
from derivative trading and derivative clearing respectively. The 
SCC replaced its rules in 2007 and, in 2009, it will introduce new 
rules enabling parties to appoint an Emergency Arbitrator prior 
to the commencement of proceedings when urgent relief is 
required. 
Such a rapid development in the rule-systems of arbitration 
institutions demonstrates a clear response to the demands of 
parties to arbitral proceedings. These new frameworks represent 
a head-on tackling of the issues which have begun to trouble 
arbitration – delay, cost and judicial intervention. 
Some scholars and practitioners have doubted the importance 
often attached to the choice of the seat of arbitration. 268  
Alternatively, it is suggested that such a choice is simply 
determined as a matter of convenience, not by the parties but by 
the arbitration institution they have selected or governed by the 
desire for neutrality and so the role of the arbitral tribunal is 
transitory and the seat has no necessary connection with the 
dispute. Professor Mistelis argues that there is no empirical 
support for this view, however.  
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Using the scoring system described above and the results of 
Professor Mistelis’ survey of online respondents, it is possible to 
build up a picture of the preferred seats of arbitration: 
 
Preferred Venue of Arbitration  
   
 
Other venues of arbitration mentioned by the respondents of 
the survey included Singapore, Italy, Nigeria, Cairo, Hong Kong, 
Australia, Greece, The Netherlands, Mexico, Austria, Belgium, 
Taiwan, Argentina and the United Arab Emirates. 
The final aspect of Professor Mistelis’ research examines the 
reasons for locating the seat of arbitration in any given place. 
These, as cited by the respondents, comprise legal considerations 
(36%), convenience (30%), neutrality (21%) and proximity (6%) 
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amongst others (7%). The conclusion to be drawn is that the 
future of arbitration is promising but corporations in the survey 
did identify a number of factors which need to be addressed, 
including cost, multiparty dispute capability and enforcement. 
The following articulation by Dr Wetter summarises the findings 
above in concise manner and, further, offers an insight on the 
nature as well as the perception of the proceedings: “London is the 
locale of the greatest number of international arbitrations in the world, yet 
the vast majority of these are viewed by counsel and the parties as wholly 
domestic in character in the sense that the proceedings are indistinguishable 
from those which take place between two English parties.”269 
A recent article in The Lawyer highlights that a conference in 
London (October 2008) was to hear that lawyers need to devise 
pioneering ways to ensure that London stays the forum of 
choice when it comes to arbitration.270 The article goes on to 
explain that a panel member argues that London has: “ …a legal 
system that provides valuable certainty and reassurance in these uncertain 
times…London remains and will continue to remain one of the premier 
centres for international arbitration…This is despite the recent Attorney 
General’s recommendation in West Tankers [2007] that may lead to the 
end of English courts’ ability to grant anti-suit injunctions, and the 
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development of regional arbitration centres such as Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Dubai.”271 
However, the speaker was to argue at the conference, the article 
detailed, that there are key issues that need to be overcome. 
Particularly, the cost of arbitrating in London remains a 
significant challenge in an increasingly competitive international 
market. The article then details that the ICC is developing new 
initiatives to improve arbitration processes globally which 
potentially threaten London. More generally, these remarks serve 
to illustrate a growing sentiment reminiscent of the conclusions 
drawn by the Civil Justice Review in 1988 and Lord Woolf’s 
Access to Justice Report of 1996. At that time prior to the 
enactment of the Arbitration Act 1996, “…[t]here was a strong 
feeling that our arbitral system should take account of the needs and wishes 
of the commercial and trading community”.272 
It is worth noting that within the international scene there are 
several emerging arbitral centres presenting a threat to London. 
This is the case, for instance, in respect of Ireland.  
The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform in the 
Republic of Ireland published a new Arbitration Bill on the 9 
June 2008, intended to repeal the three existing statutory sources 
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of arbitration law in Ireland – the Arbitration Act 1954, the 
Arbitration Act 1980 and the Arbitration (International 
Commercial) Act 1998. The effect of a new Act will be to 
consolidate the existing legislation but also, significantly, to 
incorporate the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law into 
Irish arbitration law. At present, the Model Law does operate in 
Ireland but only applies to international commercial arbitration 
as is set out in the Arbitration (International Commercial) Act 
1988. On the adoption of the new Act, the Attorney General of 
Ireland, Mr Paul Gallagher SC, has commented that one of the 
reasons the Bill arose was due to a “desire for finality to be met”. The 
Attorney General clarified that “[a] system of appeals undermine the 
raison d’etre of arbitration”. 273  The Arbitration Bill 2008 was 
expected to become law in Ireland during the latter stages of 
2009 but due to other legislative priorities has been delayed 
indefinitely. In a recent newspaper report, it has been suggested 
that “the Bill will make the Irish framework for [arbitration] identifiable 
to trade partners and compatible with international practice in this area”. 
Furthermore, the author added simply that “reforming the law will 
make it easier for businesses from abroad to trade [in Ireland]”.274 
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It is submitted that this move by Ireland – a jurisdiction which 
has had a similar legislative framework as regards arbitration to 
the UK – is significant. Not only does it represent a clear 
endorsement of the value which an UNCITRAL system offers 
in terms of harmonisation but more specifically, taking into 
consideration the comments of the Attorney General, it also 
signifies a rejection of a model which facilitates limited judicial 
intervention. The development is inevitably designed to attract 
parties to choose Dublin as their seat of arbitration and places 
this city on the arbitration map as a potential future arbitral hub.  
*   *   * 
More than 53 countries have adopted the 1985 UNCITRAL 
Model Law in the last 20 years. Arbitration superpowers which 
have designed their own laws include the Chinese Law of 1994 
(as amended), the French Code of Civil Procedure, the Swiss 
Private International Law Act 1987, the Swedish 1998 
Arbitration Act and the USA’s Federal Arbitration Act. It is 
possible to assert with confidence that arbitral regulation is 
increasing at an unprecedented rate, promoting arbitration in the 
respective jurisdictions in the process. The effect of this recent 
phenomenon is a growing number of jurisdictions with an 
adequate legislative framework from which potential parties to 
an arbitration may choose to locate their arbitral proceedings. 
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The advantage that these relative newcomers to the arbitral 
centre elite have is that they are able to learn from the 
experience in other jurisdictions and tailor their arbitration laws 
to meet the needs of today’s commerce. In so doing, they are 
likely to attract parties who are increasingly footloose as regards 
their seat of arbitration. The consequences of this global 
phenomenon are positive for arbitration as it represents 
increasing competition in the market for arbitration as we move 
from the oligopoly of a few arbitral centres to the monopolistic 
competition model of many arbitral centres with a distinct 
brand. Hong-Lin perceives that. “…arbitration, unlike national court 
systems, is a commercially orientated product that flourishes on the basis of 
market forces. To avoid fading away, the popularity of this product depends 
on whether the demands of customers are satisfied. However, excessive 
interference exercised by state courts can result in the dissatisfaction of the 
customers.”275 
As a result of this shift, it is submitted that, in order to create a 
brand which appeals to parties, it will be necessary to ensure that 
it reflects the contemporary needs of the international 
commercial community. At present, the most pressing need 
appears to be that of reducing the cost of arbitral proceedings 
which, it is argued, will become even more acute in the present 
economic conditions if arbitration is to distinguish itself from 
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litigation. The Model Law presents two distinct advantages in 
this respect. First, it affords states the flexibility to tailor their 
individual legislative frameworks to meet these kinds of specific 
needs while retaining and anchoring the fundamental principles 
of arbitration in their respective jurisdictions. Second, the 
reputation of the Model Law as providing a harmonised system 
of arbitral procedure has an inherent value and states may draw 
upon this in the brand that they ‘sell’ to commercial parties. 
Clearly, Ireland has realised this inherent value.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this thesis has been to examine, evaluate and 
compare the legislative frameworks in which arbitration exists. 
Arbitration grew out of the need to settle disputes in an efficient 
and specialised manner, as an alternative to litigation. It is widely 
perceived to serve this purpose in contemporary dispute 
settlement and retains that pre-eminent status as the dispute 
resolution mechanism of choice in international commerce. This 
is the prism through which the present study has been 
conducted. Likewise, one should be mindful of arbitration’s 
defining characteristics, particularly that of party autonomy. The 
latter is one of the theoretical foundations on which arbitration 
is based and constitutes an attractive feature for many parties. In 
short, arbitration is an effective method of settling commercial 
disputes, often in a tailored way, and its utility in this respect 
should be preserved and enhanced. 
A charting of UK arbitration history reveals a rich and defined 
jurisprudence. Lord Justice Saville once described that “[w]e have 
highly developed rules and principles governing all aspects of arbitration, 
which is one of the reasons why this country has been and still is a world 
centre for arbitration”.276 This, for many years, secured London’s 
reputation as the world’s leading arbitral hub. As other 
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jurisdictions realised how fruitful arbitration business could be, 
however, London could not take this reputation for granted. As 
the adoption of the Model Law became increasingly widespread, 
the deficiencies in English arbitration law were exposed and calls 
for a systemic overhaul grew. “London’s pre-eminence as a world 
arbitration centre began to be challenged. Foreign users were dissatisfied with 
such delays and high costs. They wanted less delay, less cost. They wanted 
their disputes resolved with certainty. The law was ripe for reform”.277 
The 1996 Act contributed many novel features to arbitration in 
England and, broadly speaking, academic commentary at the 
time of its enactment was supportive. Over a decade has passed 
since then and the arbitral landscape – as well as, more generally, 
the nature of commerce - has changed. That need to reform 
prior to the 1996 Act given “[t]here was a strong feeling that our 
arbitral system should take account of the needs and wishes of the 
commercial and trading community” 278  is apparent once more and 
renewed thinking is certainly required. 
A critical analysis of the DAC Report in light of contemporary 
developments in international commercial arbitration has much 
normative value. Its influence on the proceeding development of 
UK arbitration law was profound and it is therefore important 
to consider whether the findings made in it are still relevant 
today. In particular, the importance of harmonisation with the 
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increasing globalisation of trade, was underestimated then and 
should be re-evaluated given the present importance of inward 
foreign investment. Beyond this, it is suggested that the level of 
analysis contained in the Report was far from detailed and often 
cursory in nature. Moreover, the categories used to group 
provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law were inadequate and 
led to a number of pre-determined conclusions being made.  
The objective and comparative analysis of certain key provisions 
of both the Arbitration Act 1996 and UNCITRAL Model Law 
was engaged in with a view to determining which offers the 
optimal legislative framework for arbitration to thrive as a 
method of settling disputes. The various strands of analysis may 
now be drawn together, summarised and concluded upon. 
The examination of both legislative frameworks revealed that 
problems of definition with regard to arbitrability were 
prevalent. The scope of arbitrability remains textually undefined. 
Although an attempt has been made to sculpt the concept 
through the jurisprudence of the UK courts, there still exist 
many uncertainties. It is notable that UNCITRAL are making 
some inroads in the development of a universal definition of 
arbitrability but the effort remains in its infancy. Insofar as the 
Arbitration Act is concerned, this could be regarded as a lost 
opportunity on the part of the UK legislature to better the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in an area which is far more difficult to 
codify on an international plane than at the national level.  
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The concept of separability is now provided for by both 
legislative schemes. The 1996 Act placed the principle, 
developed at common law, on a legislative footing and, in doing 
so, brought UK statutory law into line with the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. The marrying of separability and competence under 
the Model Law results in a broader notion of the former. This is 
undoubtedly beneficial as far as arbitration is concerned. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that these are conceptually distinct 
and should, as many commentators have advocated, 279  be 
treated under discrete provisions. Accordingly, the structure of 
the Arbitration Act offers greater theoretical coherence in this 
respect. 
As to the competence issue is concerned, the enactment of the 
Arbitration Act marked the introduction of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz onto the statute books of the English legal system. 
Also this effort represented an exercise in bringing UK law up to 
the benchmark set by many other jurisdictions around the world, 
including those which had adopted the Model Law. However, 
the provision is non-mandatory under the Act and parties may 
opt out of the provision where the parties agree to do so.  
In addition to any disincentives which harbour in the 1996 Act, 
the recent case law of the ECJ should be noted and may serve to 
further disadvantage London as an arbitral centre. In effect, the 
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decision in West Tankers 280  prevents UK courts from granting 
anti-suit injunctions, traditionally an attractive selling point of 
London, especially for parties to arbitration agreements.  
Judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings may have two 
consequences for arbitration. First, it may serve as a way of 
supporting arbitration. Second, in contrast, it is a way of 
hindering the process and, in some instances, may undermine 
arbitral proceedings. In accordance with the Arbitration Act, a 
court may intervene before the commencement of an arbitration 
by extending time limits and having a discretion in the 
appointment of arbitrators. In the former case, the power of the 
court to extend the possible period in which parties may initiate 
arbitration represents an aspect of the Arbitration Act which is 
more detailed than the Model Law. The Model Law makes no 
provision for such. On the latter power to intervene both 
legislative frameworks provide for this. Textually, the provisions 
under both the Model Law and the UK Arbitration Act are 
similar in scope but it is submitted that the Model Law may 
permit a narrower possibility for intervention to rescue arbitral 
proceedings given the underlying philosophy of this legislative 
framework. This is an example of a situation in which restraining 
the courts may negatively impact arbitral proceedings. 
Rutherford and Sims point out that “[s]ometimes support is necessary, 
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for example if the machinery of appointment breaks down, or where it 
becomes necessary to remove an arbitrator” and further explain that “the 
philosophy of the Act may roughly be stated as: if the parties have chosen 
arbitration, arbitration they will have’. For the good of arbitration the court 
is given powers to assist the process and to exercise the minimum of 
supervision-and that is all”.281 
The power of the courts to stay legal proceedings is a feature of 
both the Arbitration Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
However, under the latter a distinction is made between 
domestic and non-domestic arbitration agreements. In domestic 
agreements, a court may grant a stay unless it is satisfied that 
there are sufficient grounds for not requiring the parties to abide 
by the arbitration agreement. Despite DAC disapproval of the 
“sufficient grounds” refusal mechanism, it remains in the Act. 
Davidson characterises the terminology under this provision as 
deliberately vague and suggests that it is employed to cover the 
many and various instances where the courts have felt able to 
refuse a stay on legal proceedings.282 
The inherent jurisdiction of the courts under the Arbitration Act 
1996 remains one of the most controversial elements of the 
Statute. Lord Steyn noted that the English system “involves greater 
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supervision of the arbitral process than is envisaged by the Model Law”.283 
Which, considering his comments in respect of the Model Law – 
that it be the standard bearer for international arbitration 
legislation – appears to drive a horse and cart through the 
balance that the DAC attempted to strike in terms of judicial 
intervention under his stewardship. Other commentators have 
criticised the level of intervention permitted under the Act, 
arguing that specific aspects of the Act were unsatisfactory. Lord 
Hacking, for example, criticised the provision for review of 
awards in the Act, pointing out that “[u]nlike the UNCITRAL 
Model law, where there is no judicial review of arbitral awards, the parties 
under the 1996 Act must expressly agree to exclude judicial review. If not, 
the English Courts are entitled to judicially review arbitral awards”. 284  
Crucially, inherent jurisdiction represents a licence for courts to 
intervene in arbitral proceedings outside of the express terms of 
the Arbitration Act. Having said this, the approach of the courts 
in their exercise of this power has been, to date, commendable 
in that they have not abused it to the detriment of arbitral 
proceedings. Thus, the attitude of suspicion that once bedevilled 
arbitral proceedings appears to have abated in as much as their 
conduct is now concerned.  
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Court intervention after the arbitral proceedings may come in 
the form of challenge, enforcement or appeal of the award. This 
may be viewed as courts being able to undermine arbitral 
procedure and devalue the currency of an award. An appeal on a 
point of law under the Act is potentially very broad in scope. It 
is submitted, however, that an error of law should always be 
permitted. Arbitration must operate within the framework of the 
law and judges are eminently qualified to police the boundaries 
of arbitral law. UNCITRAL contains no general right of appeal 
on the question of a substantive error of law and therefore 
embodies a risk of injustice. Admittedly, the construction of 
such a provision is a delicate balance and it is necessary to take 
into account that, as Rokinson explains, “[i]t is probably true to say 
that the majority of those who include arbitration clauses in their contracts, 
and certainly those few who refer a specific dispute to ad hoc arbitration, do 
so because they do not wish their disputes and their commercial relationship 
to be referred to a national court, whether out of a desire for privacy or a fear 
for a suspicion of bias.”285 
Wherever intervention occurs, the benefits of efficiency, 
economy and specialist dispute resolution are rendered, to a 
greater or lesser extent, redundant. Bearing in mind the level of 
court intervention which is permitted by the Act - despite a 
guiding philosophy to the contrary - perhaps it is useful to recall 
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the fundamental issue that is at stake. Hacking utilised the 
following quote from the Chancellor in the famous Star 
Chamber of 1475286 to warn of the potential dangers of the level 
of judicial supervision under the 1996 Act: “This dispute is brought 
by an alien merchant…who has come to conduct his case here, and he ought 
not to be held to await trial by twelve men and other solemnities of the law of 
the land but ought to be able to sue here from hour to hour and day to day 
for the speed of merchants”. 
Although the objective and comparative analysis demonstrates 
the hypothesis abstractly, it should not be deductively concluded 
that this is the case in practice. Alternatively, the empirical 
inquiry provides illumination. In particular, it was found that 
importance is attached to reputation both in terms of the rule-
system chosen to govern dispute settlement and, also, within the 
framework of institutional arbitration. As the UNCITRAL 
Model Law continues to be adopted the world over, this induces 
an inherent value by virtue of the perpetual harmonisation that 
transpires. Undoubtedly, this informs its reputation.  
In Ireland, it is thought that adoption of a world-renowned 
legislative scheme will define that jurisdiction as arbitration-
friendly and, more generally, improve trade. Similarly, brief 
reference should be made to Scotland – another jurisdiction 
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having much in common with England – which has recently 
enacted its own arbitral legislation.287 Hew Dundas explains the 
Scottish approach: “[t]he solution of the Bill is twofold: first,…the Bill 
includes all the provisions of the Model Law; second, the Bill gives the 
parties the option to apply the Model Law but not as a total alternative to 
the Bill, instead subject to the overriding safeguards in the Bill (many not 
given by, therefore adding to, the Model Law) which apply on a mandatory 
basis”.288  In this way the Act embraces the Model Law while 
preserving valuable aspects of existing Scots law. While one 
swallow does not make a summer, the developments in 
Scotland, Ireland and elsewhere, as well as the efforts being 
made by arbitral institutions to attract parties, are evidence of a 
stronger international movement towards harmonisation and 
concerted resolve to answer the calls of the merchant. 
Research suggests that the most common perceived 
disadvantage of arbitration is cost. This may be lower under 
UNCITRAL where there is likely to be less judicial intervention. 
As the traditional view of the UNCITRAL approach is 
“…focusing in legislative texts on fundamental rules of principle, providing 
an enabling statutory framework, and leaving the detail of ever-changing 
practices to sets of rules at the contractual level…”,289 it provides a very 
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flexible and attractive option for states. With the principled 
skeletal framework that the UNCITRAL Model Law provides, 
jurisdictions may adopt it and tailor its provisions to suit the 
needs of the parties they are seeking to attract.  
As arbitral centres become ubiquitous, the importance of 
meeting ‘consumer’ requirements and developing a brand in this 
market will become more acute. As a result, it is no longer 
sufficient for this arc of dispute settlement to simply bend 
towards party autonomy, procedural fairness and judicial 
restraint; all-round efficiency must also be part of the mix. 
Indeed, as one commentator has put it “alone the 1996 Act will 
certainly not ensure that arbitration in London will 
continue to flourish”.290 
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